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he English language 
~  brings out the 
best in the Irish. 
They court it like 
a beautiful woman. 
They make it bray with donkey 
laughter.  They hurl it at the 
sky like a paintpot full of  rain-
bows, and then make it chant 
a dirge for manS fate and 
manS follies that is as mourn-
ful as misty spring rain crying 
over the fallow earth. Rarely 
has a people paid the lavish 
compliment and taken the 
subtle revenge of  turning its 
oppressorS speech into 
"  sorcery.  TIME 
Senior Writer T.E. Kalem 
in a review of  Borstal Boy. 
In appreciation of  the Irish from those who share their love of  language. 
TIME, The Weekly Newsmagazine .  ~--... 
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Garret FitzGerald,  the Prime Minister, 
assesses his country's  place and policies in the world 
AMERICANS  WHO  DO  NOT  FOLLOW  IRISH  ISSUES  MORE 
closely  than by  reading their  local  newspapers  might 
perhaps be forgiven for thinking that we are a politically 
introspective people, either impervious or indifferent to 
forces·  or events beyond the horizons of an old, intract-
able, and murderous quarrel that drags on in Northern 
Ireland. Those who know ils a little better have learned 
that we are not as  they might have expected.  History 
and temperament have in fact given us  a peculiarly in-
ternationalist sense, both of our own problems as  well 
as of our limited but rather complex place in the world. 
As  one who has never concealed his profound interna-
tionalist convictions, I find  this enthusiasm for the ex-
ternal world a considerable encouragement to me  at a 
difficult tirp.e in our country's affairs. 
For centuries the Irish have looked outside for inspi-
ration, relief or an avenue of escape from misery at home. 
The struggle for political independence looked to Spain 
in the 17th Century, France and Italy in the 18th and 
early  19th, and of course overwhelmingly to America 
from the great famine of 1846-48 onward. Emigration, 
itself l~rgely the historical source of our internationalism 
tod~y, continued during these centuries, swelling into a 
diaspora that reached almost every country on earth and 
in such numbers that there are today more people con-
scious of recent Irish extraction abroad, relative to the 
number of Irish people at home, than any other country 
can comparabty claim. 
Our involvement with the external world was, there-
fore,  from the beginning grounded more in the human 
links of kinship, friendship,  and material need than in 
any colder diplomatic calculation. This human emphasis 
has endured and strongly colors our policy in today's 
more complex world. Thus, our people continue to see 
our official  friendship  with the United States  as  an 
expression of their own tnore intimate personal links 
with Americans. Our involvement in the European Com-
munity is  partly felt as  an echo or a renewal of earlier 
solidarity, itself founded on still earlier waves of emi-
gration to the European continent. Thus, too, Irish for-
eign policy reflects a human compassion which our his-
tory inevitably inspires for other peoples who are trying 
to overcome the difficult political and economic burdens 
of a colonized past. 
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Although one of the oldest peoples in Europe, we are 
a young state. Memories of deprivation and conflict are 
recent, and these memories, reinforced by the tragic drama 
which continues in Northern Ireland, have given  us  a 
keen sense of the precious value and also the fragility of 
order and stability in public affairs, not alone in Ireland 
but in the larger world. 
As  a small open economy, we  have a vital stake in 
international economic and political  stability.  We  see 
our relationships with the United States and Europe as 
central to this objective. New economic links have been 
and continue to be forged with America. In 1980 over 
50 per cent of foreign investment in Ireland was of US 
origin. Ireland has come  to be  seen  by  American cor-
porations  as  one of the  most attractive locations  for 
investment, with unrestricted access to the Common 
Market of the European Community. 
Our relationship with Western Europe has also been 
transformed. We joined the Community in 1973 and we 
have since participated in the effort to promote economic 
integration and closer political union with an enthusiasm 
which reflects the great desire of our people to act in a 
large and less claustrophobic environment than the.  dif-
ficult and sometimes bitter Anglo-Irish relationship which 
had previously dominated our international horizons. 
Europe 
At this time of uncertainty in international relations and 
of world economic  difficulty,  it is  not surprising that 
there should be efforts to restate or even reinterpret the 
basic political European ideCll. Economic integration has 
faltered within the Community. In the eyes of the world, 
the efforts of the Community have in recent years been 
marked more by squabbling than by progress and some 
of the  member states  have  seemed  to be  preoccupied 
with narrow national interests. Public confidence in the 
future of the Community has suffered within Europe-
even in Ireland. Externally, the Community's potential 
has been recognized although Europe's friends, includi~g 
the United States, have shown impatience with the in-
evitable complexity of the Community's decision-mClk-
ing procedures and have at times  chosen to disregClrd 
the  European institutions either  by  proceeding unilat-
erally and without any consultation or by consulting only 
some of the larger member states on matt~rs which are within the Community's competence. 
No one is  more aware of the tiresome irritations of 
the Community system than a small member state such 
as Ireland which lacks the relatively greater administra-
tive resources of larger partners. Equally, few can be as 
painfully conscious of the damage do~e t? the  inte~ests 
of the Community either by internal disunity or a failure 
on the part of our friends in the world, particularly the 
United States, to deal with the Community through the 
institutional systems which have been created patiently 
and with enormous labor and outside of which the smaller 
member states interests have no protection. 
European Foreign Policy 
The Community's capacity to influence external events 
depends directly on the degree of internal cohesion which 
we have achieved. It is  only through greater economic 
integration in the Community, by  building on existing 
policies and developing new areas of Community activ-
ity, that a broader common interest can be created. 
These factors are already being acknowledged in the 
current debate in Europe on the future of European union 
and in the efforts that are now being made to develop 
the procedures and the scope of European Political Co-
operation (the inter-Governmental process through which 
the 10 member states of the Community seek to coor-
dinate their foreign policies). The Irish Government, in 
particular, is convinced that any real prospect of finding 
a  common will  among the Ten to act together in  the 
face  of world problems-for example, East-West rela-
tions-is set back by a failure to make progress on in-
ternal Community problems such as the seemingly end-
less and sometimes very bitter squabble about the 
Community budget. 
That is to say, we do not believe that the Ten should 
embark on an intensification of European Political Co-
operation merely as an alternative to, or a more congenial 
distraction from, the Community's existing internal ten-
sions. We see European Political Cooperation as an ex-
ternalization of the Community's internal strength, i.e. 
its internal unity of purpose. The Community's "foreign 
policy" and its "internal policy" are, in short, mutually 
dependent and mutually reinforcing. 
US-European Relations 
The United States has consistently supported the EC ideal 
of closer integration as  a policy objective. Some Amer-
ican leaders, however, have found that this policy when 
put into practice, e.g. in trade negotiations, runs counter 
to their perception of the interests of the United States. 
As  a  short-term view this  is  understandable but it in-
volves, in my judgement, a profound misconception of 
the long-term interests of the West. It is  also a failure 
to face reality. The reality of the 1980s is that economic 
and political circumstances in the United States and Eu-
rope  differ  with  the  result  that their perceptions  and 
approaches sometimes  diverge~ The proble.m.s  and ten-
sions that result should be seen to be subsidiary to the 
larger interest which is  a harmony (though ?ot neces-
sarily an identity) of purpose between the United States 
and Europe. The ideological credibility of the West, after 
all  rests largely on its manifest pluralism. In more prac-
tic~l political  and economic  terms,  Americans  should 
recognize  that the value  to them of their relationship 
with Europe today will  be determined directly by  Eu-
rope's ability to develop separate stature in world terms. 
The Irish Emphasis 
Ireland's  position  in  the  Community is  marked  by  a 
number of peculiar features which in themselves serve 
to underline the distinctiveness of the European exper-
iment. On the one hand, although deeply committed to 
Western democratic values, we are not members of any 
military alliance. In fact, we are the only member state 
of the Community not to belong to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization  (NATO).  Our non-membership of 
the alliance has not given rise to any serious difficulty 
and,  indeed,  has  created a  useful  working distinction 
between the foreign policy roles of the Ten and NATO 
which has proved congenial to both groups. 
It is  also  the  case  that, while we  greatly value our 
traditional friendship with the United States, and while 
our economic development is  based to a  considerable 
extent on the development of that relationship, our his-
torical experience with a large neighboring state places 
us  firmly  among those in the Community who believe 
that the  best prospect for  the  future  of US-European 
relations depends on respect by each side  for  the pre-
rogatives of independence and "sovereignty" of the other. 
Ou.r historical experience also gives us a strong sympathy 
with developing nations or peoples struggling for their 
freedom and this has characterized our policy in a com-
munity of states of which we are the only member to 
have experienced colonial occupation ih modern times. 
We, therefore, bring a particular emphasis to issues under 
discussion in European Political  Cooperation. For ex-
ample, while the East-West relationship continues to be 
the primary focus  of efforts to maintain international 
peace, we believe that there are other conflicts of a re-
gional nature which cannot be  seen  solely  against the 
background of a bipolar East-West relationship but have 
their own intrinsic features which must be faced squarely. 
Thus, we have supported the efforts of the Ten to en-
courage progress toward a comprehensive peace settle-
ment in the Middle East. 
Both the United States and Europe acting together can 
do much to assist Israel, the Palestinian people, and the 
Arab countries to work toward a settlement of a conflict 
that diverts  too many  resources  and prevents  normal 
development in that part of the world. We have made 
our own specific contribution to the search for peace by 
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Nations peacekeeping operations in the area, most re-
cently in southern Lebanon. 
In Southern Africa, Ireland among the Ten and at the 
United Nations has urged rapid and peaceful change. 
The example of Zimbabwe is an encouragement of those 
who wish to avoid damaging conflict i~ a sensitive part 
of  Afric~. We  hold that the time  is  ripe  fqr  vigorous 
efforts to encourage South Africa to reach an early ne-
gotiated settlement in Namibia and to make the neces-
sary changes internally in South Africa itself. The longer 
term interests of Europe and America are best served by 
action to remove the causes  of conflict and to lay the 
basis for friendly and stable relations among all of the 
states in the region and between them and·  the rest of 
the world. 
The greatest problem we  face  is,  of course,  on our 
own island. It is not possible in this brief review of our 
position in the larger world to give a full picture of the 
historical, social,  econ.omic,  or political complexity of 
this tragedy. Such a review would, however, be incom-
plete  witpout reference  to  Northern Ireland,  not just 
because it is  our greatest single problem, but because I 
believe that the United States and Europe can play con-
structive roles in helping to solve it. 
At the heart of the problem in Northern Ireland are 
the conflicting aspirations of the two communities, the 
Protestant unionist majority and the Catholic nationalist 
minority. There is  a deep desire on the part of the ma-
jority of Irish men and women that a solution should ~e 
found for the problems that have divided the people of 
our island, a solution which is agreed by the British and 
Irish Governments ap.d a majoritY of the people of North-
ern Ireland. 
For some seven years now ther~ has been a political 
vacuum ip. Northern Ireland which the men of violence 
have attempted to fill.  A tiny minority of terrorists on 
the nationalist side have, over the past 10 years, maip.-
tained a campaign of violence which has deepened the 
divisions in the community and frustrated the efforts of 
the  British  and Irish  Governments  to  find  an  agreed 
solution. The activities of the nationalist terrorists, no-
tably  those of the Provisional  Irish  Republican  Army 
(IRA), have intermittently provoked violent reactioqs on 
the majority side of the community which have, if any-
thing, surpassed in ferocity and cruelty the violence pf 
the IRA.  The security forces,  for their part, particularly 
in the early 1970s, were guilty of serious and extensive 
ill-treatment of citizens as  confirmed by  the European 
Commissi9n for Human Rigpts, one tragic result of which 
was the alienation of hundreds of young men who be-
came involved in violent crime. 
The impasse has been greatly exacerbated by the cur-
rent hunger strike by prisoners who are members of the 
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Provisional  IRA  or the allied Irish National Liberation 
Army ( INLA)  in which 10  men have already died. 
Emotions have  been raised to  a  dangerous point in 
Northern Ireland and public feeling in the Republic has 
also been unsettled to an extent. 
Tpe continuation of the hunger strike has postponed 
the prospect of early success of the current talks between 
the British and Irish Governments and has also seriously 
undermined the position of moderate political leaders in 
Northern Ireland. As is well-known, it has benefited the 
propaganda machine of the Provisional IRA, particularly 
in the United States.  For these  reasons the Irish  Gov-
ernment has  urged  the  British  Government to  find  a 
solution to the hunger strike which would not involve 
the sacrifice of any fundamental principle. We have rea-
son to believe that such a solution is possible. Up to this 
time of writing we have been disappointed at the British 
response to our represeptations which we feel has failed 
to reflect the seriousness with which we view the dan-
gerous opportunities which this situation creates for sub-
version and which could, if prolonged, create a danger 
to the security of l,oth islands. 
With the passage 9f time the solution to the funda-
mental political problem of Northern Ireland b,ecomes 
not alone more diffkuh but more urgent. It is essential 
that both Governments should give  to its solution the 
highest priority. They must both confront in their full 
dimensions the age-old differences between those who 
favor and those who oppose a specifically Irish solution 
to the crisis.  The  mem~ership of all  of Ireland in  the 
European Community provides the Community with an 
opportunity to exemplify in a dramatic way its funda-
mental commitment to preventing conflict between the 
peoples of the  Community. Arperican leaders are also 
presented with an opportunity to encourage and assist 
progress towards a peaceful solution which sorpe of them 
have grasped. We have already welcomed the establish-
ment this year of the "Friends of Ireland," a bipartisan 
group of leading US politicians, whp are helping to pro-
mote a greater understanding of the positive role America 
can play in resolving this tragic conflict. 
After the last World War, the possibility of renewed 
conflict between t}le  peoples of Europe was prevented 
by a massive infusion of American generosity and good-
will. That danger was kept at bay thereafter through the 
construction of European institutions in the European 
Community which enshrined and irpplemented the ideal 
of peace. Despite these great constructive efforts a con-
flict  between Europeans continues tqday in the north-
east of Ireland. It will require the energy anq goodwill 
of Americans  and Europeans  alike to ensure that any 
solution devised by the Irish  an~ British Governments 
and the  leaders  of the  people  of Northern Ireland  is 
implemented and endures.E Maximum 10° 10 tax 
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..WHOEVER WINS THE ELECTION SHOULD HAVE FIRST
choice on going into opposition." That was the sardonic
view of lreland's new Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Garret
FitzGerald in the course of the June election campaign
as he warily contemplated  the economic and political
problems awaiting the new Government,  notably the
crisis in the country's public finances and the need to
secure a settlement in the H-Block hunger strikes in
Northern lreland.
But that election provided a result, but no clear winner.
The voters denied victory to all the parties and left six
independents to play political king makers in the for-
mation of the new Government. So, for three weeks
before the Dail (parliament) resumed to elect a Taoiseach
and Government,  they kept everyone guessing as they
agonized publicly over their new power and responsi-
bility.
The choice was whether to support the incumbent
Fianna Fail Government led by Charles Haughey,  which
had iust suffered  a huge reverse at the polls, or a center
left, Fine Gael/Labor coalition headed by FitzGerald.
I7ith 80 seats, the coalition  had a two seat majority over
Fianna Fail, the largest single parry,but the independents
still held the balance of power. But national  suspense
and speculation finally ended with the Dail votes on June
30. Then, the independents  by and large abstained, so
providing the new coalition with a three-vote maiority
and qualified endorsement.
For the new Taoiseach,  a 55-year-old  economist and
former minister for foreign affairs in an earlier coalition
Government  (7973-77), the election result was a per-
sonal triumph. Four years earlier when he took over as
Fine Gael leader, he took over a party demoralized by
a massive general election defeat which saw its voting
strength drop to its lowest level in 20 years.
But since 1,977 he has transformed  the party from a
role of semipermanent  opposition  to that of major chal-
lenger to Fianna Fail as the natural party of Government.
And in the June elections a revitalized  Fine Gael came
close to realizing that aim. In the 60-year history of the
state, Fine Gael (Family of the Gaels) had never taken
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more seats (65) or won a higher share of the popular
vote (37 per cent) than it managed this time.
The maior factor in that success was FitzGerald him-
self. As p^rty leader he consistently  enioyed a higher
rating in the polls than Haughey, but the question re-
mained whether the huge personal support he enjoyed
could be converted into party votes at election time. In
opposition, he drafted a new pafy constitution and set
about a complete reorganization of its structures. He
broadened  its political base, once heavily reliant on middle
class and large farmer support, to appeal to the young
and capture greater working class support. In the cam-
paign Fine Gael's election program complemented all
those efforts with the party adopting tax switching pol-
icies similar to those favored by the Conservatives in the
t979 British general election-a reduction in the stan-
dard rate of income tax financed by higher indirect taxes
on nonessendal  items.
If Fianna Fail was the main victim of Fine Gael's elec-
Old Ireland conuerges  with the netp. This peat-burning  electricity gmerating pLTHE TIGHTROPE 
~nfronting the  new  Government,  with its  fragile  majority. 
toral success,  so  too was the Labor party-its current 
coalition partner. As  the refashioned Fine Gael shed its 
conservative image and policies and adopted an increas-
ingly social democratic stance, it did so  at Labor's ex-
pense. In the postelection talks on the terms for coalition, 
a depleted Labor party (15  seats)  had little bargaining 
power.  But  the  joint program  preserved  the  essential 
positions of both parties, with Fine Gael adopting com-
prehensive Labor proposals for a major youth employ-
ment program. 
The new Government-which includes four Labor 
ministers among the cabinet of 15-reflects the new 
dominance FitzGerald now enjoys over his  party since 
the election.  By  Irish political standards his  choice for 
the key Government posts, while revealing a remarkable 
self confidence, also showed a disregard for the conven-
tional political wisdom in cabinet making. Those chosen 
were by and large young and with relatively little political 
expenence. 
For his foreign  affairs minister he  took the virtually 
unprecedented  step  of appointing  a  nonelected  back-
room party worker, James Dooge, a professor. Only once 
before has the constitutional provision allowing a Tao-
iseach to bring an outsider directly into Government, via 
a  Senate  nomination,  been  invoked.  Dooge,  a  former 
Senator himself,  is  a professor of civil engineering and 
a close associate of the Taoiseach's. And in his portfolio 
he is expected to perform with something like the same 
distinction as FitzGerald himself, when he occupied that 
role in the earlier coalition Administration. 
His minister of finance, John Bruton, is  not just the 
youngest member of this Cabinet, but at 34, the youngest 
finance minister in the history of the state. Agriculture 
Minister Alan Dukes, also in his mid-thirties, is  one of 
those few deputies who have managed to win a place in 
Government on their first day in the Dail. 
More than anything else the choices which provoked 
some controversy, not least within Fine Gael itself, re-fleeted FitzGerald's desire to stamp his authority on the 
party and the Government as it faced directly into tack-
ling the country's problems. And, in particular, it faced 
two issues which threaten its survival in power. 
The first is  the H-Block hunger strikes by  Irish  Re-
publican Army (IRA) members in the Maze prison outside 
Belfast. Two of them were elected absentee members of 
the  Dail  last June:  one,  Kieran  Doherty,  became  the 
eighth hunger striker to die and the other has promised 
to resign his  seat. The government could well lose the 
subsequent by-elections to Fianna Fail and thus its slim 
parliamentary majority. Another general election might 
then be  unavoidable;  at the very least, the handful of 
independents would assume an even more crucial role 
if the Government is  to be sustained in office. 
But, party political considerations aside, there remains 
a  broader national concern that a continuation of the 
hunger strike could seriously destabilize public opinion 
in the Republic. This fear has been put by Irish ministers 
to their British counterparts in urging a flexible response 
and a  conciliatory stance in  handling the situation. 
FitzGerald has raised the matter with British  Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, but with little success.  A 
Government request to President Ronald Reagan to press 
the British Prime Minister on the matter has met with 
no visible response. 
Like the British Government, FitzGerald does not be-
lieve the IRA  hunger strike claim to political status can 
Garret FitzGerald (center)  leaves the Dial, the lower house of Parliament, 
after he was elected Prime Minister of the coalition Government. <t>Wide World 
Photos 
be  met.  But,  he  feels,  a  more flexible  response to  the 
demands of the strikers could see  a settlement without 
loss  of principle on either side.  As  yet no formula has 
been found and attempts at a solution have defied the 
best efforts of a whole range of mediators-including 
The new Cabinet (front L-R}: James Tully (Defense);  Garret FitzGerald (Taoiseach);  Patrick Hillery (President);  Michael O'Leary (Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Energy); Peter Barry (Environment); Eileen  Desmond (Health and Social Welfare); Peter Sutherland (Attorney-General); (back 
L-R) John Bruton (Finance);  Tom Fitzpatrick (Fisheries and Forestry);  Liam Kavanagh (Labor);  Alan Dukes (Agriculture); Jim Mitchell (Justice);  Patrick 
Cooney (Transport and Posts and Telegraphs); John Kelly (Industry,  Commerce, and Tourism); john Boland (Education); Patrick O'Toole (Minister for 
the Gaeltacht); James Dooge (Foreign  Affairs). ©  Irish Times 
8  EUROPE September-October 1981 the European Commission on Human Rights, the Pope's 
special envoy, the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace 
and, more recently, the International Red Cross. 
But pressing for  a settlement remains a top priority 
with the Irish Government, for the continued failure to 
resolve the crisis has polarized the communities in the 
north and is  now adversely affecting Anglo-Irish  rela-
tions. Without some settlement, no discussion or prog-
ress  can be  made on providing a solution to Northern 
Ireland's larger political problems and the Irish and Brit-
ish Governments would find difficulty in advancing dis-
cussions on the joint studies agreed last December as  a 
means  of improving relations  between  the  two  coun-
tries.These joint studies were the product of the Anglo-
Irish summit talks between then Prime Minister Charles 
Haughey and Thatcher, with both agreeing to meet again 
in London six months later to review progress and take 
decisions  in  the  light  of the  "totality of relationships 
within  these  islands."  But  from  the  outset there  was 
political controversy as the British Government insisted 
they were concerned with a study of institutional and 
not constitutional relationships, while the Irish Govern-
ment-with an election on the horizon-was slow, pub-
licly, to accept such a restrictive view of their potential. 
FitzGerald pledged himself to full  publication of the 
content of the studies (covering areas such as economic 
cooperation, citizenship rights, and security matters) to 
defuse the growing suspicion in the north and false op-
timism in the south, that they were advancing Irish unity 
by stealth. But the H-Block crisis has come between the 
two Governments and the  meeting scheduled for July 
was  deferred until  the  autumn when, it is  hoped, the 
hunger strike will have ended and the irritant in Anglo-
Irish  relations  will  have  been  removed.  On Northern 
Ireland, the differences between Haughey and FitzGerald 
may be more tactical than strategic while Haughey saw 
the Northern Ireland problem as a matter for resolution 
in the first instance by the two sovereign Governments, 
FitzGerald sees the need, in addition, to take the north's 
politicians into the confidence of both Governments if 
an agreement acceptable to the two communities in the 
north is  to be secured. 
If Northern Ireland remains a major concern to the 
new coalition in Dublin, it is one over which it can only 
strive to exert influence rather than exercise control. On 
the other hand, the deteriorating state of the Irish econ-
omy confronts the Government with its most formidable 
challenge. On taking over, it inherited a major crisis in 
the country's public finances with Government spending 
and borrowing running out of control and rising inflation 
making Irish exports less and less competitive on world 
markets. 
A Government review  of the economic state of the 
nation pointed up  an alarming trend in  the public fi-
Population ...........................  3.43 million 
Area .............................  27,137 sq. miles 
Gross Domestic Product 
(1980, at current prices and exchange rates) ... $17.4 billion 
Inflation Rate 
(1980, CPI) ...............................  18.2% 
Unemployment rate 1980 ......................  8.3% 
first quarter 1981 ..........................  10.0% 
Trade 1980 
Exports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $8.48  billion 
Imports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $11.12 billion 
Source: Eurostat 
nances.  By  the end of last June, the  budget deficit  on 
current account had already reached 90 percent of its 
full  year target as  Government spending overshot pro-
jected limits. The current deficit on the balance of pay-
ments was heading toward IR £1.97 billion ($2.96 bil-
lion) or 20 per cent of gross national product. 
At the same time Irish industry is finding it increasingly 
difficult to stay competitive on world markets as  a 20 
percent inflation rate pushes up wage costs and eats into 
profit margins. In 1981, income increases are estimated 
at about 17 percent while, by contrast, wage levels among 
the European Monetary System's narrow band members, 
are expected to be about half that level. 
Against this background of financial crisis and to deal 
with what FitzGerald described as the "desperate prob-
lems" bequeathed by the outgoing Government, the new 
Taoiseach introduced an emergency budget on July 21 
and put his Government's survival on the line after just 
three weeks in office. 
Despite being regarded as the toughest in 20 years-
with indirect tax rises pushing up inflation by as much 
as  4  percent-the calculated gamble paid off.  The in-
dependents  balked at bringing down the Government 
and precipitating another general election. 
So  the style set by Garret FitzGerald's first weeks in 
office was that of a leader prepared to  govern coura-
geously and live dangerously. He has acted as he hopes 
to continue for the next five years. But that depends on 
his slim parliamentary majority. E 
Joseph  O'Malley is  political correspondent for  the Sunday 
Independent 
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GARRET FITZGERALD,  THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER OF JUST
two months has, in his time, been a business executive,
an author, a journalist, and of course, a politician.  He
is probably best known, however, as an economics lec-
turer. Not surprisingly, when he held his inaugural press
conference, one of the points he made was that the "public
finances were worse than he had expected." Two weeks
later he went on television  and gravely intoned that there
was going to be a tough deflationary budget. "As a
country we are living beyond our meansr" he said.
Eighteen months earlier, then Prime Minister Charles
Haughey, who is by profession an accountant  and by
inclination a successful,  millionaire property speculator,
went on television and said: "It is clear that as a nation
we are living way beyond our means."  So nvo Prime
Ministers-past, present, and most probably future, with
economics  or business background-along  with virtually
every Irish economist of note feel that Ireland's public
borrowing and in turn-because  lreland has a very open
economy-its  balance-of-payments  deficit on current
account have become untenable.
Three general questions  then easily pose themselves.
First, why and how has lreland's borrowing  been allowed
to rise to a level where it is widely considered to be out
of control? Second, what should be done about the bor-
rowing and why? Third, and this is the really tricky one,
is it necessarily wrong for a small, developing country
on the poorer fringes of \Testern Europe, to get into debt
in order to develop? If it is not wrong what is the per-
missible level of indebtedness?
The answer to the first question is relatively simple
but the ramifications of the answer are wide. Haughey
succeeded the immensely popular Jack Lynch as Prime
Minister after something of a putsch by the republican
wing of the Fianna Fail parry. They thought Haughey
was more republican than Lynch. But Lynch's legacy
was more an economic problem than a republican one.
He got himself reelected in 1977 on the promise of. a
jolly spending  spree.
Once elected, even though the economy was coming
out of a recession,  he proceeded  to meet the election
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promises. He abolished domestic rates, cut taxes, and
increased public spending. Unemployment  fell, but, in
short, he overstoked the economy. The result was that
by the time he was succeeded by Haughey, the public-
sector borrowing requirement-that  is to say the Gov-
ernment's yearly overdraft as opposed to its long-term
debt-was equivalent to 13 per cent of gross national
product (cNP).  .
Haughey promised to do something about this and
the budget of January 1980 was designed to get the
borrowing requirement down to 17 per cent. By the
summer of that year however all targets had been aban-
doned simply because, Haughey needed to get reelected.
Moreover, the country by this time had entered recession.
To deflate the economy in the way necessary to reduce
the borrowing requirement would have meant hardship
and would have cost votes. Haughey gambled that by
carrying on spending  and going to the country early he
could conceal the state of the country's indebtedness. In
Total foreign inuestment in lreland  r's $3.6 billion at current  prices,
creating a net 700,000 new iobs. Here an lrish worker at a Nippon
Electric Cotnpany  assembly  plant for integrated circuits.  oconon  coulson,
Voodfin  Camplreland receiued a tremendous economic boost from ioining  the Comtnon
Market in 1973. oCotton Coulson,  Voodfin  Camp
the event the gamble only iust failed. Haughey lost the
general election by iust two seats.
The message in Haughey's behavior is that lreland,
rather like the United States, has got itself into a srare
of almost permanent  election or at least permanent  elec-
tion fever. Elections come along every four years these
days, although constitutionally the term is five years. For
at least two of the four years, Governments have their
eye on the next poll. Decisions  about the economy, are
taken, or rather are not taken, because of political and
electoral considerations.
A critical economic consequence of electioneering  was
that, before FitzGerald unveiled some austerity  measures
late inJuly, the public-sector borrowing  requirement  had
risen to IRf,1.97 billion (currently  about $2.93 billion).
This is the equivalent of about 20 per cent of the Irish
cNp, a staggering proportion if one considers, for com-
parative purposes, that Thatcher is puning Britian through
economic agonies in her attempts to control public-sector
borrowing requirements amounting to less than 5 per
cent of cNp.
The Irish economy is also particulary vulnerable  to
external circumstances. It imports over $11 billion worth
of goods. It has no oil and over 70 per cent of its energy
needs are in the form of oil, rendered  ever more expensive
by the Organization  of Petroleum Exporting Countries
and, more recently, by the appreciation of the US dollar.
Apart from oil, Ireland has a high propensity to import,
not only capital goods for its industrialization, buialso
consumer goods. Combine these needs and the demands
of public-sector borrowing and the balance-of-payments
deficit on current account widens alarmingly.  This year
it may amount to nearly $2 billion, a record.
Because of the energy problem and the openness of
the econohy, Ireland tends to import inflation. Oil and
the price of other imported goods help explain why in-
flation is heading to hit 20 per cent. Additionally, public
spending, which in large part is financed by borrowing,
has helped push up inflation. There have been some
generous public-sector wage agreements,  important in a
country like lreland which has nearly a third of its work
force in the public sector.
But Ireland has more than ideological reasons for trying
to reduce its borrowings. Here one begins to answer the
second question, posed earlier, of why should something
be done about debts. Until April l979,Ireland  was linked
at parity to sterling. For all intents and purposes, Ireland
was part of sterling as much as, sayr'Wales or Liverpool.
This meant its borrowings were not too serious since
they were subsumed by a much larger currency.
The number  of people employed in agriculture has dropped to less than 20
per cent ofthe uork force, cotnpared to 50 per cent 20 years ago. oconon
Coulson,  Voodfin  Camp.
In April 1979,Ireland joined the European Monetary
System (EMs), breaking the link with sterling. For the first
time in 150 years Ireland had an independent  currency.
It meant being part of a fixed exchange-rate system,
which in turn demanded greater financial discipline. For
example, three years ago the balance-of-payments  deficit
on current account was $272 million. This was easily
covered by invisible earnings notably tourism and by
capital inflows. There is no way a deficit of nearly $2
billion will be covered by inflows other than foreign
borrowings.
Reserves are not bulky enough to bridge the payments
gap. If the Irish pound was not to come under great
pressure for a devaluation  within the EMS or a realign-
ment, deflation was inevitable. ITith its open economy
devaluation would be disastrous,  the value of exports in
its main markets, Britain and 'Sfest Germany,  would
EURorr  September-October  l98l llshrink, and the cost of the capital goods which it cannot
avoid importing would rise.
Accordingly,  since one of the FitzGerald  Government's
first pacts was to bring in a tough budget through in-
creases in indirect taxation and some trimming of the
capital budget, the public-sector borrowing requirement
is expected to fall back this year to $2.38 billion or 15.5
per cent of cNp. Finance Minister John Bruton has talked
about bringing public borrowing  under control within
four years.
But what in the Irish context is a reasonable level of
borrowing? Is it not sensible, not to say inevitable, for
a poor country to borrow in order to create employment
and increase living standards?  Ireland has always had
an unemployment problem. In the 1840s its population
was 8 million people. Came the famines and 1 million
died, and a further 1 million emigrated, mostly to the
United States. The country has been hemorrhaging  its
people ever since. In the 1950s people were leaving at a
rate of 70,000 ayear) and the population  of the Republic
dropped to 2.2 million.
This machine cuts peat to be dried into briquettes for fuel.
@ Cotton Coulson,  Woodfin  Camp
Armed with a package of incentives and a tax holiday
the Governments  of the 1950s and 1970s set out to
attract foreign investment. To date some 300 foreign
companies, half of them US concerns, have invested in
Ireland. Total investment  is $3.6 billion at current prices.
More important there has been a net creation of 1001000
new jobs. The numbers now on the land have dropped
to less than 20 per cent of the work force compared  to
50 per cent 20 years ago. Ireland also received a tre-
mendous economic boost from foining the Common
Market in 1,973.Its prices for agricultural goods, for
example, leapt overnight.
But successive Governments  in the 1,970s felt the need
also to spend in order to develop and to borrow. Primed
by public money, the economy grew by 6 per cent, 5.5
per cent, and 7 per cent in the mid 1970s. Per capita
income crept to the level of Northern Ireland, which
with its industrial base had always been higher. Un-
employment in 1,978 feel to a historic low of 8 per cent.
The jobless figure has now crept up again (to 12 per
cent) and it could well go higher because of the deflation
forced on the Government. Th; message is clearly that
of a 20 per cent annual borrowing requirement is too
high if the country is to maintain its credit rating with
foreign banks-indeed if it is not to become hopelessly
in debt to foreign banks and is going to maintain the
value of the currency.
However, around half the 20 per cent borrowing re-
quirement was on current account. That is to say it was
money being used for day-to-day expenses, paying civil
servants, running the Government. Most leading econ-
omists feel there is no harm in borrowing up to 10 per
cent of cNp if the cash is used for infrastructure,  roads,
telephones, and so on. This in turn will help attract more
foreign investment and help export-led growth. The cur-
rent-account  spending is on the other hand considered
profligate and self-indulgent. If the coalition Govern-
ment can get this in hand, then the prospect when the
recession bottoms out in countries which are major trad-
ing partners (like Britain), is that Ireland can resume
growth and develop its industrialization. This will mean
fobs and also that fewer people will have to emigrate.
In the meantime,  however, doing something about the
current-account borrowing means unpopular  budgets
when expectations have become high. This means the
Government could well be defeated if forced to the polls.
So again the need is for a balancing  act and the weighing
political expediency  and financial good sense. This one
price for having one of the developing world's few de-
mocracies which really functions well. C
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Garret FitzGerald, the leader of the new, and 
rather shaky, coalition Government in Dub-
lin, has probably spoken, written, and almost 
certainly thought more about the problem of 
Northern Ireland than most politicians in the 
Republic of Ireland. But that does  not nec-
essarily mean he is going to have more success 
in handling it than any of his predecessors, 
or that his approach to it is going to be rad-
ically different. 
For  like  every  other established  political 
leader in the Republic he  is  an Irish nation-
alist, professing Irish unity, of some sort or 
other, as  his  goal  and the only logical, and 
morally  permissible,  resolution  of the  Irish 
problem. 
In modern times only Conor Cruise O'Brien, 
as a minister in the coalition Government from 
1973 to 1977 and as a writer then and since, 
has challenged the whole theme of Irish na-
tionalism, pointing out that Irish unity may 
be neither inevitable nor logical and arguing 
that by  maintaining it, Irish nationalists, in-
cluding Irish Governments, are helping per-
petuate the violent divisions inside Northern 
Ireland. 
For  a  time  between  1973  and  1977, 
FitzGerald  and O'Brien were  seemingly  as-
sociated in a new and open approach to 
Northern Ireland, paying particular attention 
to the fears and suspicions of the Protestant 
population there, and to increasing contacts 
with it. 
FitzGerald, and his  party, have continued 
to stress the importance of these contacts, but 
since  O'Brien was  resoundingly rejected  by 
Irish voters in 1977, FitzGerald has been con-
spicuously  careful  to reassert  his  basic  na-
tionalism, and to make it clear that he is  no 
disciple  of O'Brien. Thus he  produced, in 
opposition, a detailed and complex plan for 
an Irish confederation. It is the formal policy 
of his party to seek a public commitment from 
Britain to Irish unity. 
But in general he would be regarded as  a 
most moderate nationalist, a reasonable na-
Dennis Kennedy is associate editor of  The Irish 
Times. 
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tionalist, and one unambiguously opposed to 
the violence of the Provisional Irish Repub-
lican Army. 
By contrast the man he has just replaced as 
Prime Minister, Charles Haughey, would gen-
erally  be  regarded  as  more of a  hard-liner, 
more republican, more open to criticism over 
his attitude to political violence. 
Ironically in the year and a half during which 
Haughey was Prime Minister and FitzGerald 
leader of the opposition, their roles were in 
some aspects reversed: FitzGerald criticizing 
Haughey for not being nationalistic enough 
in  his  dealings  with  British  Prime  Minister 
Margaret Thatcher, and also urging a much 
tougher line  with Britain over the  H-Block 
hunger-strike protest in the Maze prison. 
Clearly  FitzGerald  was  worried  that 
Haughey  would play the  Northern Ireland 
card in the election, and would win on a wave 
of nationalist fervor. Haughey had, of course, 
seized the center of the stage with his Anglo-
Irish initiative based on his summit meeting 
with Thatcher in Dublin last December, and 
with the commissioning of joint studies into 
various aspects of relations between Ireland 
and Britain. This,  Haughey claimed,  raised 
the Irish problem onto a new plane, opened 
the totality of the relationship between Britain 
and Ireland to examination, and cleared the 
way for real progress toward Irish unity. 
hi the face  of such intoxicating fare, 
FitzGerald had to tread carefully-the fact of 
the new  Dublin-London links  he  could not 
reject, but he could, and did, criticize Haughey 
for raising nationalist expectations far beyond 
any  justifiable  level  and  also  for  offending 
Northern Protestant opinion by maintaining 
secrecy over the exact contents of the Anglo-
Irish talks. 
In  the event,  the Anglo-Irish  initiative he 
inherited when he became Prime Minister in 
July was running out of steam. It was emerg-
ing  that the  matters  being  studied were  of 
minor importance, and unlikely to be of po-
litical or constitutional significance. It  seemed 
clear too that British enthusiasm for the Dub-
lin-London process had faded.  At the same views from two capitals 
time the FitzGerald Government approach to 
the H-Block crisis, demanding more flexibility 
from London, put considerable strain on An-
glo-Irish relations. 
So,  by midsummer, the future for the An-
glo-Irish approach initiated by Haughey with 
such trumpeting, looks extremely limited. Both 
FitzGerald  and Thatcher  are  committed  to 
continuing it, but it is hard to see it surviving 
as  more  than a  routine  exchange  of views 
between heads of Government and practical 
contacts at official level on a variety of tech-
nical matters. 
This running down of the process-if  it ever 
amounted to anything more than public re-
lations-may save FitzGerald the embarrass-
ment of actually wrecking it. His Government 
is  committed to  involving  elected  represen-
tatives from Northern Ireland in the process 
when any matters affecting Northern Ireland 
arise-and even  moderate  Unionists,  never 
mind the likes of Ian Paisley and other hard-
liners, ·  would undoubtedly refuse to partici-
pate,  thus leaving  FitzGerald the option of 
going back on his undertaking, or ending the 
process. 
In  its place FitzGerald has so  far  offered 
only a policy of contact-contact between 
south and north, between individuals and in-
stitutions. This is the theme in three key doc-
uments:  the Fine  Gael election program on 
Northern Ireland, the joint program agreed 
between the  two coalition parties, and 
FitzGerald's one major speech on the subject 
during the election campaign. In that speech 
he said this: 
"We shall ask workers and farmers,  busi-
nessmen and community leaders, politicians 
and teachers, and, above all, our young men 
and women to make an unprecedented ges-
ture of friendship and goodwill to the people 
of Northern Ireland-we shall ask  them to 
travel to Northern Ireland, to holiday there, 
to do business with Northern Ireland ....  " 
Faith in the efficacy of such contacts stems 
from the view, expressed in the coalition pro-
gram, that many of the present difficulties are 
continued on page 16 
Facing up to 
old frustrations 
DAVID BELL 
British tourists traveling in France and Italy 
this summer have been taken aback to find 
slogans  such  as  "Mrs Thatcher murdered 
Bobby  Sand~" scrawled on walls.  The Irish 
Republican Army (IRA)  hunger strikers-and 
Britain's.  continuing inability to solve the worst 
sectarian problem in  modern Europe-have 
become a burning topic this year in the United 
States and in many European countries but 
in Britain, the eye  of the storm, it has been 
rather different. 
Each death has been reported, but not nec-
essarily as  the lead item on the news  or on 
the front pages-Ulster ·ranks well down on 
Britain's list of most pressing political issues. 
Most Britons, if they think about it at all, still 
approach the "Irish question" with a sense of 
weary indifference, tinged with apprehension. 
For 13 years now the "troubles" have been 
a regular fixture on the television screens. 
Political breakthroughs, understandings, and 
initiatives have come and gone. All; with that 
special brand of hindsight that the British re-
serve for the Irish, are said now to have been 
foredoomed to fail. Meanwhile the killing and 
bombing have continued,  usually  in  Ulster, 
but sometimes spilling over into mainland 
Britain. 
The optimism that Britain could resolve the 
Ulster issue so marked in 1968 (the year the 
army was given a rapturous reception on the 
streets of Belfast  by  the  Catholic minority) 
has given way to an increasing sense of help-
lessness. As a result present British policy can 
roughly be translated as follows: Britain can't 
be  seen to give in to mindless  IRA  thuggery, 
can't persuade the majority Protestants to make 
any concessions worth making, can't pull the 
army  out for  fear  that the  Protestants  will 
annihilate the Catholics in a civil war and so 
has no choice but to keep on plugging away 
in  the  hope that the  IRA will eventually see 
reason and give up. 
Thoughtful Britons readily admit that this 
scarcely  amounts  to a  constructive strategy 
continued on page 16 
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caused by myths, misunderstandings, and sus-
picions arising out of lack of personal contact. 
It  is  an  optimistic analysis  that ignores  the 
irreconcilability of Irish nationalism and 
Northern Ireland  Protestant rejection  of it, 
and that also makes no reference to specific 
northern grievances  such as  the lack of ex-
tradition of wanted IRA terrorists from south 
to north. But the intention to pursue the con-
tacts  is  genuine.  In  his  own entourage 
FitzGerald has bright, ambitious young men 
to match his own energetic approach to any 
problem, and they are confident enough, or 
brash enough, to believe they can work won-
ders on the north. So doubtless new policies 
and new initiatives will emerge, frequently. 
Unfortunately even this aspect of the 
FitzGerald approach has run into early trou-
ble.  His Government's line on the H-Blocks, 
putting the onus on London to make conces-
sions  to  the  IRA,  has  greatly  offended  even 
moderate Protestant opinion in the north. 
Where, they have asked, is the much vaunted 
FitzGerald sympathy for  and understanding 
of the Protestant position? 
Another snag is  FitzGerald's unrestrained 
public admiration for John Hume, the leader 
of  Northern Ireland's  Catholic-nationalist 
party, the Social Democratic and Labor Party 
(SDLP). Most northern Protestants believe that 
contacts between Dublin and the  SDLP  are 
already too intimate, and that Hume's influ-
ence on Government policy ip.  Dublin is  al-
ready too strong. 
Another plank in  FitzGerald's  northern 
platform  has  a  hollow  ring:  His  party ad-
vocates a pluralist society in the Republic that 
would eventually attract support from a sec-
tion of northern unionism. ~ut  he has already 
agreed to back a call for a ban on abortion 
in  the Irish  Constit~tion, and his  party has 
refused to move decisively on the question of 
divorce-already ruled out in  the Constitu-
tion.  It is  this  official  enshrinement  of the 
strongly Catholic nature of society  in  the 
Republic  that has  been  one of the  greatest 
obstacles to reconciliation in Ireland, and one 
of the  prime causes  of northern Protestant 
rejection of Irish nationalism. E 
DAVID BELL 
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and  acknowledge  that Britain  has  grossly 
mishandled Ulster down the years.  But they 
are also tired of hearing that Britain has not 
been trying to get a solution in the past dec-
ade. 
As most Britons see it, every attempt to find 
some  political  way  forward-by creating a 
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Former Irish Prime Minister Charles Haughey's 
initiative led to direct talks with Britain about 
Northern Ireland. © UPI 
new Administration to share power between 
Catholics and Protestants-has foundered on 
the  same  obstacle:  the  Protestants will  not 
give way.  The most helpful of all attempted 
solutions, the 1973 Sunningdale accord, did 
set  up  a  power-sharing executive  and  even 
envisaged  a  Council of Ireland, a very  ten-
tative step  along the road to some  kind  of 
North-South federation. But it perished, killed 
by a Protestant general strike a year later. 
This same rooted Protestant suspicion sur-
faced again last year when Margaret Thatcher, 
the  British  Prime  Minister,  and  Charles 
Haughey, then the Irish Prime Minister, set 
in motion new talks about unspecified Anglo-
Irish issues. Protestant accusations that Brit-
ain  was  softening  them  up  for  a  sell  have 
already forced Thatcher onto the defensive. 
For Ulster is  not merely a religious  issue. 
It also poses constitutional problems for Brit-
ain of fearsome complexity which often get 
lost behind the bombs and the propaganda. 
Since the partition of Ireland in 1921 the six 
counties of Ulster have been part  of the United 
Kingdo~  of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land. Thus, constitutionally at any  rate, the 
province is not like India, Kenya, or Malaya 
which could be floated off on their own with 
relative ease. 
Protestants (and Catholics) in the province 
hold British passports and are bound in with 
the rest of the kingdom and the Protestants 
are obsessively loyal to the crown. Successive 
British Governments have baulked at the con-
stitutional precedent which might be created 
if Britain were seen to be forced to "pull out" 
of its own territory because of "a handful of 
terrorists." Could the same thing then hap-
pen, the question is asked, in Scotland or Wales 
in 10 years time? The Protestants, meanwhile, 
say that withdrawing from Ulster is like aban-
doning Yorkshire. 
The IRA is, of course, contemptuous of this 
kind of domi11o  theory. It insists that Ulster 
is  a British colony and that the six counties 
are under British imperialist domination. In 
Ireland as  a whole, says the IRA,, the Protes-
tants are the real minority. They should give 
in, or get out. 
Very  few  Britons accept the  IRA's  view of 
the situation and the vast majority support 
Thatcher's refusal  to grant its  prisoners 
"political status." Where the IRA is concerne~, 
even  normally  liberal  people  ca~ turn into 
hawks. "I don't care about the hunger strik-
ers" said one lawyer. "The more of them that 
die the fewer we will have to deal with in the 
future." 
Even the way the IRA  is  described betrays 
the  differences  in perception.  British  media 
almost always  refer  to them as  "terrorists" 
whereas most US  newspapers-and the two 
major news agencies-always speak of guer-
rillas.  Rightly  or wrongly, most Britons are 
contemptuous of parallels with El  Salvador 
or Vietnam and suggestions that the IRA is in 
the tradition of  Jomo Kenyatta who led Kenya 
to independence or even of the founding fath-
ers of the US revolution. Instead they see the 
IRA  as cruel, ignorant, misguided maniacs. 
Part of this  is  because Britain cannot see 
Ireland except as  a problem with an almost 
infinite pedigree.  Hundreds of years  of vio-
lence, misunderstanding and bigotry-on all 
sides-seem to have frozen the situation fast. 
In short the Irish problem has become, numb-
ingly, "just more of the same."  · 
This in turn probably explains why the IRA's 
intermittent attempts to take the "war" to the 
mainland have failed. The bombings and the 
assassinations  have  hardened  opposition to 
the terrorist$ and actually made it easier for 
most Britons not to think about their political 
case at all. 
So  what happens  now?  The  most  recent 
polls show that a vast majority of Britons have 
absolutely no enthusiasm for keeping the army 
in the province and wish the whole issue would 
go away. But they also reveal that most people 
have no alternative to.the present policy. Nor 
do  they  think  that the  United  Nations,  or 
some other arbitrator, will  be  able  to over-
come the political obstacles. 
At Westminster there have been some signs 
that the bipartisan political consensus which 
has covered everything to do with Ulster  is 
beginning to  break down. The left wing of 
the opposition Labor Party is now urging the 
Government to set an irrevocable date for the 
withdrawal of the army. James Callaghan, the 
former Prime Minister, thinks that the prov-
ince  should  be  made  independent.  Various 
conservatives are toying with new proposals 
which could set Ulster in  a federation  with 
the .South. But so far none of these amount 
to a believable strategy. 
There  are  those who  argue  t~at British 
withdrawal followed  by civil  war might be 
no bad thing because it would at least "dear 
the air." For the British (and Irish)  Govern-
ments who would have to pick up the pieces, 
however, such a scenario is a total nightmare, 
and one never far from their minds. E the  affordable 
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Robert E. Hunter argues that the European honeymoon with the ReaganAdminist1 
strains, and military requirements. 
"THE  WESTERN  ALLIANCE,"  ONE  WAG  RECENTLY  SAID, 
"has been unraveling since Adam and Eve." A pointed 
comment, underlining the dynamic nature of the alliance 
and a long series of dire predictions which have not come 
true-in part, perhaps, because they became self-denying 
prophecies. 
Is  today any  different?  A recent month-long trip to 
Western Europe has led to the conclusion that, beneath 
the usual rhetoric of alliance malaise, there are real and 
persistent problems that cannot be ignored. And whether 
they will  be readily surmounted is  less  certain than at 
many times in the past. 
First, the substance: 
Economic Policy. Transatlantic disagreement over eco-
nomic policies of individual nations is nothing new, but 
the intensity of the squabbling this spring-focusing on 
high  US  interest rates-has brought the  economic di-
mension to center court of alliance difficulty  as  rarely 
before. In part, President Ronald Reagan's Administra-
tion has been subjected to criticisms that are an accident 
of timing: At the beginning of every new regime in Wash-
ington, West European anxieties  skip  upward on the 
charts, as  the allies  nervously take the measure of the 
new  President  and his  team.  Trouble  over  particular 
issues thus gets magnified and projected forward, how-
ever much staying power or underlying force these issues 
actually have. 
But there is  more to this disagreement than that. At 
one level, there has been widespread European frustra-
tion at the difficulty  in  getting official Washington to 
understand the impact of record high US  interest rates 
on European economic management-whether in paying 
oil  bills in US  dollars that have soared by  as  much as 
35  per cent in  recent  months to  produce a  "third oil 
shock," or in having to raise interest rates and distort 
economic planning to defend  European currencies.  In 
West Germany, for example, the "real" rate of interest 
(the nominal rate less inflation) is  about 10 per cent-
what Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has called the highest 
rates "since the birth of Christ." 
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At another level, there is  widespread European con-
cern that the United States is  simply insensitive to the 
problems its  actions  are  causing in  Europe-a feeling 
only partly dispelled at the Ottawa summit in July by 
the  eloquence  and grace  of Reagan's  defense  and the 
general good manners of his  interlocutors. Nor is  the 
interest-rate problem alone.  For example, many Euro-
peans assert that they were taken by surprise this spring 
by the US-Japan auto agreement, although all the West 
European auto-making states quickly cut their own deals 
with Tokyo. And there has been some European testiness 
over the way in which the Reagan Administration has 
used trade in East-West relations: lifting the grain em-
bargo on the one hand, primarily useful to the US, while 
on the other hand seeking further limits on high tech-
nology trade, primarily harmful to Western Europe. 
To be sure, officials in Washington are quick to point 
out that many of Europe's economic ills are home grown, 
that only a few  years ago the allies were griping about 
a  depressed  dollar,  and that the  hoped-for success  of 
"Reaganomics" will  cure American inflation and thus 
help  everyone.  The gleam  of protectionism,  they  also 
point out, is not just in American eyes as the continuing 
world economic crisis  everywhere  puts strains on the 
spirit of multilateralism. 
Whoever is  right in current transatlantic debate on 
these issues, however, the allies collectively remain very 
much in the woods; and mechanisms and willingness for 
relating domestic economic management to the needs of 
neighbors lags far behind the growth of economic 
"interdependence"  -which means  vulnerability to the 
acts of others. For all the orchestrated bonhomie of 
Montebello, the annual ritual of the economic summits, 
with their promises to "do better," will not suffice. Nor 
are these problems simply economic: They spill over onto 
alliance politics  as well.  For instance, some European 
commentators are beginning to contrast US demands for 
increased defense spending by the allies with what they 
characterize as Washington's unwillingness to show un-
derstanding of the interest rate problem-as though pay-on is proving short-lived, cast adrift on the rocks of high 1~nterest rates, East-West 
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ing  for  arms  is  somehow independent of overall  eco-
nomic management. The West German decision to cut 
increases in defense spending must certainly be seen in 
this light. And, in general, these economic divisions are 
pressing hard on the sense of community that undergirds 
the overall alliance. 
East-West Relations.  Another key  bellwether of allied 
comity-or anxiety-in recent years  has been the state 
of East-West relations, and especially the extent to which 
Europeans are comfortable with the way Washington 
plays its necessarily lead role in dealing with Moscow. 
The  mood was not auspicious when  Reagan  came to 
power, following the failure of the US  Senate to ratify 
the SALT II treaty and European reluctance both to accept 
the Carter Administration's view of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and to accede to the response required 
from the alliance. 
Here, too, the posture adopted early by the Reagan 
Administration went down badly in most European cap-
itals, with an often-strident rhetoric that outran actual 
policy, which in the main has been more temperate and 
cautious. Yet here, much of the problem is also real and 
reflects different emphases in East-West relations if not 
emerging differences in  basic interests. The Reagan Ad-
ministration's view  of East-West  relations  as  globally 
encompassing-from Europe  and  the  Persian  Gulf to 
Angola and the Caribbean-is simply not shared by West 
European nations tied by geography and largely limited 
by reach and interest to the Continent. Even where Eu-
ropeans do look outward and recognize  that their in-
terests are involved, as  in the Persian Gulf, few  accept 
Washington's defining Soviet power as the primary threat 
(and especially the direct application of that power), as 
opposed to risks  to  stability of local Gulf regimes,  re-
quiring a quite different response. 
Some officials  in  Washington bemoan European in-
sularity regarding the Soviet threat as  well as  the desire 
of the allies  to reap  the benefits of European detente, 
at what these Americans s.ee  to  be  the price of under-
cutting US  efforts on behalf of the alliance as  a whole. 
But American pleas fall  largely on deaf ears, while crit-
icism  also  flows  the other way,  as  when  Secretary  of 
State Alexander Haig announced arms sales to China at 
E  u R  orE September-October 1981  19 a  delicate  and dangerous moment in  the Polish· crisis. 
Many Europeans also take umbrage when they are ac-
cused  of being  neutralist. or pacifist-although, to  be 
sure, there are now elements of both in many European 
societies-and they resist the notion that Americans 
somehow know more about European security  needs 
than those allies living cheek-by-jowl with Soviet power. 
As a rejoinder, some West Germans have taken to point-
ing out that the Bundeswehr is  conscript-based-whereas 
the United States will  not face  this issue,  politically-
and they  are  almost derisive  about the  quality  of US 
forces in the Federal Republic. 
The cruise missile shown above is  one of the weapons behind the growing 
mistrust across the Atlantic. Courtesy of US  Air Force 
This debate, too, will go on, but with an undercurrent 
of mutual mistrust that has not been there before. With 
a few partial exceptions, transatlantic minds don't meet 
on the Soviet challenge and the best means of meeting 
it;  and simply  "consulting" about differences  of view 
will not bridge the gap. 
Theater Nuclear Weapons. This year's "sleeper" issue 
in the alliance is proving to be the impending deployment 
of new theater nuclear forces (TNF)  on the Continent, to 
offset  Soviet  deployments  of its  SS-20  medium-range 
missiles as well as to keep the issue of the Soviet Backfire 
bomber from reemerging. 
A scant year and a half ago, the North Atlantic Council 
succeeded in reaching what the Germans call the "double 
decision:" agreement to deploy 572 modernized Pershing 
missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) on 
the Continent, but also to seek limitation of theater nu-
clear forces with the Soviet Union in the period before 
Western missiles are ready for deployment in 1983. 
The weaknesses in this approach were always obvious: 
The West German requirement that these weapons be 
deployed elsewhere on the Continent in addition to the 
Federal Republic always foreshadowed near-intolerable 
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pressure on Belgium, an uncertain outcome in Italy, plus 
hard sledding in the Bundestag. All that is  now corning 
to  pass,  with particular difficulties  in West Germany, 
where there was little public understanding in  1979 of 
the double decision and its implications. 
Unfortunately, the carefully-planned, but always un-
certain, NATO  effort to make it all come right has been 
weakened by further mistrust across the Atlantic. Earlier 
this year, allies with difficult parliaments felt  let down 
by the seeming reluctance of the Reagan Administration 
to pursue TNF talks with the Soviets-a charge vigorously 
denied-and by  its  parallel reluctance,  now turned to 
grudging willingness, to resume the SALT  talks without 
which, virtually all experts agree, no TNF  agreement is 
possible. Washington officials, meanwhile, see these ar-
guments  as  excuses  to  get  out from  under  the  more 
important NATO  decision  to  deploy  the Pershings  and 
GLCMs-and the mistrust builds.  It has been further 
heightened by  the US  decision to produce the neutron 
bomb-even though it is  to be  stockpiled only in the 
United States. Officials in Europe had warned that rais-
ing the ghost of the neutron bomb (a cathartic experience 
for some in 1977-78) would vastly complicate the more 
important issue of TNF. 
There is irony in all this. Originally, the United States 
conceived new TNF  deployments largely as  a means of 
meeting fears  expressed by Schmidt in 1977-that a 
growing Soviet preponderance of theater weapons would 
lead the US strategic arsenal to be "decoupled" from the 
defense  of Europe-a classical  fear  which returns like 
the 7  -year locust. As the debate has progressed, however, 
respectable strategic arguments have faded into the back-
ground, and transatlantic disagreement is  beginning to 
center around tertiary issues:  Americans aver that alli-
ance credibility now depends on following through on 
a strategic decision; some European leaders see Govern-
ments falling over an issue now viewed as of secondary 
importance to them,  except  as  a  way  of pleasing the 
Americans. In fact, some German observers-seemingly 
innocent of the debate's origins-are even suggesting that 
deploying Pershings and GLCMs  could be "decoupling." 
The wheel comes full  circle. 
In the absence of renewed transatlantic sensitivity that 
has been lacking for some time-plus a miracle or two-
the chances of TNF deployment must be rated as no better 
than even,  with only  the Soviets  taking comfort from 
the West's TNF tangle. Again, different perspectives about 
the nature of threat and response have not been sorted 
out in ways that can enhance rather than confuse allied 
solidarity. E 
Robert Hunter is Senior Fellow in  European and Middle Eastern 
Studies at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. friends and 
ment more serious than fledgling attitudes of 
neutralism or pacifism that have gained some 
currency, a development allied to those atti-
tudes.  There  is  less  today of an  instinctive 
looking toward America as part of the same 
community,  with  an  indispensable  political 
and security dimension, perforce to be  nur-
tured. This does not come from West Euro-
pean leaders making their pilgrimages to the 
White House, or from parliamentarians sea-
soned in Atlantic relations. But in a younger 
generation of Europeans, there is a spreading 
sense that somehow "America" stands for 
things they find objectionable in modern so-
ciety as  they see it in their own countries. If 
it develops, this nascent attitude promises to 
be  more lasting than earlier opposition to 
America's Vietnam involvement-which both 
had a "remedy" and did not so directly touch 
individual lives in Europe. 
strangers 
Behind these substantive examples of alliance 
difficulty lies the question of more basic un-
derstandings of common purpose across the 
Atlantic. 
Quite visible, now, is  a shift in  global 
power-and hence of America's capacity to 
exercise the leadership that once quickly quelled 
alliance difficulty. As America's military power 
has  declined  relatively in  the face  of Soviet 
chailenge, it has greater need for allied but-
tressing, both in Europe and beyond (a need 
which even massive US defense increases will 
not obviate)-yet it thereby treds upon Eu-
ropean reluctance to follow  America's  stra-
tegic lead or to look beyo11d  the Continent. 
As America's economic power is now rivaled 
by others, it can no longer set the course of 
Allied  cooperation-yet it  faces  European 
economies themselves  unable to share lead-
ership, especially as the three pillars of Britain, 
France, and West Germany are tri-polarized 
in  both  political  philosophy  and  economic 
approach,  while  the  European  Community 
sits dead in the water. 
In  time,  the  allies  can learn  to adjust to 
these new realities. But there is a more subtle 
development in transatlantic rel~tions that is 
more difficult to fathom: what has been called 
the problem of the "successor generation." 
For many  years  following World War II, 
Americans and West Europeans of all stripes 
knew one another and worked together, from 
post-War military Governments and the Mar-
shall Plan to the web of Western institutions 
that were the dominant preoccupation in for-
eign affairs of that generation. A political cul-
ture embracing both sides of the Atlantic-
not just among governmental elites, but also 
in the trades and professions-put down firm 
roots  in  common  assumptions  about  rela-
tions, interdependence, and approaches to 
solving problems. 
Today, this  instinctive reaching-out is  far 
less  evident among a younger generation of 
both Europeans and Americans.  Other than 
officials in Government and others in a few 
specialized professions with an international 
dimension, the sense of knowing one's coun-
terparts across the Adantic cannot be  taken 
for granted among emerging leaders-in busi-
ness, labor, science, scholarship. At the same 
time, the fascination of younger students with 
society across the Atlantic has dwindled, as 
exchange programs have lost funding and as 
attention, where not directed inward, shifts 
to other parts of the world. This is especially 
telling in the United States, where the ranks 
of young specialists in  European affairs  are 
thinner than at any time since World War II. 
This problem is reflected in the rapid change 
of personnel  in  the  US  Congress  in  recent 
years, where there has been a serious deple-
tion of legislators attuned to the subtleties and 
crosscurrents of European and transatlantic 
politics. This is  not to say that in  the Con-
gress-as its  members  reflect  upon sizeable 
defense  increases  coupled  with  painful  do-
mestic stringency-we will  soon see  a "s9n 
of the  Mansfield  Resolution."  But  there  is 
room  to  worry  about  growth  of  Congres-
sional septiqtent that our allies are not·  pre-
pared to play their part in the common game. 
In Europe, meanwhile, there is a develop-
In sum, if there is today a challenge to US-
European relations,  it is  less  with  the  sub-
stance of individual issues of the moment-
such as those illustrated earlier-even where 
they carry the seeds of real differences of in-
terest. It is  rather that the next years  could 
see a gradual loosening of the instinctive bonds 
of alliance, those based more upon habit, sen-
timent,  common experience,  and "knowing 
one another," than upon calculations of na-
tional interest. And that problem is both more 
fundamental and harder to resolve. E 
ROBERT HUNTER 
Founder's Day 1969 at Harrow, Winston Churchill's prep school: Will this generation understand its 
American counterpart as well as  its predecessor did? ©  Keystone Press Agency 
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Caspar  Weinberger,  the secretary of defense,  lays  out the parameters of deali'fj 
The following excerpts are part of an inter-
view  with  US  Secretary  of Defense  Caspar 
Weinberger. It is from the British Broadcast-
ing Corporation's series  "America, Europe, 
and the World" on US  foreign policy under 
President Ronald Reagan. The interviewer is 
David Perman. 
Is the assumption that in the past few years, 
maybe American foreign  policy has been a 
foreign policy from a position of weakness? 
I think that is  largely correct-both neglect 
of the  actual strength of the armed  forces, 
but, perhaps even  more important, a weak-
ening of the national resolution and the will 
to take some of the stern and difficult meas-
ures that are necessary to enable a country to 
be sufficiently strong, so that its voice and its 
desires can be heard. I think we saw too many 
times a lack of resolution, a lack of will, and 
consequently a lack of effectiveness in Amer-
ican foreign policy in the last few years. 
But are you aiming at something similar to 
the containment policy of Soviet power that 
we  saw the United States exercising  maybe 
during the 1950s or the very early 1960s? 
I think that it isn't so much containment. The 
basic idea is that we want to be strong enough 
with our allies in maintaining a strong allied 
position to deter any  kind of attack or any 
thought of attack upon the institutions and 
the Governments and the basic cause of free-
dom. And if we are strong enough we believe 
we can succeed in deterring any kind of Soviet 
or other attack on those basic rights and prin-
ciples. That's what we want to achieve. I don't 
think that it is particularly useful to think of 
it in terms of containment or confrontation 
or anything of the kind. 
But is the United States economy going to be 
able to bear that sort of cost? 
We  can  certainly  afford  it,  because  we  are 
pursuing a policy which we have not pursued 
before but should have, and that is to reduce 
domestic spending so  that the overall totals 
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of Governmental spending do  not increase. 
And even just looking at the defense spending 
alone, we will not be in a position of using 
as much of the gross national product of the 
United States for defense as we did in the pre-
Vietnam war days. So that I don't think there 
is any undue strain on the American economy. 
Do you think the West European allies  are 
doing their share of the military burden of 
the alliance? 
I think that other European countries have 
over the years done a very considerable amount 
in their own defense and for the defense of 
these common goals of preserving peace and 
freedom. I think that it would be particularly 
helpful to those causes if more could be done 
by all of us-I don't single out anybody. I do 
single out Britain and Italy as two countries 
that have made very significant contributions 
at times when it was most difficult for them 
to do so based on their own domestic prob-
lems. I think that Spain as a new member of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
may be expected to do a very  considerable 
amount and I think Portugal is doing well at 
the moment, considering their domestic prob-
lems. Germany has done well in the past and 
others we hope will continue to follow suit. 
Do you think there is any loss of will among 
the European members of  the alliance or among 
their populations, associated maybe with these 
fears that have been expressed in Washington 
of  European pacifism or European neutralism 
being on the increase? 
Well,  there are evidences  of that in  Europe 
and there are evidences of that in the United 
States. But I don't think it has infected any 
Governments so far. There are strong groups 
of people with these varying views in a num-
ber of countries,  including our own,  but I 
would be very hopeful that the present situ-
ation in which Governments are not following 
policies advocated by unilateral disarmers or 
neutral  pacifists  or whatever,  and  I would 
hope that ultimately a continued majority of 
people in each of these countries would see 
that this was a very dangerous path to pursue 
and would not want to urge  it.  Everybody 
wants peace and everybody would like to se-
cure it at less cost and not be faced with the 
unpleasant questions of rearming or contin-
uing  to vote  large  expenditures  to  military 
items, particularly when the success of your 
policy is measured by the fact that you hope 
you will never have to use any of these items 
that are so costly. But to the extent that we 
are .  faced  with a  growing threat, a path of 
unilateral disarmament is  a very  dangerous 
path to pursue, it's an invitation to the Soviets 
to use some of their strength. And so I would 
hope  that these  considerations  would  con-
tinue to  appeal to the  Governments of the 
NATO countries as is indeed the case now. 
Is it your view that detente has been an op-
portunity for the Soviet Union to get an ad-
vantage, a military and a psychological ad-
vantage, over the West? 
The simple fact of the matter is  that I don't 
know whether the Soviets intended to or used 
detente necessarily to gain an advantage, the 
important point is  that neither during the 
detente period, nor during the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks  (SALT)  period, was any  re-
straint exercised  by  the  Soviets.  The only 
country that was  restrained  by  SALT  or de-
tente was  the United States and the point I 
was making was that, as  a perfectly steady, 
unchanged, and unvarying policy for 20 years 
since the first Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets 
increased  their  military  strength  by  regular 
amounts each year on a steady upward path 
and detente  didn't slow  it and SALT  didn't 
slow it and that we should be aware of that 
and realize that this process has given them 
very substantial momentum. Indeed it has given 
them advantage in many significant areas, an 
advantage which they continue to press and 
that is why it is so absolutely essential for us 
to start rearming on the strong path that we 
have now undertaken. -
I
I
'th the Souiet Union and what is enpected of Europe.
Many of the West Europeans see d6tente as
a new cra, as it were, of relaxation  of tension
on their own borders, particularly  the West
Germans I think. They fear that maybe the
United States does not see d6tente in that light
at all and some remarks from some people
associated with the Administration, like
"ddtente  is dead"-I think was one of these
remarks-seem to bear that out. Do you think
that d6tente is dead?
Well, I don't know whether it is dead or not,
I don't know whether it was really ever alive
on a bilateral basis. I think, as I said a moment
ago, there are a lot of people and it is perfectly
normal and natural, that search for some kind
of rationalization for relaxing vigilence  and
relaxing the need to make heavy  investments
in military arms and equipment of a defensive
nature alongtheir  borders and elsewhere.  And
d6tente certainly offered the hope that per-
haps that could be the case. It was worth
examining, it was worth trying but all it did
was to increase the imbalance in favor of the
Soviets  because they did not restrain them-
selves during ddtente and the West and we
did. And that I think is a reason  for concluding
that if the aim of d6tente was to reduce ten-
sions on both sides it didn't work, but what
we are trying to do now is to regain a sufficient
strength so that by holding things in balance
we can obtain the deterrence which is the best
price of peace. But I think perhaps that one
of the lessons  maybe  is that there is no cheap
or easy road to securing  peace with freedom.
If the Soviets would genuinely reduce arms,
not talk about some esoteric formulas with
respect to limitations of launchers  and things
of that kind, but would genuinely reduce arms,
we could secure a balance that would main-
tain deterrence at f.ar lower levels than we
have now. That would be a most worthwhile
enterprise  and one that we are fully prepared
to engage in and continue with great patience
and perseverence  because that's something
worth achieving. But so far we have not had
that and we have not achieved that result and
I think it is sheer delusion that either sALr or
d6tente improved  the security position of the
West or of the United States. In fact I think
it made it much worse, because it lulled people
into believing that they had secured some real
advantage  whereas the Soviets, as I say, never
stopped for one moment, not for a single month
or a single day during that 2O-year period to
increase their military strength.
At the recent Ottawa summit of the Western
leaders,  the question of East-West trade was
raised, rather controversially  perhaps in some
people's views, and you are credited as de-
fense sectetary  with being very concerned  about
this, that the level of East-West  trade may be
giving the Soviets an advantage.Is it true, that
this is a main concern of yours in the defense
department?
Yes, we have a concern that anything that
strengthens the Soviets internally or gives them
a substantial  amount of hard currency in ex-
change to use for other purposes is something
that we would have to regard as an undesir-
able addition to their strength, at a time when
they already have a very substantial arms ad-
vantage.
But isn't this a point of potential  friction with
probably your best ally in Western  Europe
which is West Germany,  which is of course
very dependent or not dependent but very
interested in developing trade with the East?
\U7e have several  best allies in S7estern  Europe.
I think we have to look at the interests of the
alliance as a whole and I think we have to
look at the conditions that will most likely
lead to the maintenance  of peace and freedom.
And if two, three, or four years of vigorous
trade is going to lead only to strengthening
of a country that already has a very large
military establishment and a growing one and
one that does not appear to be being acquired
for defensive  purposes, than I think we have
to ask whether or not the trade is just ben-
efiting one or two countries or whether it is
benefiting  a potential aggressor. And, if it is
trade of certain kinds that give a very large
balance-of-payments  advantage,  as for ex-
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ample the Siberian  pipeline would give to the
Soviets,  then I think it becomes a legitimate
issue of consideration in relative securitv  mat-
ters.
The Soviets say that they can't really take you
seriously when you talk about entering into
arms-control  talks when you are already
rearming  in quite a massive way.
Well, I think the answer to that is that I don't
think they would take us very seriously with
arms control talks if we went into a discussion
unarmed or in a very weak position, without
any intention to build up anything remotely
resembling a balance or to secure a balance.
The Soviet agenda for such talks previously
has been afreezera moratorium which would
leave the imbalance permanently  institution-
alized and legalized so to speak, at the presenr,
very undesirable, levels.
But you are not seeking military superiority
which some people have ratherloosely  spoken
about?
No, a great many people have spoken about
it very loosely and it's a convenient term that
fits into headlines. But it has no validity and
is not related to what we are talking about.
We are talking about achieving the renewal
of the degree of strength that we used to have
that could and will maintain the peace by
deterring any Soviet attack, because the So-
viets would correctly perceive that the cost of
making such an attack would be unacceptably
high to them. And that is essentially  the kind
and degree of strength that we think has to
be maintained  to preserve  the peace. (
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OTTAWA,  LIKE SO MANY PREVIOUS WORLD SUMMITS,
failed to satisfy advance expectations,  though for some-
what different reasons. Other summits had set them-
selves grandiose targets such as agreements on energy
targets and economic recovery programs which seemed
at the time, and more often in the light of subsequent
experience, to fall short of what was needed. At Ottawa
all of those taking part-the leaders of the West's seven
industrialized  countries plus EC Commission President
Gaston Thorn-agreed to concentrate on discussions
rather than decision.
Many observers felt that this was because they could
agree on little in particular but much more in general.
In any case, it was said, sharp personal conflicts would
be unavoidable when such differing philosophies were
clashing as those of President Ronald Reagan and France's
President  Franqois Mitterrand or when interests were
so opposed as benveen the free-exporting  Zenko Suzuki
of Japan and the European countries, groaning under
the weight of Japanese imports.
However, the ch6teau Montebello,  a huge log-built
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OTTAWA SUMMIT
John WAIes fi,nds it 
osweet and sour'
hotel resort 62 miles out of Ottawa where most of the
formal sessions took place, did not ring to the sounds
of battle in quite the way expected. Perhaps  Pierre Tru-
deau, the Canadian Premier and host to the summit, had
been right and, by divorcing the leaders from their 1,500
media followers forcibly camped in Ottawa, he denied
the heads of Government  an instant gallery to play to.
The exchanges, a French spokesman  said, had been
"frankr" at times "very frankr" but the initial harmony
between the personalities never gave way to bitterness.
UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher may have said "I
agree with President Reagan" enough times to put Mit-
terrand's teeth on edge, but he never let it show. German
Chancellor  Helmut Schmidt may have found Reagan's
constant folksiness an irritation, but if he did, no one
ever knew it.
.  Curiously,  the summit was helped by the fact that five
of the participants were newcomers, Mitterrand, Suzuki,
Italian Premier Giovanni  Spadolini, Reagan, and Thorn.
None wished to mark his debut with any responsibility
for bruising personal encounters. The other importantemollient was Thorn's visit to Washington just a week 
before the summit. His explanation of European thinking 
on the main issues and his stress of the apparent points 
of difference  with  the  United  States  concentrated  the 
Administration's  mind on how to  bridge  the  gaps  at 
Ottawa. 
Avoidance of personal conflict, however, is not alone 
sufficient to declare Ottawa a success (which would have 
been the summit leaders' judgment even  if it had been 
a failure). At the very least the summit has to show an 
acknowledgement of the world's critical economic prob-
lems,  a  keen  sense  of the basic principles for  tackling 
them and some means of achieving their resolution. In 
addition, a summit has to present a credibly united face 
on the main political problems of the day-relations with 
the Soviet Union, arms control negotiations and, una-
voidably  with  coincidental  bloodshed  and fighting  in 
southern Lebanon and northern Israel,  conflict in  the 
Middle East. 
According to these criteria, Ottawa was only a partial 
success. The problems caused by the current high levels 
of US  interest rates, the strength of the dollar, and by 
the growing dangers  of trade and protectionism were 
thoroughly discussed. It was agreed that a stable inter-
national monetary and financial system and the main-
tenance of free world trade were needed to counter them. 
It was  also  agreed that an attempt would have  to be 
made to tackle these problems in concert in various fora 
and ad hoc consultations over the months ahead. What 
was  lacking,  however,  was  a  sense  that the  heads  of 
Government had satisfactorily agreed the more detailed 
principles according to which they would try to reconcile 
their differing national interests. 
In  the months ahead the height and volatility of US 
interest  rates  could still  be  a  point of major  friction 
between Washington and Europeans. Schmidt, Mitter-
rand, and Spadolini all stressed the difficulties they were 
laboring under. High American interest rates essentially 
force the Europeans to maintain their domestic rates at 
competitive levels  in order to prevent flights of capital 
and to stabilize their currencies.  Reagan took the point 
and acknowledged that he could not ignore the effects 
of his  economic policies  ..  At the same time he stressed 
with Thatcher's obvious support, that his  first priority 
was to lower domestic inflation. He was confident of 
success and hopeful that US rates would fall in the second 
half of the year. 
The Europeans could do little more than welcome this 
assurance and let it be known that they would again be 
banging on the White House door if the problem had 
not eased by the end of the year. Significantly, they also 
endorsed a final  communique which to a considerable 
extent  underwrote  "Reaganomics."  Mitterrand  did 
manage to have the defeat of inflation and unemploy-
ment billed  as  the  West's  ''highest  priority,"  but the 
communique then stressed the need to employ all of the 
weapons of current economic orthodoxy, listing low and 
stable monetary growth, the  use  of high interest rates 
"where fears of inflation remain strong," a reduction in 
public  borrowing,  and a  shift in resources  from  con-
sumption to public investment. 
The "middle of the road monetarist" Schmidt and the 
Socialist Mitterrand did not begrudge their endorsement 
of these principles. All  of the European leaders seemed 
content to have Ottawa as a justification for their present 
policies  and for  any new austerity that is  needed and 
promptly did so on their return home. 
While reaffirming their "strong commitment to main-
taining liberal trade policies," the summit·leaders threw 
their weight behind plans for a ministerial meeting next 
year, the first since 1973, of all  the countries involved 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). 
This meeting would examine current impediments to free 
trade and make a general commitment to renounce "beggar 
my neighbor" trade policies. The fact that it is now firmly 
entered into the political calendar will  be enough, it is 
hoped, to discourage any further drift to protectionism 
in the meantime. 
On the trade front, a second important decision was 
to  hold regular,  four-sided  consultations  between  the 
United States, Canada, the EC, and Japan. These would 
attempt to resolve bilateral trade problems without broader 
interest being ignored, as  was the case, the Europeans 
claim, when this year's Japanese undertaking to cut its 
car exports to the United States risked a  diversion of 
shipments to Europe. 
Considerable discussion at the summit was given  to 
North-South issues  which,  at the present stage of the 
world debate, are dominated more by political than 
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important  concessions to European views which could
have an important  impact at October's North-South
summit at Cancun, Mexico. In the first place, he aban-
doned opposition in principle to the proposed "global
negotiations" in the United Nations on the transfer of
During EC Commission  President Gaston Tltorn's trip to Washington  on
the eue of the Ottawa summit, he uisited President Ronald  Reagan  (top),
Speaker of the House of Representatiues  "Tip" O'Neill (middle),  and the
National  Press Club (bottom).
Courtesy  of House of Representattves
@ Robert Knudsen,  Washington
resources from rich to poor countries. Secondly, he agreed
to take part in negotiations  on a possible international
financial mechanism for promoting energy investment
in the third world. Here, however, Reagan would not
go as far as endorsing  the specific idea of creating  a new
energy affiliate to the l7orld Bank.
Perhaps the most discordant note at Ottawa was struck
at Reagan's insistence on the dangers of Western Europe
becoming too dependent on the Soviet Union for its
energy supplies and on the need to tighten up controls
on high technology exports to the Eastern bloc. Schmidt
vigorously rejected the first point arguing that the pro-
posed DM 20 billion (currently about $8.2 billion), 5,000-
kilometer pipeline would only be satisfying 5 percent of
'S7est Germany's energy requirements and that it made
good political sense to tie the Soviet Union more firmly
into'Vfestern  Europe's economic system. Neither he nor
Mitterrand was particularly sympathetic  to Reagan's
second point, but they finally agreed on a review of
possible new export restrictions within the Consultative
Group Cooperation Committee (cocorra), the Paris-based
committee which screens the We'st's exports to the East
to ensure that security is not endangered.
Discussion of broader East-'S7est political issues was
undoubtedly  eased by a secret letter Reagan sent to Schmidt
a few days before the summit assuring him that the
United States would begin negotiations with the Soviets
on reductions in theater nuclear forces this aurumn.
However,  the Chancellor did stress the need for contin-
uing dialogue with the Eastern bloc while Reagan talked
of his suspicion of Soviet intentions and of the need for
the United States to restore a military balance with the
Soviet Union.
These are the two poles of the Atlantic argument  gen-
erating a sort of creative tension out of which the Eu-
ropeans know that they need to try to satisfy the US
demands for more spending within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization  while the United States is learning
gradually that it must keep alive the prospect of d6tente
if neutralist and pacifist sentiment in Europe is to be
spiked.
In this world of declining expectations, the Ottawa
summit looks better in retrospect than it deserves to. It
offered, after all, no sense that the'S7est's leaders have
any kind of winning recipe for coping with virtually zero
growth and rising unemployment. Its main achievement
was a negative one, albeit very important. The world is
more, not less, economically  and politically interdepen-
dent, said Ottawa, and for the next 12 months at least
the seven leading industrialized countries will try to avoid
solving their own domestic problems by beggaring their
neighbors. (
lohn Wyles is the Financial Times' Common  Market
correspondent in Brussels.
@ Robert  Knudsen,  WashingtonTHE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
Yesterday's a,chieuements - tnrnnrcmr's goals
EDWARD  HEATH
The institutional development of modern Eu-
rope appears to some to be along contradic-
tory lines. In economic and political affairs
the operative units have become larger. There
are now two major blocs, the European Eco-
nomic Community and the Council for Mu-
tual Economic Assistance (courcoN),  with a
number  of fringe countries related to a greater
or lesser degree with each of them. There is
in fact really no comparison  between  the highly
organized European Community with its in-
stitutional basis and the loosely linked
coMEcoN group. Nevertheless it seems to the
people of Europe that their affairs, in politics,
defense,  and economics, become more and
more complex,  requiring a larger and larger
size of institution  to manage  them and thus
appearing at times more and more remote
from the people affected by them. Th.y accept
this intellectually, however much they revolt
against it emotionally,  because they appre-
ciate that no individual European  country can
defend itself alone against the threat from the
Soviet Union; because they realize that few
countries have a market of sufficient size to
be able to compete  on their own with Japan
or the United States; and because  they know
"Eoen those who wished the ttlti-
rnote outcorne to be a federa,l sgstem
did not seek to eopu the amangernent
in North America or Australin,"
that security, politics  and economics, peace
and prosperity are indissolubly  linked.
All this makes  them wish all the more to
have a gf,eater say in running  those affairs
closer and more familiar to them. Hence the
pressure in parts of Britain, pafts of France
and parts of Spain for devolution, not nec-
essarily in the same form, but for the same
purpose as it already exists in the Federal
German Republic and in Switzerland.  This
explains the growth all over Western Europe
of innumerable community groups and or-
@ Keystonc  Press Agcncy
ganizations. This is a healthy sign and much
to be encouraged.  I see nothing incompatible
benveen the nvo objectives of creating and
developing  the institutions  required to cope
with the characteristics  of modern defense,
trade, and industrial processes whilst, at the
same time, encouraging  grass-root  activities
among our fellow citizens which enable them
to take part in discussing,  and sometimes  ad-
ministering, their own local affairs.
Those who first created the European  Com-
munities did so in the full knowledge that they
were starting out on a new path. The Com-
munity, as they envisaged  it, was not to be
an enlarged nation-state,  nor was it to be a
replica of any of the existing federal systems.
Even those who wished the ultimate outcome
to be a federal  system did not seek to copy
the arrangement  in North America or Aus-
tralia. The organization  embodied in the trea-
ties involving an independent  permanent
Commission  to prepare and propose policies
for decision  by a governing body of ministers,
after being debated by a representative  as-
sembly,  was something quite new in inter-
national institutions.
It is true that among its supporters  were
those who believed that at some future date
a blueprint would be prepared for a political
community, to deal particularly with foreign
policy and the relations of the Community
with the outside world, and also probably a
defense community,  which would give Europe
a degree of independence  from its major ally,
the United States, which it had hitheno lacked.
Today nobody believes that the Community
will set about dealing with these problems in
this way. Instead the last five years have shown
that the Community  institutions and the
member states together have developed ad
hoc arrangements to meet the new circum-
stances they are all facing.
Perhaps the most important of these is the
regular four-monthly  meeting  of the heads of
government known as the European  Council.
No provision for this is made in any of the
treaties. Indeed  when French President  Georges
Pompidou invited other heads of Government
to join him for a summit meeting in Paris in
October 1972 there were some, among them
many good Europeans, who challenged the
right of heads of Government to meet in this
way and to lay the lines of development of
the Community for the rest of the decade.  At
that meeting  a detision  was taken to reassem-
ble in four years'time. Only a year later, after
the oil crisis, heads of Government  realized
that the business  of the Community  could not
be carried on unless they met at least every
six months. Now they do so every four months,
combined with a considerable number of bi-
lateral meetings.
Another important example  is the stan which
has been made on formulating a common for-
eign policy at regular  meetings of the ministers
of foreign affairs. These developments  spring
from a pragmatic approach which can be
described as typically British, but which has
in fact been found by all its members to meet
the real needs of the Community without  in-
volvingit in the unnecessary doctrinal  debates
as to whether this should become a federal
or a confederal entity. I am sure that it is this
approach that will govern the future nature
of our European  institutions. A further  im-
petus will continue to be given to this by the
directly elected  members  of the European
Parliament.
The application of Greece, Spain, and Por-
tugal for membership of the Community  also
clearly demonstrates that the Community is
not a static organizaion  but a means of cre-
ating an ever wider community  in Europe. All
three countries  have recently moved from
authoritarian  regimes to democratic  parlia-
mentary systems. As such they are politically
to be welcomed into the Community. At the
same time, as the negotiations show, their
admission provides considerable  economic
problems for the existing members. France
and Italy will be confronted with competition
in agricultural  products, soft fruits, citius, and
wine and the Community may well find itself
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industries in the Community will face  more 
competition, particularly in the field of tex-
tiles and other consumer goods, from the new 
members. 
Although this presents problems, the seri-
ousness  of which  should  not be  underesti-
mated, it also provides the Community with 
opportunities  for  taking  decisive  action  on 
new policies which will enable it to expand 
to 12 whilst, at the same time, accommodat-
ing the resources and the production of the 
additional Mediterranean countries. It  will be 
an incentive to create an expanding economy 
which  will  effectively  absorb  the  industrial 
products. It will bring about strong pressures 
to reorganize Mediterranean agriculture so as 
"An  exciting  prospect  would  be 
opened  if the  Community  were  to 
establish  a  modus  vivendi  between 
the transnational companies and the 
Governments of developing countries 
which would be beneficial to both." 
to reduce the surpluses of existing products 
and  make  the  Community  more  self-sup-
porting in other basic foodstuffs such as maize 
and soybeans. The fact that the Community 
will need to deal with these problems through 
properly thought-out overall policies will also 
support the impetus for Community action in 
other spheres. 
One of the undoubted successes of the first 
25 years of the Community has been the cre-
ation of a fresh relationship with the former 
colonial territories of the member states. This 
association,  at first  suspect to  many of the 
developing countries outside the Community, 
has been widened since the enlargement took 
place in  1973. In  many ways its  nature has 
also changed. The Community has been able 
to finance development in these countries, 
consume their basic raw materials and food-
stuffs, and at the same time provide a market 
for  a  growing quantity of their industrial 
products. 
In  negotiations  for  fresh  agreements,  the 
Community may well be able to create prec-
edents for  the relations between North and 
South as  a whole.  One of the major preoc-
cupations of the industrial West is  the rapid 
fall in the exploration and mining of minerals 
because of political uncertainty about the sta-
bility of many developing countries and their 
future attitudes towards any investment made 
in  them. This is  bound to lead within a few 
years to world shortages of some basic raw 
materials. The problem is  largely one of the 
relationship between the large transnational 
companies which carry out this  form of in-
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vestment and the Governments of developing 
countries  which  feel  themselves  to  be  poor 
and weak in the face  of these giants. An ex-
citing  prospect  would be  opened  up  if the 
Community were able to establish a modus 
vivendi between the transnational companies 
and the Governments of developing countries 
which would be beneficial to both. In this, as 
in the past, the Community is  aided by  the 
fact that it is  a new organization and of it-
self-as apart from its constituent members-
has no colonial past to embarrass it. 
The  fact  that the  Community  is  making 
these attempts to ensure the supply of raw 
materials  and  to increase  world trade in  a 
liberal trading context does not exonerate it 
in any way from the effective use of its own 
resources. There is an interesting contrast in 
the  comparatively  small  difference  between 
the total domestic product of  the United States 
and that of the European Community and the 
large gap between the achievements of the two 
economies. 
The United States is able to maintain a vast 
defense program, including the continuing 
development of nuclear weapons, to carry out, 
rightly or wrongly, a number of huge space 
projects, and to support individual industries, 
such  as  civil  aviation and computers which 
scoop  the  world pool.  In  Europe  we  have 
reached no such position.  Can it be that in 
our continent too many firms and too many 
Governments in too many countries are trying 
to achieve the same objective when in fact in 
modern conditions there is insufficient room 
for them all to do it successfully? In the private 
sector this requires the rationalization of our 
free-enterprise services which must be carried 
out by  the  firms  themselves.  In  the  public 
uThe ultimate result might well be 
a still greater disparity between the 
standard of living  of Western Eu-
rope and the Soviet bloc." 
sector it requires concerted action by govern-
ments at the highest level to make decisions 
on a rational program which takes into ac-
count overall each member's national interest. 
If, as  a result, the Community were able to 
increase  the scope of its  industrial achieve-
ments it would at the same time be  able to 
benefit its European neighbors by expanding 
its trade with them. Moreover it would have 
a broader base on which  to secure its  own 
defense.  In  the process it would enable Eu-
ropeans to enjoy a richer, fuller life. 
The  ultimate  result  might  well  be  a  still 
greater disparity between the standard of liv-
ing of Western Europe and the Soviet bloc. 
The Iron Curtain might become more firmly 
entrenched than ever  before.  However well 
established a modus vivendi between the con-
flicting ideologies may become, it is difficult 
to visualize within a measurable time span a 
situation in  which the COMECON countries 
develop liberal economies which will enable 
them  to  work as  one  within the European 
Community. However much individual mem-
bers of the Soviet bloc wish to expand their 
trade with the rest of the world, to become 
members  of international economic organi-
zations and to give the impression of drawing 
closer to the members of the Community, they 
still  internally  maintain  authoritarian  re-
gimes, completely unacceptable to the West-
ern democracies. Strangely enough the more 
liberal they appear in their outward stance to 
the rest of the trading world, the more illiberal 
their regimes seem to become internally. Nor 
can one yet see a situation in which the Soviet 
Union  will  be  prepared to  allow any  of its 
satellites to move outside its orbit even though 
at times they may appear to stray somewhat 
from its path. 
This  does  not mean to say that Western 
Europe,  and in  particular  the  Community, 
should not continue to expand trade with its 
Eastern neighbors. We  should help them to 
improve the standard of living of their people 
by providing them with modern technology 
and with large credits with which to support 
it,  always  providing that it is  not of direct 
assistance  to  Soviet  military  strength.  Al-
though we may not be able to determine the 
time span in which a more liberal society can 
evolve behind the Iron Curtain, there is every 
reason  to continue our efforts  to open the 
windows through which  the citizens  of the 
Eastern  bloc  can look out upon  and  com-
municate with the Western world. 
From Europe came the explorers, the nav-
igators, the traders, the missionaries, who 
carried with them the values and traditions 
of centuries of Western civilization. There 
followed an era during which the great pow-
ers, that is to say the European powers, tore 
all their own continent apart. Sometimes this 
originated in personal ambition or the desire 
for national domination; at others it was the 
result of trading rivalry or commercial con-
flict. Those days are now past. Europe has to 
play its part in maintaining its defense against 
the threat from outside its boundaries but it 
can devote more of its  resources  not to in-
ternal conflict but to the development of its 
people  in  the traditions  and culture  which 
have been its heritage over so many centuries. 
More than that. It can convey its values once 
again  to  the world,  not liy  the  sword  but 
through friendly help and with the example 
of free peoples. E 
Reprinted with the permission of Elsevier Publishing ProJects SA, 
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THE TRAGIC DEATHS OF FERNAND SPAAK, CHEF DE CABINET 
to EC  Commission President Gaston Thorn, and of his 
wife Anne have a  special  meaning for the Washington 
community and the many corners of the United States 
that they knew and loved so well. 
Appointed Head of the EC Commission's Delegation 
to the United States in  1976 by  Lord Soames, Spaak's 
task was to put the Delegation on the map and to give 
it the leadership and coherence which up till then it had 
lacked. From the very moment he  arrived he  took the 
Delegation in hand and soon made it one of the most 
professional diplomatic missions in Washington. I recall 
a briefing he gave at an editorial luncheon of the Wash-
ington Post, after which a senior editor remarked "Spaak 
is  one of the most impressive public officials we  have 
ever entertained." 
Always a master of his dossiers, and quick to see the 
political implications in technical issues  such as  trade, 
agriculture, economic and financial affairs, or the arcane 
world of nuclear proliferation, Spaak quickly made his 
mark, not through the style  section of newspapers or 
magazines, but through sheer ability and hard work. Yet, 
he keenly understood the importance of the fourth estate 
in the United States and never condescended to the press. 
Although as a European fonctionnaire it was unnatural 
to him, he became an expert interviewee on radio and 
television. 
To understand Fernand Spaak the  man it was  nec-
essary to see him in his home environment at the official 
residence on Belmont Road. It was there that his literary 
tastes, his love of antique books, his pipe collection, and 
his fondness of gardening, were most in evidence. The 
e)Q:ellence  and generosity of his  wine cellar and table 
were renowned and the guest lists formidable. 
In all this Anne Spaak was an essential partner.  Warm, 
charming, and cultivated, she imbued the Spaak house-
hold with color, texture, and taste. Herself a passionate 
European, she expected other Delegation wives to spread 
the European gospel just as  she did. Who could forget 
that memorable  lunch  for  the  American  media  when 
Black September occupied the neighboring mosque? The 
Spaak residence was immediately converted into an out-
side broadcast unit for television while Anne Spaak plied 
the TV crews endlessly with coffee. Typically she even 
wanted to offer herself as a hostage in the place of some 
children held in the mosque. 
The Spaaks together were indefatigable travelers. Dur-
ing  their  four  years  in  Washington they  visited  every 
state in the Union (except Hawaii). He-addressed Coun-
cils on Foreign Relations, World Affairs Councils, Ro-
taries, Kiwanis, business circles, and countless other col-
lections of "notables." Anne meanwhile would explain 
mainly to women's groups the importance of the  Eu-
ropean idea and the role of women in Europe. The mail 
which followed each visit was eloquent testimony to the 
impact the Spaaks made. 
Fernand Spaak in his  constant pursuit of excellence 
was a demanding colleague. His charm and good looks 
belied  a  man of temperament,  fastidious  about detail 
and impatient of incompetence.  On issues  of real im-
portance Spaak was decisive and visionary and, above 
all, human. 
In Fernand, Europe has lost one of its most talented 
servants, and, for those of us  privileged to work with 
him, not just a colleague, but a lifelong friend.  In the 
Spaaks, together, the United States has lost two friends 
who grew to know, understand, and love the many di-
mensions of this country. Their passing poignantly re-
calls  Shakespeare's lines:  "High events  as  these  strike 
those that make them; and their story is no less in pity 
than his glory which brought them to be lamented." 
ANDREW A.  MULLIGAN 
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President Francois Mitterrand has wasted no time in setting the French 
economy on a course far  different  from  that of most other  Western  nations. 
Paul Lewis reports. 
THE  FRENCH  HAVE  A  TALENT  FOR  DOING  THINGS 
differently. And they are indulging it once again. 
When General Charles de  Gaulle came to power at 
the start of the Fifth Republic some twenty three years 
ago, he said his actions would be guided by "a certain 
idea of France" quite different from everyone else's. Few 
doubt he and his heirs lived up to that promise, trans-
forming France from  an unstable,  agricultural nation, 
bogged down in hopeless colonial wars in Vietnam and 
Algeria,  into a  haughty industrial power with atomic 
weapons, enjoying a greater degree of international pres-
tige than at any time since Napoleon. 
Today,  Socialist  President  Fran~ois Mitterrand can 
also claim to have his own, distinctive view of France's 
role in the Western world, once again very different from 
its neighbours. Within days of capturing the Elysee Pal-
ace and seeing his supporters gain an absolute majority 
in the Parliament, something de Gaulle never achieved, 
Mitterrand unveiled a unique plan, running counter to 
all  conventional wisdom, for restoring prosperity to 
France. His aim is to break out of the recession that has 
gripped all Western nations with varying degrees of in-
tensity  since  the  first  oil  price  explosion of 1973, by 
blasting the French economy back into an orbit of high 
growth and falling unemployment. 
Calling unemployment "the priority of priorities," 
Mitterrand argues that an unfair share of the miseries 
brought on by the West's economic difficulties has fallen 
on the workers and the poor for  too long.  "I have  a 
contract with France for change and I will keep it," the 
new French President said shortly after his election. Just 
as  Ia  continuite was the favorite slogan of the Giscar-
dians ousted during this spring's elections, so the most 
popular word in the French political lexicon today is  le 
changement-change. 
For three years now, Western industrial countries have 
all  more or less  agreed that inflation fighting  must be 
their top economic priority, despite the relentless rise in 
unemployment this has brought. Once hallowed Keyne- Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy will seek to increase Government spending 
sian theories which held that Governments should boost  instead of cutting it.© Ledru, Sygma 
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omy have been discarded as recipes for hyper-inflation. 
"Governments no longer believe  they can spend their 
way back to prosperity," German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt said recently. 
Only when inflation has been beaten, the  argument 
runs, will investment revive and the West return to the 
sustained prosperity and low unemployment it knew in 
the 1950s and 1960s. The way to  beat inflation is  to 
limit public spending, control the growth of the money 
supply, cut oil  imports, and generally reduce Govern-
ment interference in  the workings of the economy, al-
lowing the free play of market forces to determine which 
France: Principal Projections and Indicators, 1977..;..81 
(Percentage Changes, except as indicated) 
Gross national product and components (in volume) 
Gross national·  product 
Consumer expenditure 
Government purrent expenditure 
Gross fixed investment 
Stock building 
1 
Total domestic demand 
Foreign balance 
1 
Output, employment, and costs 
Industrial production 
Employment 
Hourly eamings in manufactuFing 
l:Jnit labor costs in manufacturing 
Unit labor costs of competitor countries
2 
Unemployment rate (actual) 
of the economy, rather than reducing it. In addition, the 
French Socialists plan to curb France's highly ambitious 
civil nuclear power program, increase the country's re-
liance on imported oil,  and limit its  booming foreign 
trade in arms. Moreover, they are pledged to do all this 
without devaluing the franc,  boosting inflation, or re-
treating into protectionism. 
Already the Socialists are starting to reflate in what 
they hope will prove a non-inflationary way  by  trans-
ferring wealth from the richer sections of society to the 
poor, who are expected to spend it immediately, thus 
boosting demand. The minimum wage has been raised 
along with various social security benefits·. Public works 
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981 
3.1  3.7  3.5  1.2  0.4 
3.2  4.7  3.5  2.1  1.5 
1.4  4.3  1.6  2.5  2.2 
-0.8  1.3  3.7  2.0  -2.6 
-0.2  -0.3  1.1  0.1  -0.8 
1.8  3.6  4.4  2.2  -0.1 
1.3  0.1  -0.9  -0.6  0.5 
1.8  2.4  4.5  -0.7  -1.7 
0.5  0.4  -0.1  -0.8 
12.6  14.2  13.4  15.0  14.5 
9.0  8.8  8.3  12.6  13.0 
6.8  6.3  5.1  10.0  8.4 
4.7  5.2  5.9  6.3  7.9 
1The figures indicate the change in stock building, or in the foreign balance, as a percentage of GNf» in the previous year. (They thus indicate the contribution 
of these elements to the growth of GNP.) 
2Weighted average of changes in indices expressed in terms of national currencies. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, July 1981 
companies survive and which go under. 
The outgoing French Government of President Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing and his financially conservative Prime 
Minister,  Raymond  Barre,  accepted  this  so-called 
"monetarist" answer to the world's economic difficul-
ties,  as  does  Schmidt and Britain's Conservative Gov-
ernment. So, too, do most leftist European political lead-
ers. "What do you want me to pay you with ...  confetti?" 
Britain's former Labor Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Dennis  Healey,  would shout back  in  exasperation  at 
leftwingers demanding he reflate the economy by raising 
wages. 
But Mitterrand and his Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, 
the former Socialist party boss  of the declining textile 
area around Lille,  are committed to a  completely dif-
ferent  approach.  Their  alternative  "social  democratic 
answer to the crisis,"  (as  the Socialists call it)  seeks to 
increase Government spending instead of cutting it and 
to step up state intervention in the day-to-day workings 
are  being increased.  The first  batch of some  200,000 
promised new  civil  service  jobs  are  being  advertised. 
Government funds earmarked for bailing out troubled 
companies have been raised. And by 1985 the working 
week will be cut from 40 hours to 35. But all this largesse 
will  be  paid for  this year by  higher taxes  on the  very 
rich  and on banks and oil  companies, next year  by  a 
general reform of the tax code. Only a marginal increase 
is  planned in the Government's budget deficit. 
Then in October, the Socialists plan to move onto the 
second stage of their controversial economic recovery 
program-nationalizing the commanding heights of the 
French economy. Although the Government already owns 
75 percent of the country's banking sector, it will take 
control of all remaining private banks and, in stages, of 
11 major industrial groups. First to go will be Dassault 
and Matra, the armament makers, France's two bank-
rupt steel producers, Sacilor and Usinor, along with three 
big companies heavily into advanced electronics, St. 
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pagnie  Generale  d'Electricite.  Later the  State  will  ex-
tend its  tentacles  over Pechiney,  the  aluminum  giant, 
Rhone-Poulenc,  the synthetic  fiber  and chemical  pro-
ducer,  ITI-France  and  Roussel-Uclaf,  a  German-con-
trolled pharmaceutical giant. 
Just what the purpose of this wholesale extension of 
the public sector is supposed to be has never been spelled 
out clearly by  the Socialists. There is  vague talk about 
directing more credit to small- and medium-size indus-
tries, although the allocation of credit has always been 
state-controlled in France. There is similarly vague talk, 
too, about "restructuring" the nationalized companies 
to create a few larger and more efficient groupings. Yet 
with the exception of the steel makers and Rhone-Poul-
enc, all of the companies on the Socialist "hit list" are 
operating profitably and most are themselves  the  off-
spring of Government-supervised mergers over the last 
10 years designed to transform a host of small, national 
companies into a number of big, multinational ones. 
The truth is, of course, that the Socialists' commitment 
to nationalize so much of French industry and banking 
is  an awkward bit of baggage left over from their now 
defunct electoral pact with the Communists, but which 
Mitterrand was forced to retain to appease the left wing 
of his  own party and to encourage Communist voters 
to support him in districts they could not hope to win 
by themselves. 
The French Communists may have done badly in this 
year's elections,  getting their lowest share of the  vote 
since World War II in the presidential contest and seeing 
their seats in the parliament halved from 87 to 43. But 
they have managed to leave, nonetheless, a vivid imprint 
on the economic platform of the victorious Socialists. 
When the Socialists  have  completed their  nationali-
zation program, France will have the dubious distinction 
of possessing more state-owned industry than any other 
country in the Western world. Theirs will  also  be the 
only Western Government with a complete monopoly 
of credit, apart from Portugal where the banks were all 
nationalized by the Marxist army officers who overthrew 
the dictatorship of Marcello Caetano in  1974. 
The key question about the French Socialists' ambi-
tious and radical economic plans is  whether they pro-
mote greater efficiency, or the reverse. Put another way, 
it is  whether their nationalization and reflation  goals 
prove compatible with their equally ardent promises to 
defend the Franc, to keep France a free-trading member 
of the European Community, and to preserve a healthy 
private sector in its economy. Keeping all these balls in 
the air at the same time,  promises to  be  anything but 
easy. 
Mitterrand starts with several important advantages. 
The Government budget deficit is low by Western stan-
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Two different approaches: The conservative monetarist approach to 
fighting inflation goes out with the former Government of  Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing (left), shown here with the new Socialist President Frant;ois 
Mitterrand. © Gerard Rancinan, Sygma 
dards thanks to ex-Prime Minister Raymond Barre's 
penny-pinching ways, leaving some room for increased 
public spending. The prudent financial  policies  of the 
outgoing Giscardians have also left the Bank of France 
with a formidable war chest of gold and dollars for the 
defense of the franc. France's credit rating remains high 
on international markets enabling the new Government 
to borrow easily to finance part of its spending spree. 
The presence of four  Communist ministers  in  Mitter-
rand's Government, while upsetting for the Reagan Ad-
ministration, probably ensures it a longish honeymoon 
with the trade unions. Above all nationalization is  not 
necessarily the dirty word in France that it is in America, 
with its overtones of Marxism and inefficiency. 
France has a tradition of large, well-run, state-owned 
enterprises which are fully  competitive on world mar-
kets. Renault, the automobile maker and Aerospatiale, 
the  aviation and armaments company,  both of which 
were originally nationalized by General de Gaulle after 
World War II, are examples; as are the big three state-
owned banks, Banque Nationale de Paris, Credit Lyon-
nais, and Societe Generale. 
But France's new Socialist Government is already us-
ing up the precious margin of maneuver these advantages 
give  it, fairly  quickly. Mitterrand's reflationary efforts 
are expected to eliminate the slight contraction the Or-ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
forecast in the economy this year and improve the modest 
1.5 percent real growth foreseen in 1982. But if world 
interest rates stay high, it is unlikely to lift growth sub-
stantially over 4 percent next year, as  a recent study of 
the Socialist's economic program by Chase Econometrics 
suggests. And even if growth did improve, Chase Econ-
ometrics  still  warns  that unemployment will  do  little 
more than level  out around the  present figure  of 1. 7 
million because of the large  number of school-leavers 
entering the labor market. 
Meanwhile, the e~ternal constraints on the Socialists' 
freedom of action are becoming increasingly apparent. 
The franc is only being supported by draconian exchange 
controls. Inflation, already 14 percent when Mitterrand 
took over, is starting to accelerate as a result of the franc's 
fall against the dollar. Faster domestic growth promises 
to suck in more imports, wiping out the hoped-for re-
duction in France's $6 billion current-account deficit this 
year. Like successive British socialist Governments in the 
1960s and 1970s France's new rulers will find it difficult 
in  practice  to  reconcile  their  commitment to  cut un-
employment with their determination to stave off a po-
litically embarrasing devaluation of the currency, which 
would only add to their economic difficulties by increas-
ing the cost of imported oil and other goods paid for in 
dollars and further boosting inflation. 
But what worries many economic commentators more 
than how the economy itself performs over the next few 
months, is the danger that the Socialists will slow down 
the needed restructuring of French industry to meet the 
difficult world trading conditions ahead, in order to 
maintain employment. As Yves Laulan, chief economist 
at the  Societe  Generale,  put it:  "What is  most to  be 
feared is not so much short-term economic fluctuations, 
but the progressive creation of structural distortions in 
the economy by the Socialists' policies." 
Big  companies  fret  that under  Socialist  rule  it will 
become politically impossible to shed surplus labor. 
Owners of small  firms  worry that high  taxes  and in-
creased red tape will stifle entrepreneurial spirit. As dis-
illusionment with the results of their  radical new policies 
sets in, many observers fear that France's new Socialist 
rulers will  be tempted to move toward protectionism, 
price controls, ~nd a siege economy. 
It shpuld not be  forgotten  that the French Socialist 
party already contains a powerful Marxist wing, rea4y 
for more radical measures than the Government prograp1 
envisages.  By  bringing the Communists into the  Gov-
ernment, Mitterrand hopes to weaken them, forcing the 
leadership to compromise on its principles and encour-
aging more of the rank and file to switch their allegiance 
to the Socialists as the leading force for radical change 
in Fran~e. But this strategy could backfire if the economy 
goes  sour. The Communist ministers  might then walk 
out of the  Government with their  prestige  enhanced, 
denouncing the  Socialist economic program as  inade-
quate to deal with the crisis. 
Already it is  clear that much more than economics is 
at stake in France's radical bid to break out of the world 
recession. Overnight, france,  has been transformed from 
a hard currency country and one of the pillars of Europe's 
fixed-exchange-rate  monetary  system,  into  a  soft-cur-
rency one whose continued adherence to the European 
Monetary System  is  in  doubt-"the Italy of northern 
Europe," as  one Western ambassador puts .it. The po-
Young French  workers check job announcements at this free  employment 
service. French  unemployment has reached nearly 8 percent. © Alain Keler, Sygma 
litical consequences of this change are emerging. 
France's  traditional  special  relationship  with  Ger-
many, which in the past has been a major driving force 
for closer political integration in Europe, is now in trou-
ble.  Schmidt has not concealed his  distaste for Mitter-
rand's economic policies,  which he  fears  will  weaken 
France and undermine support for inflation fighting and 
free trade throughout the West. Already, smaller Western 
countries are growing restive with the West's joint com-
mitment to restrictive  economic policies  and glancing 
enviously at the example set by Socialist France. 
Right now Mitterrand seems to be trying to compen-
sate for  his  controversial economic stance in his  allies 
eyes  by  taking a super-hard anti-Soviet line  in foreign 
policy, attacking Germany and Britan for their "neutralist" 
tendencies and encouraging the Reagan Administration 
to match the build up of Soviet SS-20  nuclear missiles 
by  modernizing  the  Nort~ Atlantic Treaty  Organiza-
tion's nuclear arms. But if the Socialists' economic pol-
icies go  seriously wrong, it will  become hard for them 
to maintain France's traditiqnally high level of defense 
spending. The country could then become another Brit-
ain-a model  ally  of the  United States  on paper,  but 
without the means to back it up in practice. E 
Paul Lewis is a New York Times correspondent in  Paris. 




Street rioting by white and black youngsters
in some of England's  inner city areas this sum-
mer has dealt a severe blow to the complacent
and widely held belief that the United King-
dom remains a'socially stable, cohesive,
peaceful country with a respect for tradition,
established authority, and the rule of law. The
nightly television pictures in July of burning
buildings, mobs throwing stones and gasoline
bombs, and iniured policemen came as a shock
to most British people, let alone the rest of
the world.
For Conservative Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, Britain's  short hot summer of inner
city violence  came as an unexpected  warning
of the strains being imposed on British society
by the return of mass unemployment  and years
of economic  disappointment. She admitted
that the riots had brought her the greatest
anxiety since she came to power iust over two
years ago. Certainly they placed a serious
question mark over the Government's  entire
economic and social strategy, its monetarist
experiment to cure the country's  ills through
cuts in spending programs,  and the control
of the money supply.
Thatcher's  rather harsh and strident reac-
tion to the inner city riots aroused widespread
criticism but the Prime Minister has always
taken pride in being a "warrior" not a "healer."
For all her natural concern, she still appears
concerned that no real alternative exists to
her own anti-inflationary  policy whatever the
risks it carries for social conflict.
But the new force in British politics, the
Social Democratic Party (sop), provided in-
stant evidence  that the British have not lost
their affinity for the middle-of-the-road 
"p- proach. In July, the sop made a stunning elec-
toral debut in the by-election in Warrington,
Lancashire.  Roy Jenkins, co-founder of the
parry, former  Labor cabinet minister and for-
mer President of the European Communities,
invaded  solid Labor territory and pulled in
42 per cent of the vote.
Labor held on to the seat, but with a vastly
reduced maiority, while the Conservative  can-
didate, garnering a meager  7 per cent, endured
the humiliation of losing his electoral deposit.
The result was universally  interpreted  as the
strongest of rebuffs to the politics of the ex-
tremes, be they practiced by the dominant  left
of Labor or the right of Thatcher's  Govern-
ment.
The responses to the violence and looting
were perhaps predictable.  Many on the po-
litical right placed the blame for the troubles
on left-wing extremists  who they alleged were
conspiring to subvert the established  order in
society through the manipulation of young
people. It was suggested  that four masked
men were traveling around Britain from one
inner city area to another  stirring up hatred
against the police. The tough, chief constable
of Manchester, James Anderton, spoke of "real
anarchy" and intervention by outside strangers
in the savage rioting in the Moss Side area of
his city.
Such accusations should not be dismissed
out of hand as the figment of fevered  imag-
inations in search of a scapegoat.  Some left-
wing extremists were eager to exploit the riot-
ing for their own revolutionary ends and they
made no attempt to disguise their goals. A
leaflet was distributed by the Marxist-dom-
inated Labor Party young Socialists in Tox-
teth which appeared  to condone and encour-
age attacks on tlie local police. A handful of
ultra-left militants did urge channeling  the
energies of the young rioters into positive
political action on the streets.  But, rightly, few
people in Britain were ready to believe that
theJuly troubles were part of a grand political
conspiracy.
Indeed, the impression  was much more that
the white and black youngsters  involved were
not motivated  by some revolutionary view of
the world. On the contrary, they seemed  to
have no overtly political interest at all. Ob-
vious attempts to mobilize emotions for po-
litical ends met with widespread indifference
and often with downright hostility.  Many
police chiefs in the riot-torn  areas insisted that
the rioting was criminality,  pure and simple.
Looters  line up to enter a iewelry store after rioting in Toxteth in July.  @ Keystone Press Agency
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Oxford, questioned:  "'What in the name of
goodness  are these young people doing on the
streets indulging in this behavior at midnight?
Are their parents not interested in their fu-
tures? Is there no discipline that can be brought
to bear on these young people?"
Oxford (and Thatcher)were  far from alone
in condemning  the dogmas of the "permissive
society" or in taking dead aim at the falli-
bilities of the educational  system or the per-
ceived collapse of parental discipline. Some
of the remedies proposed-the return of cor-
poral punishment,  summary arrest, making
parents liable for the damage caused by their
children, and strengthening the muscle of the
polic+are  far from new and certainly do not
command universal backing.
Even the beleaguered police force was vis-
ibly reluctant to make use of the tools that
Home Secretary  William Whitelaw  told the
House of Commons  they could use, such as
water cannons, armored cars, and plastic bul-
ets. Such recourses,  several police chiefs ar-
gued, could undermine their traditional meth-
ods of preserving law and order (of which
more later). After all, in spite of the wide-
spread looting, arson, and rioting, the police
continued to exercise a restraint in the streets
remarkable by the standards of America's
urban disturbances  in the late 1960s or even
those in Amsterdam, Zurich, and West Berlin
earlier this year.
In looking for causes (and perhaps solu-
tions) four interconnected  areas seem para-
mount; the issue of unemployment,  particu-
larly in the cities, and flowing from that, the
attitudes  of the young, the existence of racism,
and the relations between the police and ra-
cially mixed communities.
There can be no doubt that youth unem-
ployment is a maior cause of the inner-city
violence.  More than half the school-leavers  in
Britain this summer will find no immediate
work to do. Nearly half the nation's jobless
are under the age of24.
The inner city areas are particularly de-
prived. In Toxteth in Liverpool, for example,
it is estimated that 47 per cent of black young-
sters and 42 per cent of the whites are un-
employed. The figures are equally horrific in
the Brixton  area  of. London and in Moss side,
Manchester. The levels of unemployment  are
more than twice as high for young blacks as
they are for young whites.
Industry has moved away from the inner
city areas to the suburbs and new towns, so
there are far fewer manual iobs available for
the many unqualified  and unskilled  young
people in search of work. The present  slump
in Britain, the worst in half a century, has
also hit job opportunities in the service and
distribution sectors, where many young peo-
ple used to find jobs in the more affluent past.
Skinheads tnarching  with the British Mouement
last year. @ Keystone  Press Agency
Added to the unemployment  crisis for the
young are relatively poor housing, the col-
lapse of the family network, and uncaring
local Government. They constitute a depress-
ing cycle of urban decay. Many young people
are in despair  as a result. Until recently, rising
unemployment  had not appeared to provoke
any violence from its victims. Being without
work tends to isolate individuals  from one
another. It encourages  inertia, apathy, a dis-
inclination to become involved in protest.
But the young are now in a more rebellious
mood. Ten years ago the way to upset au-
thority  was to grow hair long, wear love beads,
and preach peace. Now there is a new tough-
ness, a macho style among the punks, skin-
heads, and the "heavy metal" brigade. Bald
heads, boots, and Nazi regalia are now de
rigeur among  the young working class. There
is a contempt for authority,  a love of action
for its own sake. Even before the July riots,
worries  were growing about the mounting
crime wave of muggings of old people, petty
theft, and vandalism.  Some observers  see the
events of mid-summer  as merely the logical
escalation  of individual random violence  into
something larger.
The Government  rushed through more fi-
nancial aid to help the young unemployed
before Parliament  went into summer recess.
But this may not do much to ease the crisis
of the inner cifies. The former Conservative
minister Enoch  Powell suggested  that the July
riots vindicated  his warnings  about black im-
migration  made 13 years ago, but it would
be an over-simplification to jump to the con-
clusion that the inner ciw troubles were racial
in origin.
Certainly some of the rioting  was sparked
off by incidents involving blacks and whites,
such as in the Indian community of Southall,
in London,  when two coachloads of white
skinheads arrived in the area for a pop con-
cert, shouting racist abuse, smashing shop
windows, and harassing  an elderly Indian lady.
In Brixton,  where serious violence broke out
earlier in the summer,  there was renewed con-
flict when a white policeman  tried to arrest
a young black youth. The disturbances  in
Toxteth were similarly sparked.
In each case a common denominator  was
poor relations  between  the police and the lo-
cal community. Complaints  about police ha-
rassment of the black West Indian community
in Brixton have become wide-spread  recently.
The riots in the spring followed a big police
operation by men in plain clothers to catch
drug pushers and petty thieves through a stop
and search of suspects.  The eminent high-
court iudge Lord Scarman  was appointed by
Thatcher to enquire into the causes of the
earlier Brixton riots and some of his first com-
ments suggest he will take a critical look at
policing methods?hen he reports later in the
yeat.
A major problem is obviously that there
are very few blacks in the British police. The
metropolitan police in London have only 12
blacks on the entire force. The picture looks
no better in Liverpool, Manchester, or other
major cities. The police retain widespread
popularity among the white majority in Brit-
ain. There is still a tendency to see the police
as beyond  reproach  and cases of individual
abuse of police powers  have done little to dent
the overall favorable image. But the defensive
attitude of the police has done nothing  to
reassure  those who live in the inner city areas.
There is a clash of culture, a mutual incom-
prehension of differing life styles. It will not
prove easy to overcome this problem.
Thatcher has already said that Britain's  in-
ner city problems  will not be solved merely
by throwing money at them. A decade ago
the United  States took positive action to ease
the problem of the ghettos. Despite the riots
and the Vietnam war, America was an afflu-
ent, dynamic  nation with a high rate of eco-
nomic growth. But Britain is fast becoming a
relatively poor country with zero growth, fall-
ing industrial output, high inflation,  and the
worst unemployment  since the great depres-
sion of the 1930s. It lacks confidence,  the
spirit of "can do."
In the cozy afterglow of the royal wedding,
there is a danger of trying to avoid the difficult
issues. But time is running out. It will need a
revival of political statesmanship to resolve
Britain's crisis. (
Robert Taylor is the labor correspondent of the
London Observer.
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Guy d,e Jonquieres on the chWi,ng internationnl face of tel,ecm'muninati,on's.
ALONG \gITH THE AUTOMOBILE,  AIR TRAVEL, AND PERHAPS
also television, the telephone  has been one of the most
powerful forces at work this century to expand the fron-
ii.tr of individual freedom. Most of us expect, without
thinking twice about it, to be able to lift our receivers
and talk to anyone we choose, whether they live iust
around the corner or several thousand  miles away. If for
any reason we are prevented  from doing so, we tend to
react as though we have been arbitrarily deprived of a
basic human right.
Yet in most countries of the world the telecommun-
ications industry is organised along lines that are far
from democratic. \7ith few exceptions, it is the fief of
large, impersonal bureaucracies, some of which hold
viriually dictatorial powers. Many nog only set the rules
but decide who plays by them. Often, there is only one
player.
Gradually, though, this rigid pattern is starting to
change. The effects have so far been most noticeable in
the United States, where decisions by the courts and
regulatory  authorities have chipped away over the last
decade at American Telephone and Telegraph's (nrecr)
monopoly over much of the telephone service. Now,
pr.s.rt.s are building in Europe' too' for a swing toward
more liberal policies which could have far-reaching con-
sequences.
These trends are only partly due to a fashionable re-
action against the concentration of economic and in-
dustrial power in relatively few hands. Indeed, since the
Reagan Administration  came into office the political
climate in the United States has clearly turned against
energetic trust-busting  and now appears more favorable
to corporate bigness than at any time in recent history.
A more important and universal  reason is that ad-
vances in technology are fundamentally  altering the in-
dustry's business. Until now) telecommunications  has
been predominantly  concerned with transmitting  human
speech. But in future, more and more of the information
humming across the wires or through the ether will be
in the form of computer data. In the United States, the
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volume of data communications  is expected to grow by
as much as 30 percent annually this decade, about three
times faster than voice traffic.
It will also become increasingly difficult to distinguish
befween the two types of communication. This is because
analog systems) which transmit sound waves corre-
sponding exactly to changes in the speaker's voice, are
being steadily replaced by digital herworks. These con-
vert speech sounds into a stream of fast-moving elec-
tronic pulses which are virtually identical to computer
language.
The basic principles of digital communications are not
new-they were established  before \7orld'$Var II. But
other branches of technology  have had to catch up before
they could be widely applied outside the laboratory. Only
recently have developments like the low-cost silicon chip,
optical fibers, and communications  satellites  made it
economic to introduce digital exchanges and transmis-
sion systems.
The consequences of this "convergence" between
computers and communications  are f.ar-reaching, open-
ing the door to many new types of servicg. A few ex-
amples:
o Videoconferences, linking business executives in dis-
tant cities by means of closed-circuit television. Though
still expensive to use, these services promise to reduce
sharply the need for business travel in the future.
o Electronic mail. A message is typed into a computer
terminal and flashed within seconds to its destination,
where it is reproduced on a display screen or printer.
o Electronic libraries. Vast quantities of written infor-
mation can be stored in a remote computer and retrieved
and processed on small terminals from anywhere in the
world.
o Home information services. Televisions or personal
computers can be linked to huge networks, enabling
consumers to pay bills, check bank accounts, reserve
airline seats, or order goods by manipulating controls
on their sets.The "information  revolution" is already starting to
cut across the traditional boundaries of broadcasting,
publishing, entertainment,  financial services and other
industries. In the United States, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission  (rcc) gave it a powerful push last
year by voting to exempt from regulation communica-
tions services which involved computer processing of
data. \7hile intended to stimulate competition, the de-
cision also reflected the FCC's view that advances in tech-
nology were making it increasingly pointless to try to
distinguish between the two types of business.
The decision is proving difficult to implement,  how-
ever. There is still much controversy, in particular, over
whether AT6cr should be free to enter the newly dereg-
ulated market. The pcc ruled that it cotrld, provided it
did so by setting up by next March a separate subsidiary.
But the ruling is. being vigorously contested in the courts
by the Justice Department  and a number of companies
which fear that AT6cT would swiftly dominate  the market.
A final resolution may require the rewriting by Congress
of the 1,934 Communications  Act.
In Europe, in contrast to the United States, Govern-
ment authorities are directly involved in the operation
of the telecommunications  industry. \7ith few excep-
tions, responsibility for providing national public tele-
communications  services is entrusted not to privately-
owned companies but to state monopolies known as
prrs, which exercise extensive powers. They have ex-
clusive rights to build national telecommunications net-
The German cotnpdny  Nixdorf AG manufactures  tltese data terminals  at
its plant in Massachusetts.  Courresy  of Nixdorf Computer
works, control acgess to them, determine  what types of
traf.fic they carry) and set tariffs. They also decide what
apparatus subscribers  may use and, in many cases, are
the monopoly suppliers of equipment.
But a sizeable breach is about to be driven into this
monolithic structure by Britain. Inspired by US dereg-
ulation, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Govern-
ment will start dismantling this autumn the monopoly
of British Telecom, the telecommunications  arm of the
Post Office. The Government  is motivated  not only by
a distaste for state intervention in the economy in general,
but also by its conviction that freer competirion  is the
most effective mechanism for realizing the full benefits
of the latest advances  in communications technology. It
believes that British Telecom is too bureaucratic  and
inefficient to respond adequately to market needs.
The first bulwark to be attacked is British Telecom's
far-reaching  equipment monopoly. Over the next three
years, the rules will be steadily relaxed to allow sub-
scribers to buy a much wider range of apparatus on the
free market, instead of being obliged to accept only prod-
ucts supplied to British Telecom by its main manufac-
turers. Authority for certifying equipment will be trans-
ferred from British Telecom to a new, independent body.
Much more controversial is the Government's  pro-
posal to allow private competitors to lease capacity on
British Telecom's  circuits and offer freely commercial
services like electronic mail. The Government  is also
considering  sanctioning  the creation of independent
communications  networks. A consortium  of big British
companies has already been formed to build an advanced
network for business users, for which it is seeking official
approval. Ironically, the Government  owns substantial
shareholdings in two of the companies involved, the
British Petroleum oil group and Cable and'$Tireless, an
international telecommunications company. Other groups,
including IBM, are looking at the possibility of starting
business satellite services.
British Telecom is fiercely opposed to the ending of
its nenryork monopoly. Like AT6cT, it has voiced fears
that private competitors will cream off profits on its most
lucrative  business,  notably long-distance traffic, while it
must continue to carry loss-making operations. It has
warned that it may have to recoup through politically
controversial  increases in local subscriber charges. Though
the debate about the economic impact of liberalization
has been far from conclusive until now, the state of
British Telecom's finances, already cramped by official
restrictions  on its borrowing powers, may influence the
speed at which the Government implements its plans to
allow freer network competition.
From across the Channel, other European prrs are
pondering somewhat  nervously the changes confronting
one of the leading members of their "club." None is yet
EURone  September-October  7981 37Heinz Nixdorf, chairman  of the
board of Nixdorf AG.
certain how the British experiment will work out in
practice. But most are uncomfortably aware that it could
have wider repercussions which would affect their own
positions.
In fact, a number of them have already been quietly
trimming their monopolies  in response to market de-
mand. In both Belgium and the Netherlands, the rules
have been bent more than once to meet the requirements
of big multinational companies which hinted gently that
they might consider locating elsewhere  if they could not
obtain the services they wanted. In France, which is
investing heavily to modernise its telecommunications
network and introducing new facilities like videotex in-
formation services, the monopoly over subscriber equip-
ment has been relaxed. A wide selection of receivers  can
now be purchased off-the-shelf  at retail stores.
Germany continues to enforce one of the strictest re-
gimes in the EC, but pressures for relaxation are growing
ih.r., too. Earlier this year, the national monopolies
commission accused  the Bundespost  (German Post Of-
fice) of distorting  market forces and impeding innovation
This electronic home information system  prouiding news, information,  and
in-home shopping,  was giuen a trial run last year in Coral Gables, Florida.
Courtesy AT&T
by pursuing excessively restrictive practices. Similar ob-
jections have been made by manufacturers. One of the
most vocal critics is Heinz Nixdorf, head of the rapidly-
expanding Nixdorf Computer.  He has complained that
the Bundespost took so long to approve one of his com-
pany's new products-an ingenious telephone termi-
nal-that it was out of date by the time it was allowed
to be sold. He has also indicated that Nixdorf's decision
to start manufacturing  in Massachusetts a few years ago
owed much to liberal US policies.
Many experts believe that prrs will have to amend
their practices further in response to pressure from in-
fluential business  users. Good communications  is be-
coming increasingly vital to the international competi-
tiveness of companies,  which are now demanding  more
sophisticated  facilities-and  greater freedom to use them
flexibly-than have been available in the past.
The prrs will have to make a massive effort to meet
these demands. To do so will mean wholesale  modern-
ization of the ground-based communications  networks
which constitute their main assets. But ripping up mil-
lions of miles of copper wire arid replacing it with ad-
vanced transmission  circuits made of optical fiber will
take many years.
The cost will be huge and will continue to rise as the
pace of technological change accelerates. The gap be-
tween each new "generation" of telephone exchanges
has already shrunk in the past decade to less than 10
years from about 25, with dramatic implications  for the
conservative depreciation policies of the PTTs. Many of
them will probably be forced into closer collaboration
on equipment  purchases in the future. British Telecom
and the German Bundespost  are already discussing co-
ordinating their orders for optical fiber to maximize
economies of scale.
Most European governments have smiled on PTT mon-
opolies because they have been highly profitable. But it
is uncertain whether attitudes in national capitals will
remain as complaisant  if the PTTs are forced to make
politically controversial  increases in subscriber  charges
and to borrow heavily on crowded capital markets to
sustain rising investment programs. The future of their
iron-clad monopolies will look even less secure if it can
be demonstrated that allowing private competition  freer
rein to operate services on their networks would increase
their revenues by generating extra traffic.
Britain's experiment in liberalization goes to the heart
of these issues. However it turns out, it seems clear that
Europe as a whole is in the grip of powerful new eco-
nomic and technological forces which will transform the
face of its communications  industry during the rest of
this century.  C
Guy de !onquieres reports on high technology for the Financial
Times.
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chips: high stakes
Howurd Banks suggests futrope and the United
States may need to collaborate.
Microelectronics-implanting tiny pieces of
silicon with thousands of minianrre transis-
tors and other circuits to make a computer
or memory on a chip-was invented  in
America. And the American industry, unsur-
prisingly, dominates the world market, sup-
plying over 50 percent of the $15 billion of
all sorts of semiconductors estimated  to have
been purchased  in the world in 1980.
Sometimes,  however,  the public could be
forgiven for believing that the American sem-
iconductor business  was about to be swal-
lowed whole by the Japanese,  whose microe-
lectronics business supplied 22 percent  of total
world consumption last year. The public
statements  of many leaders of the American
industry, at first blush, sound like nothing less
than pleas for protection from Japan. Their
complaints spill over into general criticism  of
European  countries, for protection,  sheltering
public markets like the postal services,  and
so on.
What worries the Americans  is the very
rapid growth of the Japanese  industry,  which
has developed  from next to nothing over the
past 10 years. ln 1967, Japanese production
of the all-important  integrated  circuit chips
was iust $7 million and, according to the
American Semiconductor  Industry Associa-
tion, iust $137 million in1970.It reached $2
billion last year. The semiconductor  makers
do not want to end up like their opposite
numbers in the consumer electronics industry,
which is now eclipsed by Japanese  and other
Asian makers.  In some sectors,like  videotape
recorder/players,  and domestic hi-fi equip-
ment, imports and sets assembled in America
from foreign-made pafts hold 100 percent of
the American market. Even where American-
owned firms still supply the major part of the
market, as in color television sets, most of
them are now made abroad in countries with
lower wage costs.
More specifically,  Americans  are concerned
at the extraordinary growth of Japanese  sales
in the fastest growing and more important
sectors of the market. For instance in the latest
versions  of random access memory chips, which
can record up to 641000 pieces of information
and which are used in large numbers in to-
day's computers,  the Japanese have 70 per
cent of the world market. This was a tech-
nology invented in America.
The takeover was partly America's own fault,
since its microelectronics  industry  cut back
investment in the 1974-75 recession and was
then caught with too little capacity in the
1978-79 boom. But the Japanese capitalized
doubly  on this failure by supplying American
users with circuits of higher quality than they
could get from domestic  suppliers,  thus re-
taining market penetration  after demand for
random  access memory chips slowed as a re-
sult of recession.
Already  direct exports of Japanese  semi-
conductors to the United States exceed Amer-
ican sales to Japan. Wrong, say the Japanese,
but they include all semiconductors imported
from American-owned  companies, wherever
they are located. The recession in America
has, however, trimmed the trade imbalance a
little in the first part of this year. Imports of
Japanese semiconductors  into the United  States
are down by around one-fifth over a com-
parable period last year, while American  ex-
ports to Japan have declined barely at all.
Negotiations  by the American  semicon-
ductor makers with Washington  are based on
asking for equal treatment  in Japan with Jap-
anese companies, in much the way that'for-
eign companies are treated in the United  States.
As,part of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade negotiations,  the Japanese agreed
to reduce the present 10 per cent import dury
on semiconductors  to 4.2 per cent by 1987.
The United States would reduce its present
5.8 per cent duty in step. American chip mak-
ers want that timetable shortened consider-
ably, while they are strong enough to take
advantage. Government-to-government ne-
gotiations are already under way, with a no-
tional deadline of next spring.
Pleading free trade sounds good in Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan'sWashington,  of course.
And it is accompanied by requests for more
tax breaks on research and development
spending, to help the American industry stay
ahead technologically. But there has been a
subtle shift in the American industry's tack
recently. The complaints  about Europe's  pol-
icy to protect its own high-technology  indus-
try, about the EC's 17 per cent import duty
on semiconductors,  and about preventing  non-
European makers Jrom competing for con-
tracts for telecommunications  equipment,  have
been put a little to one side. How about the
Americans and the Europeans getting to-
gether in some way to beat the Japanese?
There are dark, but unspecified, hints that
this rnight involve horse trading over some
other trading difficulty  between the Ameri-
cans and the Europeans (steel trigger prices,
for example, or textiles). The idea seems to
be to stop the Japanese expanding the 5 per-
cent market share they now have in Europe,
a share built up in only five years. The Amer-
icans, including their numerous plants in the
Common  Market,  have around a70 per cent
share and the Europeans the remaining 25
per cent or so.
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semiconductor industry  more  has  become 
muted in recent months. The Americans point 
to the program funded by the ministry of in-
ternational trade and industry to develop large-
scale integrated circuits, where $50 million a 
year is  being spent, and the latest scheme to 
develop Japan's software industry. 
The Japanese politely  point out that the 
United States has funded a  very similar-
sounding scheme  to  develop large-scale cir-
cuits for military use (spending $210 million 
over four years). The EC has proposed a $140 
million scheme, to run through 1985, to cre-
ate a common basis in design and production 
of large-scale  integrated circuits,  to  investi-
gate computer-aided design (an important tool 
in  designing  modern circuits),  and for  seed 
money to start an equipment industry for 
making semiconductors. The West German, 
French,  and British  Governments are  also 
spending money directly  (for example, Brit-
ain's Inmos investment) or indirectly through 
research and development funding. 
Raising capital is a much thornier subject. 
The American industry constantly claims the 
Japanese makers have a clear advantage be-
cause of the nature of the Japanese financial 
system, which places much less emphasis than 
in  the  United  States  on  quarterly  financial 
returns to investors. Because the systems are 
different  a  resolution  of this  gripe  may  be 
impossible. 
THE  HOUSE 
Integrated circuits will be to the last part 
of the  20th Century what steel  was  to  the 
19th Century.  They seem  likely  to  become 
one  of  the  industrial  world's  largest  com-
modities, with a total output of $75  billion 
or so by  1990. For the discovering country, 
America, to find that Japan is intent on taking 
over as  leading producer must be something 
of a  shock.  Gnostic  Concepts,  an  industry 
consultant with considerable experience with 
the Japanese semiconductor industry, reckons 
that, by  1990, the Japanese industry world-
wide could just have overtaken the American 
industry worldwide in total output. By them 
Gnostic expects that the Japanese could have 
a one-third share of the American market. 
A  recent  announcement of a  massive  in-
vestment by  Nippon Electric in  a factory to 
make  microelectronic chips  in  California is 
merely the first. This $100 million plant, which 
will be one of the most highly automated in 
the world, will be followed by others owned 
by Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Toshiba. Already these 
companies  are  assembling  in  America  (and 
Europe) chips that have been fabricated and 
processed in Japan. 
For those at the receiving  end of Japan's 
push to export its chips and the factories to 
make them, the fundamental problem is get-
ting equal access to the Japanese market. As 
other industries (steel, cars, ball bearings) have 
shown, once a Japanese industry gets larger 
it also invests to become more efficient, until 
there  is  little  hope  for  a  foreign  import to 
compete in the Japanese home market. In the 
meanwhile, the Japanese use non-tariff trade 
barriers, and sometimes highly unofficial bar-
riers, to keep out imports. 
According to American officials, one method 
being used with semiconductors involves cus-
toms valuation, and a trick called uplift. Jap-
anese customs increase the value for customs 
(and tariff) purposes where they believe that 
the declared price is  lower than it should be 
for an arms-length deal, which they equate to 
the price being charged by an American sup~ 
plier to  a  Japanese customer.  Where  an 
American supplier is selling to a subsidiary in 
Japan and the chips are to be used in making 
some product in direct competition with Jap-
anese industry,  uplift is,  it is  claimed,  used 
with vigor. 
Access to Japan's home market is, however, 
not totally impossible. Texas Instruments is 
making chips there, though it is  the only 
American company doing so. IBM is investing 
in a plant to make memory chips for its own 
use  (it  is  to open in  1983  ),  and Siemens  of 
Germany has a joint venture with Fuji Electric 
which  is  due to start making chips this  au-
tumn. Those in the know say that getting a 
plant started in Japan is, for example, no harder 
than taking a majority share in a microelec-
tronics company in, say, France. E 
Howard Banks is  West Coast correspondent for 
The Economist 
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~---------------------------~ EXPORT CREDITS 
can a t·nance wa 
be averted? 
ANNE VORCE 
Whenever the international economic climate 
turns cold, countries seek the warmth and the 
rewards  of foreigQ  markets  with  renewed 
competitive vigor.  Thus it  is  not altogether 
surprising that international attention should 
be  focused  now on one of the more arcane 
and least understood elt;ments of the global 
trading system-the financial subsidy of ex-
ports. What was less predictable, however; to 
all but a handful of experts was that the con-
flicts, philosophical and practical, between the 
industrialized world's three power blocs, the 
United States, the European Community, and 
Japan, would be  as  divisive  as  it is  turning 
out to be. 
Export credit subsidies are the various fi-
nance  arrangements  supported  by  Govern-
ments to promote the sale  of their national 
exports,  particularly  capital  goods.  The  fi-
nancial arr;mgements offered in an export 
package have become as important to the in-
ternational competitiveness of the package as 
price and quality. As  a result, many govern-
ments have become increasingly aggressive in 
promoting  exports  through  financial  com-
petition. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development  (OECD)  has  es-
timated  that export credit  subsidies  of the 
industrialized countries totaled roughly $5.5 
billion in 1980 and may reach $6 billion in 
1981. 
The industrial nations have been seriously 
negotiating in Paris under OECD auspices since 
the early 1970s to establish coordination of 
the diverse national export credit policies. The 
issue dates back to the 1950s when Govern-
ments began to support the financing of in-
creasing capital goods exports, such as man-
ufacturing equipment and plants. At the time 
the private sector was unable to assume the 
risk and lengthy period of financing for these 
products. 
Increasingly fierce competition for markets 
in the 1970s led to the adoption of a consensus 
in 1976 and the refinement of that agreement 
in 1978. However, certain participants-no-
tably  the  United  States-have felt  that the 
arrangement  is  inadequate  and  are  threat-
ening to wage an export credit "war" by dis-
regarding the guidelines  (referred to as 
"derogating") if no accord is  reached by the 
time of the next formal meeting in Paris sched-
uled for early October. 
The existing guidelines set minimum inter-
est rate levels, maximum repayment periods, 
and minimum down payments for subsidized 
credit. The guidelines distinguish between rich 
and poor importing countries, with the less 
developed countries receiving the best finan-
cial terms. The arrangement does not cover 
agricultural  commodit!~s,  aircraft,  military 
equipment, nuclear power plants, and ships 
that· are  subject  to  a  separate  OECD  under-
standing. The guidelines are in the form of a 
gentlemen's  agreement  and parties  who do 
not observe them are expected to notify the 
other participants to allow competition under 
the new terms. 
"I'm suffering from too much sun!" ©  Padry, Le 
Herisson,  Paris 
The basic dispute is  among the European 
Community, the United States, and Japan over 
whether the  existing guidelines  should  be 
changed. In a general sense the debate is based 
on disagreements over the role of Government 
in  trade matters and the importance of ex-
ports to their respective economies. The Com-
munity has taken the position that the existing 
guidelines are adequate and that it would prefer 
to  maintain  these  minimal  regulations  that 
permit member states relatively independent 
conduct of their policies. 
The United States and Japan feel  that the 
guidelines are only the first step toward re-
form of the system and have supported pro-
posals for major changes. Although the United 
States would prefer to eliminate export credit 
subsidies on the grounds that they create trade 
distortions, the United States is willing to ac-
cept fundamental changes in the arrangement 
that would link the guidelines to market forces. 
The Community has opposed this view of 
the role of rp.arket forces. The Americans have 
stated that they will aggressively compete if 
their proposals are not accepted. The United 
States has already selectively derogated from 
the guidelines by extending its loan maturities 
beyond the accepted limit. Japan has argued 
that special  provisions  for  low-interest~rate 
countries should be adopted as  well. 
For over  a  year  negotiations  have  floun-
dered on the question of raising interest rate 
floors, currently in the range of 7.50 to 8.75 
per cent, depending on the national income 
of the importing country. Although market 
iqterest rates were relatively low and nearly 
uniform when minimized subsidized levels were 
first  adopted  in  1976  (and  revised  slightly 
upward in 1980), they are now at record high 
levels  and are widely divergent.  As  a result, 
th~ cost  of official  support has  sharply  in-
creased  among  countries  according  to  na-
tional  interest rate levels  and the  extent of 
official credit support. 
The interest rate question is linked to other 
fundamental  considerations  in  the  negotia-
tions. The European Community has opposed 
a ~ajor increase in interest rates in the short 
run because it does not want to concede the 
US position that subsidized interest rates should 
be related to market rates and currency fluc-
wations. Similarly, the Community does not 
want to agree to Japan's proposed exception 
for low-interest-rate countries since this would 
also suggest an acceptance of the central role 
of market rates. 
In  adqition, the Japanese case is  sensitive 
because the Community does not want to give 
Japan an advantage in low interest rates at a 
time when Japanese penetration of European 
markets and <;:ompetition with the Europeans 
in  third markets continue.  Nonetheless, the 
United States hopes to win a concession by 
the C?mmunity on its  market-rate point by 
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nese issue has been the main stumbling block
in the negotiations since December, according
to knowledgeable Reagan Administration
officials.
The second major area of disagreement
between  the Community  and the United States
concerns mixed credits, which combine ex-
port credits with Government foreign aid. For
-xample, 
a Government  may provide  foreign
assistance  for the down Payment' which usu-
ally does not exceed 25 per cent of the total
financial  package. The resulting financial ar-
rangement  undercuts the export credit guide-
lines by offering a "blended" interest  rate that
is lower than the accepted interest floor. The
current guidelines require notice to all par-
ticipants if the grant element reaches  a certain
level.
The Community  oPPoses anY changes,
whereas the United States wishes to eliminate
all mixed credits  at a certain level. The United
States has been especially critical of France,
which first used the device and which has used
mixed credits to finance about 5 to 10 per
cent of its capital goods exportsr  mainly to
developingcountries.  The French regard mixed
credits as an important  trade policy tool. An
increasing  number of countries are beginning
to use mixed credits to remain comPetitive.
The negotiations  over export credit subsi-
dies reflect an attemPt to balance  national
interest with the need for international  co-
operation. The key to the disagreements  are
the differences in national philosophies,  eco-
nomic structures and current conditions' ex-
acerbated by present  economic  conditions.
The Community  position is based on the
importance of capital goods exports to the
EC member states' economies. Despite the
large increase in Government cost to subsidize
interest rates and mixed credits,  the EC coun-
tries generally feel that the added competi-
tiveness is well worth the price. The extent of
subsidization  and attitudes  toward subsidies
vary within the Community, although  the
member states are negotiating  together in the
interest of EC unity. Germany has a limited
program, while France  and the United King-
doh have the most extensive programs.  For
example, the French export credit subsidy
program has played a major role in French
industrial expansion over the last decade.
The export sector has been a French prior-
ity, particularly in recent years as imported
energy prices have created balance-of-pay-
ments problems.  France's use of subsidies  is
based on the traditional French distrust of
market forces, which is precisely  the opposite
of the United States philosophy.
The basis of the American position is a
philosophical  dislike of Government inter-
vention, a traditional free-trade policy,  and
the Reagan  Administration's  fiscal austerity
program. There hps been disagreement  over
policy inside the Administration  benveen  those
who want to diminish the role of the United
States Export-Impoft Bank in line with the
general reduction of Government spending
and those who feel that the United States must
seriously  compete to avoid hurting important
industries  and ultimately to win any conces-
sions from the Europeans.
Although the early Reagan  approach  cre-
ated some confusion, current policy is a com-
promise between the two sides. While the
United States has unilaterally raised its sub-
sidized interest rate to 10.7 S Per cent to min-
imize next year's anticipated losses for the Ex-
Im Bank, it plans to target certain projects for
fierce competition, probably directed against
the French.
The outlook for further agreement  is un-
certain. With new French and US presidents,
there are signs that some accord  may be reached
at the October meeting. The subfect was raised
by Reagan at the Ottawa summit in July, and
French President  Francgis Mitterrand indi-
cated that he would agree to certain changes,
although the details are t nclear. Following
Ottawa,  US Assistant  Secretary  of State for
Economic  and Business Affairs Robert Hor-
mats stated he was "cautiously  optimistic"
about the October  meeting. The EC member
states are currently  negotiating  a mandate for
the next session. According to most pafties'
this will be the final opportunity  to ward off
an export credit "war." However,  even if an
agreement  is reached  at that time, the issues
are complicated  and problems will undoubt-
edly remain for further negotiation.€
Anne Vorce is a consultant  on international
econotnic  issues. She is based in Washington.
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The Dutch political  summer is proving long
and fractious.  That a center-left coalition
will succeed  one of the center-right  has
been in the cards since the elections last
May 26. But political  marriages are rarely
easily arranged and Holland  has had to en-
dure months of protracted bickering  and
bargaining,  during which the country has
been left in essence without a Government
at precisely  the time when important for-
eign and domestic policy decisions  are beg-
ging to be addressed.
On July 21 three key political  leaders
agreed to offer their parties a proposal  for
a new centerleft coalition Government with
a program  which they felt could be hon-
ored by all. Approval of the proposal,  com-
pleted after nvo months of negotiations,
would allow formation of a new three-
party coalition reflecting the outcome of the
May 26 national elections. Under the plan,
Christian  Democratic  Premier Andries Van
Agt would return as head of a Government
including the Labor Party and the smaller
Democrats '66 with a broad majority of
109 seats in the 150-seat lower chamber of
parliament.
The conservative  partner  in Van Agt's
center-right  Government  over the past four
years, the Liberal Party would be excluded
from the coalition. First Van Agt and Labor
leader Joop den Uyl, whose parties would
get six cabinet posts, endorsed  the proposal
drafted by negotiators appointed  by Queen
Beatrix. But D-55 leader Jan Terlouw said
he had some reservations about the three
ministries  set aside for his center-left party.
After Van Agt consulted his Christian Dem-
ocratic P^rty, it too called for new negotia-
tions on the draft proposal.
Both Terlouw's D-56 members  and the
Christian Democrats felt that former Social-
ist Premier Joop den Uyl, proposed as min-
ister for social affairs, would be taking over
far too much power in the field of social-
economic planning.  The proposal  was that
den Uyl, as minister of social affairs, would
handle problems  concerning employment
and social assistance. It implied that den
Uyl's portfolio would cover mafters con-
cerning investments and taxes, which was
iust too much for the Christian Democrats.
It also irked Terlouw who was proposed as
economics minister. Terlouw said it would
denude  his portfolio of the essentials of
economic planning.
Under the proposed three-party  coalition
the Christian Democrats  and Labor each
would get six ministerial posts and the
smaller D-66 would have three. Labor
would also get the foreign affairs portfolio,
probably awarded to former Foreign Minis-
ter Max van der Stoel, while Terlouw
would have economics and D-66 also
would get defense.
The Christian Democrats said they also
had reservations on the proposals for de-
fense and nuclear armament.  These call for
stepped-up Dutch pressure within the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nero)
for a slowdown in the arms race as well as
moves to reduce  the current Dutch arsenal
of six types of nuclear weapons.
The Dutch Government  would have to
explain to its allies that Holland could not
accept, under present circumstances, the 48
NATo cruise missiles  slated for Dutch soil.
Rather than say "no" next December,  the
Government  would have to postpone a fi-
nal decision until the conclusion of US-So-
viet disarmament talks scheduled  to begin
by the end of the year.
Den Uyl meanwhile  had added a footnote
to the plan stating that his party would
stand by its campaign pledge to reject the
Dutch Premier Andries Van Agt.
long-range theater nuclear weapons, vir-
tually ruling out approval by a cabinet in-
cluding Labor.
"If there is to be a second Van Agt Gov-
ernment on the basis of the draft proposal
of the three political leaders-Ruud Lub-
bers and Jan de Koning, both Christian
Democrats, with Joop van Thiin of Labor,
as now submitted  to the parties, our coun-
try will be saddled with a monstrosity  hav-
ing more flaws than virtues,"  the right wing
newspaper Het Financiele Dagblad wrote.
The same paper, in an editorial, under-
lined the need for mutual trust of the key
figures and pointed out that it is well
known that Joop den Uyl and Van Agt do
not like each other. "A certain degree of
mutual confidence is a necessity and that is
not true of the proposed governmentr"  the
paper said.
On the other hand politicans point out
that there is no alternative.  A coalition of
Christian Democrats and Liberals can
hardly count on a maiority in Parliament. A
combination of Christian Democrats and
Liberals with D-66 appears to be excluded
because Terlouw has stated he will refuse
such a combination.
The leading independent daily NRc Han-
delsblad in an editorial said of the proposed
three-party  coalition:  "Mistrust, even ani-
mosity, characterizes  the present relation-
ship between Christian Democrats and La-
bor, parties condemned to cooperate on the
basis of the election results," adding that
such coalition in a Van Agt Government
with D-65 can hardly be called "a hearty
coalition." NEL SLIS
Athens
A cartoon published  recently in an Athens
Sunday  newspaper showed a bleary-eyed
vacationer  scrambling  out of his tent to
find it covered in political slogans. It was
scarcely  an exaggeration for although  poli-
tics in Greece often lie dormant during the
summer months,  the campaign for this fall's
parliamentary elections has already begun.
The contest promises to be close. Not least
because Greek voters appear ready for
change after seven years of rule by the con-
servative New Democracy Party, swept into
power after the collapse of the Colonels'
iunta.
Some Greeks believe the moment is ripe
for the country's first ever Socialist govern-
ment, and political  pundits say a narrow
victory at the polls for the main opposition
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (resor) un-
der its founder,  Andreas Papandreou, is a
feasible forecast.
Papandreou, the son of Greece's most
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economics  at the University of California at
Berkeley.  As a firey orator both in parlia-
ment and on the hustings, he has advocated
removal of American  bases from Greece,
and an end to Greek participation in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nnro),
and also showed marked lack of enthusi-
asm for Greek entry to the European Com-
munity.
Such policies have in the past caused
concern  among Greece's'Western partners
fearing that a strategically important  ally
might be drawn by rasor into a third
world limbo. But as the prospect of power
comes nearer, PASOK  has moderated its
stance appreciably. Its manifesto, published
in July, reiterates  the party's long-term  de-
termination that Greece should withdraw
from Neto for strategic reasons and join
the nonaligned nations. But no timetable  is
mentioned and the chances are that a PASoK
Government would not seek an early con-
frontation with Greece's NATo allies. On
the EC, Papandreou speaks less often of a
referendum on Greece's continued  member-
ship, more of reexamining  its commitments
to the Community.
While pASoK' s social welfare program,
which emphasizes increased pensions  and
improvements to hospitals and the rudi-
mentary national health system will appeal
to voters, a large question mark hangs over
its plans for "socialization"  or worker rep-
resentation in ownership  and management
of industry. Yet many Greeks may feel jus-
tified in taking the Socialist plunge while
Konstantinos  Karamanlis,  who took over as
President last year after six years as Prime
Minister, is still in charge.
pASoK' s obvious arm is to draw voter
support from the fragmented center of the
Greek political spectrum. Four years ago at
the last elections  for the single 3O0-member
chamber, New Democracy  took 42 Per cent
of the vote while pAsoK  almost doubled its
share to 22 per cent forcing the center into
third place, barely ahead of the Communist
Party.
But the New Democracy politicians claim
they are by no means finished. Under
George Rallis, another Prime Minister's son
who succeeded  Karamanlis  as Prime Minis-
ter, the present Government  is campaigning
on its record-bringing  Greece back into
NATo, ensuring seven years of stable,
though recently curtailed, growth and, ar-
guably its major achievement,  bringing
Greece into full membership of the EC at a
fast clip.
It may still be too early to gauge the ef-
fects of EC entry on the electorate, but few
Greeks  are unaware that they are net bene-
ficiaries of the Community this year to the
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Greek Prime Minister  George Rallis. courtesy of
Embassy of Greece
tune of $270 million. The Government  is
convinced that Greece will register eco-
nomic growth of more than 1 per cent this
year, and that it can make a substantial
dent in the inflation rate, running at more
than 24 per cent last year, twice the EC av-
erage.
Prime Minister Rallis has succeeded in
unifying New Democracy behind him. De-
fense Minister  Evangelos  Averoff-Tossizza,
his rival for the party leadership after Kara-
manlis became head of state, recently
agreed to become  deputy prime minister.
This move has aroused optimism that ultra-
conservative Greek voters, among them
Greece's royalist minority, may return to
the New Democracy fold on polling day.
KERIN  HOPE
Paris
As the rest of the French capital turns to
thoughts  of the approaching  fall and winter
months,  a small band of rag-trade designers




year the ready-to-wear  Paris de-
signers stage elaborate and costly produc-
tions to enforce their control over what
lands in the closets of women. The design-
ers are dedicated to the belief that what
was chic, creative, and comely last season  is
now dated, dull, and dowdy. In the $300
million Paris ready-to-wear  industry,
change is the name of the game.
The spring and summer designs are being
trotted out this fall for buyers and press at
fashion shows more commonly referred to
as "The Collections." They are pure theater
of the absurd. The designers spend an esti-
mated $80,000  to produce  a single 40-min-
ute show. But for an industry that likes to
envelop itself in an aura of class and ele-
gance, their shows sometimes  take the ap-
pearance of a mismanaged rock concert.
The larger shows can seat as many as
2,000 persons.  The crowd often begins
forming  as much as an hour before the
show starts, with a mass of pushing, shov-
ing people waving "strictly personal" invi-
tations in the air and contained only by po-
lice barricades.
Once inside, there is cramped seating in a
stuffy and smoke-filled  atmosphere. The
lucky guests have numbered seats and the
privilege  of stumbling over dozens of pairs
of knees until they reach their assigned
plastic  seats. The unlucky ones have no
marked places and are herded to the back
of the room where they often must compete
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with pillars for a view of the runway.
The shows are almost always a fashion-
able half-hour late in getting under way. If
the delay is much longer, the impatient
crowd begins to stomp feet and clap hands
like Saturday matinee kids waiting for the
movie to begin.
One can fill the time by eavesdropping
on the conversations of the "strictly per-
sonal" invited guests, which besides fashion
buyers and writers include  representatives
of button, textile, and fashion accessory in-
dustries, as well as spies from other fashion
houses and friends of friends of those in the
Paris ready-to-wear  world.
"I can't stand that girl therer" one guest
at a recent show said, pointing to a dolled-
up usherette  shoving an unfortunate
"unassigned"  guest to the back of the
room. Responded  her companion,  "I don't
even know her and I hate her."
With a sudden  blast from gigantic  speak-
ers, the music begins and the show goes on.
The crowd's reaction  is mixed.  There are
fashion groupies who ooh-and-aah  and
moan so much over the new creations thatit sounds like the soundtrack  of an X-rated
film. A few less sturdy types are unable to
cope with the stifling heat. They faint and
are dragged off. Others, perhaps overcome
by one of the free, late-night bashes  thrown
by the fashion industry, nod off into dream
land.
Some of the outfits paraded by the tall,
pencil-thin  models are mere attention grab-
bers and are not meant to grace public
sidewalks. One such outfit consisted  of a
flimsy hip-high slit skirt and plastic breast-
plate complete with belly button indention.
Toward the end of the show, the evening
gowns begin to appear  on the runway. In
recent seasons this often has meant trans-
parent materials and a parade of breasts
and thighs. As one observer noted, "never
have so few worn so little for so many" or,
as one fashion writer recently quipped,
"there's  enough skin being bared to drive a
heterosexual  man wild. Fortunately,  there
aren't many of them around."
CAROLYN  LESH
Luxembourg
Just as Luxembourg's  hold on the European
Parliament looks like it's slipping  irreversi-
bly away, the growth of Euro-buildings  on
the Kirschberg plateau just outside the city
is booming  remarkably.  The most recent in
what is turning out to be a kind of shop
window of modern architecture is the new
headquarters  of the European Investment
Bank. Saddest must be the newly-built
chamber for the European Parliament  ap-
parently  doomed to idleness at least in its
original role. But the most spectacular  is
surely still the building housing the Euro-
pean Court of Justice,  admittedly more like
a modern art museum  than a supreme court
with its trimmings of what look like giant
matchsticks, but still an eye-opener for
most visitors.
Yet having exclaimed over its design
these same visitors invariably end up asking
"'What does it do?" when told who lives in
it. Far less well known than the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in The Hague or the
European Court of Human Rights in Stras-
bourg, the European Court of Justice is the
least conspicuous  of the Community insti-
tutions even if many officials will tell you it
is potentially the most influential of all. In
a real sense here is the supreme court of the
European Community; but because  its role
is the interpretation and enforcement of the
treaties of the Community, and all legisla-
tion flowing from them, the scope for hu-
man interest newspaper  stories is clearly
limited.
In fact while it is open to national courts,
member states, private citizens, and the EC
Commission,  the bulk of the cases coming
before the court are those handed up by
national courts requiring the application of
the final glosses  of Co--unity iaw. De-
fendants are often companies or institutions
but the most newsworthy judgment  in re-
cent years have probably been those where
the court has found against a member Gov-
ernment. Verdicts against the French Gov-
ernment over its ban on mutton and lamb
imports from Britain and against London
on questions of fishing and tachographs
(devices for automatically measuring truck
drivers' working hours) are among the bet-
ter known of recent years.
Given the nature of the court's legal
stock-in-trade,  as it were, its judgements in-
evitable have political overtones and for
long it has been under attack in some mem-
ber countries for what is regarded as an ov-
ertly federalist leaning. Its defenders  say it
merely upholds  the doctrine enshrined in
the treaties that Community law prevails
over national law but that is more or less
admitting the accusation. What is surely
true is that of all Community institutions
the court has done most to promote the
cause of Europe over and above that of the
individual  member Governments. There has
been some speculation that under its new
President, Gaston Thorn, the EC Commis-
sion might have been readier to use the le-
gal avenues provided by the court to fur-
ther the cause of European integration. But
if that is true it has yet to show itself.
Vorking briskly by the standard of many
senior courts, the European court can dis-
pose of a relatively straightforward  case in
eight months or so. Normal  procedure is
for a petition with facts to be presented  fol-
lowed by written and oral procedures lead-
ing to an oral "comment"  on the case by
one of the advocates-general  who is not a
prosecutor  but is expected  to represent  the
"general  interest." The red-robed judges
then deliberate in strict secrecy, usually, but
not always, following the lines recom-
mended by the advocate-general.
Until last year such judgements were rou-
tinely accepted  by Governments even
though the court has no powers to enforce
compliance. However France's  refusal to
accept the ruling against it on lamb imports
dealt this practice  a serious blow and there
are many who doubt that Governments
faced with an unwelcome verdict against
them will be so acquiescent  in the future. It
was held to be one of the strenghts  of the
British Government's  tactics in trying to
win a reduction in its EC budget contribu-
tions last year that it claimed to be willing
if necessary to defy the court and withhold
part or all of its payments.
After a long struggle, the court has now
been expanded to 11 judges-one from
each of the member countries and one to be
"rotated"  among the larger members-
while there will be five advocates€eneral.
Demands by officials for judges were at-
tacked in many member countries where
for obvious  reasons the court is not the
most popular of EC institutions. In Britain,
during a parliamentary debate on the pro-
posed expansion, it was claimed that the
court devoted far too much time to trivial
staff cases.
Ironically  as the court moves increasingly
into the legal and political evolution of the
Community in the mid-1980s,  one of its
most exacting and complex  tasks could re-
sult in its own reduction  in size. For with
the major opposition Labor Party in Britain
now pledged to withdrawing  the United
Kingdom from the European Community,
lawyers and jurists are beginning to study
the legal and constitutional problems in-
volved, recognizing that these could be
among the most momentous international
legal issues  since the Community was
formed. ALAN osBoRN
Brussels
Differing  approaches  by the two main coa-
lition partners toward the problems posed
by Belgium's huge budget deficit have made
it an uneasy summer in Brussels. This isn't
the sort of country where a politician dare
not go on holiday f.or fear of a coup but
nevertheless  there has been a recurrence  of
election jitters this year and a growing feel-
ing that new elections cannot be long de-
layed, if indeed they have not been called
by the time this appears.
As has been the case for over a year now,
the direct source of disagreement  within the
coalition is the handling of the economy
though given the configuration of the main
parties, language  divisions  are never far be-
low the surface. But the economy, and es-
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cit and the national debt, have become the
dominant  theme in political  debate and the
touchstone by which the coalition's survival
chances will be measured.
The immediate issue is to devise a budget
for 1982 that will not imPose intoleable
new burdens on the country's indebtedness,
already of monumental  proportions. Specif-
ically it is recognized  that with a national
debt equivalent to more than $50 billion at
the end of last year, the authorities  cannot
present  spending  plans that will add more
then $6 billion to the deficit in 1982. There
are differing views on the likely deficit this
year but a general  consensus that at least
Belgian Prime Minister Matk Eyskefls. courtesv of
Belgian Embassy
$3 billion has got to be found, either
through savings or increased  revenues.
One of the more unexpected achieve-
ments of the previous Government led by
Prime Minister tUfilfried Martens  was to
win parliamentary  approval  for a modest
package of tax increases. Almost certainly
taxes will have to be raised again if the
1982 targets are to be reached but even this
will not be enough and ruthless Govern-
ment spending  cuts seem almost inevitable.
Part of the compromise package emerging
would be a stepped up offensive against  tax
cheats, though the revenue yield here is not
likely to be very great in terms of the
amounts needed.
Is the long-term  answer to be found in
scrapping  or modifying Belgium's sophisti-
cated wage indexation-the  process by
which wage earners get automatic  increases
in pay to compensate  them for rises in the
cost of living? With pressure also coming
from the EC Commission in Brussels, a
growing number of economic authorities  as
well as the employers, the Social Christian
Party, and opposition liberals believe that
Belgium simply cannot afford indexation on
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the scale practiced  at the moment. It has
been calculated, for instance, that the extra
$1 billion or so raised in taxes earlier this
year will be almost exactly matched by the
increased  wages the state will have to pay
to public-sector  workers as a result of
changes in the cost-of-living index.
Disputes over moves to change the index-
ation system led the rifts in the previous co-
alition and the resignation of Martens in
April. The new leader, Mark Eyskens, who
is also a Flemish Social Christian' is unde-
terred in his ambition to reform the system
which his party claims is frustrating every
effort by the Government  to take economic
initiatives. But the Socialists,  both French
and Dutch-speaking,  strongly oPpose any
changes either in the basic mechanism of
the system or in the composition  of the
cost-of-living index and they are powerfully
supported by the trade unions.
In spite of the growing tendency in EC
circles (not to mention the United States) to
single out indexation as a root cause of the
inflation afflicting  the Community there is
little sign that the Belgian public is yet
ready to gives its assent to any change in
the practice. However this does not make
the issue an automatic vote-getter for the
left since there is also evidence-which
seems likely to turn up sharply this sum-
mer-that inflation is a major election
priority for many voters.
Pundits are not therefore predicting a
repetition in Belgium of the recent turn to-
ward the Socialists  in France,  though it is
widely accepted that no useful predictions
can be made until the condition of the
economy in the autumn is revealed.  But if a
budget compromise  package  can be stitched
together and holds tight over the next few
months then one possibility is that the pres-
ent coalition of French and Flemish speak-
ing Social Christians  and Socialists  that has,
apart from small changes in composition,
governed Belgium since thb 1978 elections,
will continue to hold power.  ALAN osBoRN
Copenhagen
Danish Prime Minister  Anker Joergensen
approaches foreign policy in the same
straightforward  manner as he does domes-
tic policy. Tell it as it is, cut out the diplo-
matic niceties. But as any professional dip-
lomat will tell you, this is not always
advisable for bigger powers' and for na-
tions of 5 million people-like Denmark-it
is more often than not a luxury with a pro-
hibitive price tag.
At the summer meeting of social demo-
cratic parties, the Socialist International,
Danish Prime Minister Anker  loergensen
Joergensen expressed full support for a
Norwegian proposal  that the use of nuclear
weapons in Scandinavia should be banned,
a proposal similar to one the Soviet Union
has been trying to sell for years. As Den-
mark and Norway,  though members of the
North Atlantic  Treaty Organization (Ne'ro)'
have both refused to allow the deployment
of such weapons on their territory, and
there are no nuclear weapons in Sweden
and Finland, the whole issue may seem aca-
demic.
But the fundamental  question is that of
solidarity of the'Western  alliance. What the
Danes and Norwegians  will do in the event
of war, or a situation where war seems im-
minent, is a delicate question they prefer
not to answer, but it is nevertheless critical.
Quite apart from the fact that the Soviet
proposal  does not include a ban on any
weapons on Soviet territory adiacent to the
Nordic countries, it will deny the Govern-
ments the options of nuclear defense in re-
turn for nothing more than a one-sided  ver-
bal declaration.
At the very least, as the Finns have pro-
posed, any new status for the Nordic  coun-
tries must be guaranteed by both the United
States and the Soviet Union. The Danish
Prime Minister  pointedly remarked that
Danish foreign policy is not subject to re-
view by the United States, and Denmark's
noted political scientist, Erling Bioel, asked
if this was not the first steP toward a Dan-
ish withdrawal from NATo.
After several days silence Joergensen had
second thoughts.  He maintained  that there
is no change in Danish  foreign policy.
However, the opposition parties are not
convinced;  they cite the unwillingness of
the Government  to allow any growth in
real terms in Danish  defense spending  as
further proof that the maiority of the gov-
erning party is shirking its responsibilities
toward NATo. Certainly, President  Ronald
Reagan's  Administration  will find very little
comfort in developments in Denmark.
LEIF BECK  FALLESENRome 
With what woman would Italians like to 
spend the rest of their life on a desert island? 
Their mother? No, its Gina Lollobrigida, 
but at least the most popular Italian song is 
"Mamma." Well, the most important food 
in Italy is spaghetti, right? Again no. It's 
bread. And the film voted most often as fa-
vorite by Italians is not by Fellini, Visconti, 
or Antonioni. It's "Gone With The Wind." 
These are some of the results from a na-
tional survey by the Doxa research group. 
The intention was to find what Italians 
really like and dislike and compare the 
choices with the traditional Italian image. 
There are some hits but a number of misses 
as well. "0 Sole Mio'' is the Italian song 
first picked by 10 per cent of those inter-
viewed, but "Mamma" was the hit liked by 
11 per cent, with "Volare" finishing way 
down at number four with only 4 per cent 
of the vote. 
A strong 22 per cent of the population 
thinks "Gone With The Wind" is the best 
film in cinema history, followed by "The 
10 Commandments" and "Ben Hur." But 
the book from the film  is only the seventh 
most popular in the country. At the top is 
the Bible, followed by the Divine Comedy 
and Promessi Sposi, Italy's first ever major 
novel. 
The Doxa researchers tried to interview 
as accurate a cross section of the popula-
tion as possible. Half the respondents were 
men and half women, the gender division 
of the country; 30 per cent lived in the 
Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria industrial tri-
angle, 20 per cent in the north east, 19 per 
cent in the central regions and the others in 
the south or the islands. Other factors such 
as age, education, work, and income were 
also considered, but, as Doxa director En-
nio Salamon admits, this type of break-
down shows only what the majority hold 
dear, not what is actually selling big at the 
moment or what is directing national 
trends. 
For example, half the population is over 
50 years of age, so their tastes are largely 
reflected. This shows up in the category of 
most popular movie, where relatively old 
films  were chosen, films probably not seen 
by many of the 15 per cent of the popula-
tion aged between 15  and 24. It's this age 
group, however, which spends most at the 
movies. 
In another example, 11 per cent of Ital-
ians said teaching was the most desired 
profession for them. This doesn't mean It-
aly is a land of high academic priorities. 
Explains Salamon: "Fifty per cent of the 
population, and therefore of those inter-
viewed, were women who today still see the 
teaching profession as  the only one which 
allows them to combine work with being a 
housewife, which many women by tradition 
or conviction are still attached to." 
Another twist in the survey results was 
that a whopping 34 per cent of Italians be-
lieve that bread is the food or drink most 
necessary to man. The loaf beat out milk at 
20 per cent, and meat at 18  per cent. Pasta 
made only fifth place with 4 per cent of the 
vote, just behind water. This seems strange 
because Italians and pasta are inseparable, 
but it seems that how Italians eat is  more 
important than what they eat, and bread is 
a vital part of the ritual. Says Salamon: 
"Have you ever seen a family, on a Sunday 
(when shops are shut}  for example, without 
bread? You could have a refrigerator full of 
meats, cheeses, and eggs.  But without bread 
they wouldn't be eaten. And when we Ital-
ians go to foreign restaurants and find the 
bread absent or in small portions we gaze 
around as if lost." 
Home and its comforts have always been 
important to Italians. Asked what they 
would like if they were to receive a valua-
ble gift, 8 per cent of those interviewed said 
a car, 10 per cent a fur coat, and another 
10 per cent said jewelry. But the biggest 
sector, 13 per cent, wanted a color televi-
sion set. Asked if their greatest wish could 
come true, what would it be, 15  per cent 
said they wanted to travel, 12 per cent 
wanted good health, 7 per cent a nice 
home, another 7 per cent money, and 6 per 
cent wanted to win the football pools. Only 
5 per cent wanted simply a serene life. 
Italians see as their major fault a disincli-
nation to work, followed by dishonesty and 
talking too much. On the plus side, they 
said their best attribute was cordiality fol-
lowed by adaptability, goodness, and crea-
tivity. Finally, if Italians had to make a 
choice about living abroad they would pre-
fer to live in France, according to a signifi-
cant 30 per cent of those interviewed. 
Twenty per cent liked Switzerland, 12 per 
cent England, 11  per cent Germany, 7 per 
cent Spain, and 3 per cent Holland. 
MALCOLM FARR 
London 
Once again the cost-conscious Government 
of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is 
trying to silence some foreign language ser-
vices of the British Broadcasting Corpora-
tion (BBC).  Once again it may fail.  Public 
outcry over the proposed cuts is even more 
vociferous than two years ago when it 
forced Whitehall to put away the ax. 
This time, as  before, the targets are 
broadcasts in French and Spanish to Eu-
rope, in Portuguese to Brazil and the entire 
services in Italian, Maltese, Burmese, and 
Somali. Newly threatened is  the BBC's 
Transcription Service  (TS)  a major world-
wide purveyor of British culture, ideas, and 
standards. 
Not in danger is the BBC's world service 
in English. Its news bulletins command the 
respect of huge audiences throughout the 
globe. Also safe are Spanish broadcasts to 
Latin America and broadcasts to Africa in 
French. 
The proposed cuts would save about $6 
million in the $124 million annual budget 
for  BBC  External Services  (ES). They would 
take effect sometime next year. The money 
saved would be used to replace or improve 
transmitters and relay stations. The Gov-
ernment argues improved audibility is  more 
important than keeping the seven language 
services it wants to terminate-better, it 
says, that fewer programs are heard prop-
erly than more heard inadequately. 
BBC  officials say that although the Rus-
sian language service would be improved, 
most other services would benefit very little 
and there would be an unfortunate breakup 
of the intricate short-wave frequency sched-
ules crafted since World War II.  "Such a 
savage cut will undoubtedly endanger the 
worldwide standing and effectiveness of the 
BBC's  External Services," said its chief 
Douglas Muggeridge. "The policy is  not 
E u R o P E September-October 19 81  4 7 only shortsighted but could bring a serious 
decline in the reputation of the External 
Services and of the British voice overseas. 
Although editorially independent, the Ex-
ternal Services are financed by a parliamen-
tary grant administered through the Foreign 
Office. The BBC broadcasts in 40 languages, 
the United States in 45, and the Soviet 
Union in at least 80.  BBC French, Italian, 
and Spanish services in Europe reach an es-
timated 4.5 million people. In Italy the BBC 
has the largest audience of any foreign sta-
tion although it broadcasts just seven hours 
a week in Italian against 115 hours from its 
Soviet bloc competitors. 
The BBC Transcription Service last year 
sold 20,000 hours of taped radio programs 
Parliamentary 
Notebook 
DAVID W 0 0 D columnist for The Times of 
London. 
In July the European Parliament celebrated 
its  second  anniversary  since  the  first  direct 
elections of 1979-and celebrated it in more 
ways  than one.  Pierre  Pflimlin,  who is  not 
only a vice president but also mayor of Stras-
bourg, of course took the chance to join with 
the  prefect  of the  Lower  Rhine  to  stage  a 
soiree  champetre  in  the  medieval  wine  vil-
lage of Molsheim. 
The  434  members  of the  Parliament,  or 
most of them, celebrated by staging debates 
and votes on high questions such as the seat, 
or working place, of the Parliament and its 
interrelationship with the EC  Council of 
Ministers and the EC Commission. And lead-
ers  of the  Parliament's political  groups  (in 
order of strength:  Socialist,  Christian Dem-
ocrat,  Conservative,  and  Liberal)  began  to 
maneuver for the election in December of a 
President to succeed Simone Veil in the chair. 
Perhaps the less  said to American readers 
about  the  delightful  soiree  champetre  (Al-
satian folk  dancers, a  fire-brigade  guard of 
honor, regional  food and wines)  the  better, 
because the European Parliament still smarts 
from  the  CBS  television  film,  "The Gravy 
Train," shown on "60 Minutes" just before 
the arrival in Washington of a parliamentary 
delegation. Strasbourg judged it,  after a 
videotape showing, outrageously tendentious 
and unfair; in fact, the last unkindest cut after 
some critical political reporting in Europe. 
Yet  Pflimlin,  the prefect,  and the  French 
Government,  as  well  as  hoteliers  and  res-
taurateurs of Strasbourg, really had a genuine 
victory to celebrate. The day before Molsh-
eim, a campaign within the Parliament to move 
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to stations in over 100 countries. Each year 
it produces 500 hours of the best of BBC ra-
dio, reflecting the entire spectrum of British 
cultural and intellectual achievements in 
music, drama, literature, comedy, science, 
and education. Letters to The Times of 
London insist its abolition would inflict 
"incalculable damage" on British interests 
abroad. 
What worries the BBC most, though, is 
the principle of it all. This would be the 
seventh straight cut in eight years in the 
External Services budget. Yet all other ma-
jor international broadcasters are steadily 
increasing the resources of their overseas 
services. 
The recent spate of urban violence in 
the monthly plenary sessions from Strasbourg 
to Brussels had been crushed by 201 votes to 
108. The Anglo-Danish Conservative group, 
with  a  majority of the Socialist group, had 
been  the  prime movers  for  the  change,  but 
they failed  to carry the Christian Democrat 
and Liberal  groups, nor of course  French 
members of Parliament. 
In  theory,  then,  the  Parliament has  con-
firmed that it does not want to meet any more 
in  Luxembourg,  the  administrative  head-
quarters of its more than 2,000 staff, and also 
that committee meetings shall be held in Brus-
sels,  near to the Commission headquarters. 
But, itl practice, some questions remain to be 
answered. 
Above all, it is for the Council of Ministers, 
under Article 216 of the Treaty of Rome, to 
determine the seat of Community institutions, 
and it was only in March, at the Maastricht 
summit of the European Council, that heads 
of Government declared  for  the  status quo 
and renominated Luxembourg, Brussels, and 
Strasbourg as the provisional working places. 
That was  the curt answer to Parliament's 
challenge to the Council of Ministers a year 
ago  refusing  to continue to be  a  "traveling 
circus," with all the expense and inefficiency 
a  nomadic life  made  unavoidable.  Inciden-
tally, nearly one sixth of Parliament's budget 
goes  for  maintaining three  working places, 
though Strasbourg offers  the  best value  for 
money. 
Next, there is the question of what happens 
to  the  parliamentary staff,  which  with  the 
entrance to the Community of Portugal and 
Spain  will  soon rise  to  about 3,000. Their 
homes are in Luxembourg; their children are 
schooled there. Are they now to be  split, as 
some  members  of Parliament say,  between 
Strasbourg and Brussels, leaving Luxembourg 
with empty offices and chambers, not to say 
a property slump? No wonder Luxembourg 
threatens to have the law on the Parliament 
before the European Court of Justice, sited in 
mainland Britain's cities put new strain on 
the country's decaying and overcrowded 
prisons. More than 1,000 rioters had to be 
incarcerated. A parliamentary committee 
said in the wake of the rioting that the jails, 
some built a century ago, need about $20 
billion spent on them in the 1980s to keep 
them from "collapsing around our ears." 
The 120 prisons in England and Wales 
have almost 46,000 inmates-there are 
places for only 38,747. More than 17,000 
live two or three to a cell built for one in 
Victorian times. Rather than try to rebuild 
the prisons the committee recommended a 
series of reforms to ease the prison popula-
tion.E 
PETER ].  SHAW 
Luxembourg and which ensures that the EC 
treaties  and all  that flows  out of them  are 
observed by member States and Community 
institutions. Luxembourg may fairly claim that 
nothing has altered the Council of Ministers' 
decision of April  1965, that Luxembourg, 
Brussels,  and Strasbourg should  all  remain 
provisional working places.  Yet the fact re-
mains that the Parliament no longer wants to 
use Luxembourg, and some of the more mil-
itant parliamentarians say that a Parliament 
denied the right to choose where it shall work 
can be denied all important power. 
The fact is that, for many members of Par-
liament, Strasbourg is  a symbol, simply  be-
cause it has been in and out of French and 
German possession during the past century 
and therefore stands peculiarly for European 
unity. It was a British foreign secretary who, 
immediately after the war, proposed it as the 
seat for the Council of Europe, the original 
occupants of the hemicycle in which the Eu-
ropean Parliament now sits. 
No less,  the  presidency  of the  European 
Parliament is a symbol. Two years ago Simone 
Veil, a distinguished minister in French Pres-
ident Valery Giscard d'Estaing's Administra-
tion,  became  the first  President of the  new 
directly  elected  Parliament,  on  the  under-
standing that she would hold the post for two 
and a half years.  Now the politicking is  on 
behind the scenes among candidates to suc-
ceed her. 
Sir James Scott-Hopkins, leader of the An-
glo-Danish  Conservatives,  is  already  in  the 
field. Egon Klepsch, Christian Democrat leader, 
also wants the  honor, and Leo  Tindemans, 
former  Prime  Minister of Belgium  and  an-
other Christian Democrat, is  much favored. 
Members of the Socialist group are expected 
to run an official candidate, and probably a 
freelance  younger candidate, Pieter Dankert 
from  Holland, who would get  some  cross-
group support. By October we shall know the 
runners. E EATING BY APPLE 
R. W. APPLE JR. 
Italy, like Germany, came late to nationhood: 
Only in 1871 were the numerous states of the 
peninsula united under the house of Savoy. 
The preceeding centuries of  political diversity, 
together with a geographical variety exceed-
ing that of any other country in Western Eu-
rope, have left their mark on Italian cuisine. 
The cooking in  Lombardy, based on butter 
and rice,  has little in common with that of 
Sicily, which centers on fish and superb fruits 
(oranges)  and vegetables  (eggplant).  Local 
specialties are truly local: you are as unlikely 
to find the wonderful zampone, or pig's trot-
ters, on a menu in Venice as you are to find 
fegato, or calf's liver, on one in Modena, though 
the two cities are only 90 miles apart. 
The cooking of Italy has spread around the 
world; I have eaten it in Tangier and Kansas 
City and Hong Kong and Lagos, as  well  as 
more cosmopolitan centers such as New York 
and London. (I once ate a pizza in Kiev,  but 
that is a gastronomic adventure best forgot-
ten.)  Even with the best will in the world, it 
transplants badly, often so  badly as  to be 
unrecognizable. Verdi can be Verdi in many 
settings, but polenta is polenta only at home. 
So there are only two ways to know the re-
gional cuisine of Italy in all its rich abundance 
and variety:  you  can spend a great deal  of 
money and a great deal of time in delightful 
travels from one end of  the boot to the other-
or you can take advantage of the  fact  that 
Rome, like many another capital, offers res-
taurants of almost every regional persuasion. 
This first article in an occasional series is in-
tended to help you do the latter, in the hope 
that doing so  will  persuade you  to  do  the 
former. 
As A.J. Liebling used to say, there is no free 
lunch anymore, and you will not eat Venetian 
food in Rome that is as good as that in Venice 
(nor will the setting be as well matched). But 
it will  be good enough, especially if you re-
member Apple's  first  law of Italian eating: 
With very rare exceptions, you should avoid 
eals 
restaurants with starched and snowy napery, 
heavy silver, and flawlessly polished crystal, 
because they will almost certainly be preten-
tious  palaces  of flambeed  fiascos  or sadly 
over the hill. Examples in Rome: Sans Souci, 
Passetto and Ranieri (all with Michelin stars), 
George's, Hostario dell'Orso. 
Now some specific suggestions for our eat-
ing tour of Italy by taxi: 
El Toula, via della Lupa 29, telephone 678-
64  71  or 678-1196,  closed  Saturday  lunch, 
Sunday,  and  August.  How better  to  avoid 
charges of rigidity than to begin with an ex-
ception to the eponymous law cited above? 
El Toula is Rome's best Venetian restaurant, 
an elegant installation with buff-colored walls, 
deep banquettes, and soft lighting from chan-
deliers, not far from the via Condotti. Choose 
simple things, nonetheless, from  a  menu 
bursting with them-risotto with champagne, 
grilled radicchio  (a  bitter red lettuce grown 
around Treviso), scampi in various guises. 
Drink the excellent Pinot Grigio from Friulia. 
Cesarina, via  Piemonte  109,  telephone  46-
0828, closed Sunday and August. Despite the 
address,  Cesarina specializes in  the cooking 
of Bologna, which is 'to  Italy as  Lyons is  to 
France and New Orleans to the United States. 
A suggested menu in this simple, cozily mid-
dle-class establishment: mixed pasta to start 
(including Rome's best tortellini-filled noo-
dles  said to resemble Venus's navel), then a 
bollito misto (mixed boiled meat, better than 
it sounds), then a semifreddo (a soft ice cream) 
to finish. 
Chianti, via Ancona 17, telephone 86-1083, 
closed Sunday and part of August. A Tuscan 
place, better in my judgement than two better-
known ones, Nino and Giarrosto Toscano, 
which  seem  to me  to have lost their touch 
recently. It is located near the Porta Pia at the 
northeast edge  of central  Rome.  The  same 
family  has  run the  restaurant for  75  years. 
Ask  them  to recommend  a  Chianti:  Order 
either a T-hone steak (fiorentina)  or the de-
villed ·pigeon.  If it's  a  steak,  ask  for  some 
lemon to squirt on it and ignore the waiter if 
he protests. 
Coriolano, via Ancona 14, telephone 86-1122 
or 844-9501, closed Sunday and August. Right 
across the street from Chianti: If  you're in the 
mood for wretched excess, have lunch in one 
and dinner at the other. Not strictly speaking 
a  Piemonte  restaurant, it nevertheless  offes 
the two great joys of Turin: white truffles in 
the fall  and great Piemonte wines. I owe my 
knowledge of this place to Loren Jenkins of 
The Washington Post, and I suggest you do 
as  he does:  Ask the owner to make a menu 
for you that will show off his extraordinary 
cellar. He will give you Barolos that will make 
you forget Bordeaux, Burgundy, and the Napa 
Valley for several days. 
Taverna Giulia, vicolo dell'Oro 23, telephone 
656-9768, closed Sunday and August. Don't 
let  the appearance put you  off,  even  if the 
exterior does look like a pizza joint that's been 
closed since World War II.  A block or two 
from the Vittorio Emanuele Bridge leading to 
the  Vatican,  this  is  the place  to  go  for  the 
pleasures of the best tables of Genoa-espe-
cially  pasta  with  pesto,  the  delicious  sauce 
made from basil, pine nuts, and oil, and some-
thing with the piquant name of stinco di vi-
tello  (veal  shin, in  our own less  poetic lan-
guage), which is  the best roast veal, I think, 
on this bountiful planet. 
Carmello alia Rosetta,  via  della Rosetta 9, 
telephone 656-1002, closed Sunday, Monday 
lunch, and August. Stand with your back to 
the noble facade of the Pantheon, walk across 
the square, and take the leftmost of the two 
little streets that lead out of the other side. 
Then look fdr the tiny sign that says Rosetta. 
In whatever language you can muster, ask the 
Sicilian  waiter in this,  the  best Sicilian  and 
the best fish restaurant in town, to bring you 
some Corvo Bianco and whatever is fresh. 
And  then there are  the  Roman places,  and 
I'm running out of room. Don't miss Moro 
(vicolo delle Bollette 13, telephone 678-3495, 
closed Sunday and August), a classic trattoria 
near the Trevi  Fountain, or Papa Giovanni 
(via dei Sediari 4, telephone 656-5308, closed 
Sunday and August, near the Piazza Navona), 
the best restaurant in Rome at the moment, 
with  a  brilliant if zany kitchen that blends 
French nouvelle cuisine with Italian tradition, 
or Severino (Piazza Zama, telephone 75-0872, 
closed Sunday dinner, Monday and August), 
which looks like a fried-dam shack on Cape 
Cod but serves the best Sunday lunch in Rome, 
with wonderful  baby lamb, and revels  in  a 
proprietor who looks like a monk and does 
magic tricks for  the Italian families who go 
there. E 
R.W. Apple Jr.  is chief European correspondent 
for The New York Times 




Development Conference Set 
While all developing countries face se-
rious economic problems, the difficul-
ties  facing  the  least  developed  states 
require special and immediate action. 
The  specific  economic  and  develop-
ment problems of the least developed 
states  are  being  studied  in  Paris  this 
September at a special conference or-
ganized by the United Nations. 
The Paris meeting is expected to en-
dorse a "substantial new program of 
action" designed to help the least de-
veloped states in  their fight  against 
hunger, their efforts to slow down their 
increasing balance of payment deficits, 
and in resolving problems provoked by 
soaring energy  bills  and rocketing 
transport costs. The United Nations has 
identified about 30 countries that fall 
into the least developed category. These 
nations have three common features: 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
is  lower  than  $100,  the  share  of in-
dustry in the GDP  is below 10 percent, 
and only 20 percent of the adult pop-
ulation  is  literate.  Some  22  of these 
states are linked to the Community 
through the Lome Convention. 
In a report forwarded recently to EC 
foreign ministers, the Commission rec-
ognized that while critical problems 
facing the least developed states should 
be dealt with immediately, a long-term 
strategy will  be  necessary if the diffi-
culties are to be attacked at the root. 
Development Projects Funded 
European Development Fund decisions 
were recently announced by the EC 
Commission  for  development  of in-
frastructure,  agricultural,  and  indus-
trial projects in  developing countries. 
Upper Volta was  granted a  total of 
nearly EUA 19 million to improve and 
asphalt a section of road 108 kilome-
ters long which links Upper Volta to 
Mali. A grant of EUA 650,000 was made 
to Rwanda to complete the construc-
tion and equipping of the Butare med-
ical school. 
For a sewerage and drainage project, 
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Gambia was granted EUA 3.5 million. 
Uganda is to receive a loan on special 
terms of EUA 3.5 million for  moderni-
zation of the hoe factory there which 
will help improve agricultural produc-
tion. Dominica is to receive grants to-
taling EUA 200,000 to help reorganize 
the  essential oils  industry there.  All 
countries in tropical Africa will benefit 
from  a grant of EUA  2.25  million  for 
the first phase of a project to improve 
the  strains of rice,  maize,  niebe,  and 
soybean grown there. 
For assistance to small-and medium-
sized enterprises, a loan on special terms 
for  EUA 450,000 was granted to the 
Guyana Cooperative Agricultural and 
Industrial  Development Bank.  The 
funding  will  enable  the  bank  to  in-
crease its lending to national industrial 
firms. Zambia was granted EUA 300,000 
as reimbursement for the building costs 
of a temporary railway diversion after 
the destruction of two rail  bridges in 
1979. 
Financing Decisions Made 
The EC Commission approved in mid-
June the first financing decisions to be 
funded out of the EUA 150 million al-
located in the 1981 budget for aid to 
non-associated  developing  countries. 
Thailand was granted EUA 2.2 million 
as  a contribution to the construction 
of a center for the production and dis-
tribution of improved strains  of rice 
seeds in the province of Phattalung. This 
brought  the  Community's  commit-
ments in Thailand to EUA 24.4 million 
for projects financed since 1977. 
EUA 2.  7 million was approved for 
Pakistan for participation in an emer-
gency program to supply drinking water 
to refugee camps and villages in those 
areas of the country most affected by 
the influx of  Afghan refugees. The total 
cost of this project is EUA 6 million. The 
Association  of Southeast  Asian  Na-
tions (ASEAN) was granted EUA 2.8 mil-
lion  for  a scientific and technical co-
operation program financed entirely by 
the Community. It is  a two-year pro-
gram involving training, technical as-
sistance, and the organization of sem-
inars on energy resource development 
and planning, measures to protect the 
environment, and manpower training. 
This is  the first time an operation on 
this scale has been carried out for ASEAN, 
whose  five  members  are  Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore, 
and Thailand. 
Special Regional Fund Aid 
power and alternative energy sources. 
Up  to EUA 95  million will be  contrib-
uted over five years to these four pro-
grams. 
This action marked the first stage of 
five  specific  Community regional  de-
velopment measures adopted last year 
under the  non-quota section  of the 
Regional Fund. The measures are to be 
implemented in  the  form  of special 
multiannual  programs,  not as  aid  to 
individual  projects  such  as  those  fi-
nanced under the quota section of the 
fund. Another important innovation is 
that different  kinds  of programs  are 
eligible, such as market research proj-
ects,  advisory services for small  busi-
nesses,  and  agencies  to  promote  in-
novation. 
EC Aids Projects in Mideast 
The EC  Commission made several fi-
nancing decisions in early June in  ac-
cordance with the EC-Maghreb/Mash-
req cooperation agreements.  EUA 31.5 
million was granted as cofinancing with 
the Netherlands and Egypt for a project 
costing over  EUA  125  million  for  the 
construction of a waste-water disposal 
network south of Cairo.  The facility 
would serve  a number of towns and 
industrial estates in an area on the east 
bank of the Nile. 
Egypt also received a grant of EUA 2 
million  for  a  project  aimed  at sup-
porting Egypt's "open door policy" for 
industrial  cooperation  with  foreign 
countries, in this case EC member states. 
The funding covers training schemes, 
technical assistance, and investment 
operations. 
A grant of EUA 2.5 million was ap-
proved for a project in Jordan to supply 
equipment, technical assistance, and 
training facilities  required by  the sci-
ence  department at the University of 
Y  armouk at Irhid. Tunisia was granted 
almost EUA 4 million as a contribution 
to a project to supply technical teach-
ing equipment and technical assistance 
to three vocational training centers. In 
addition, Morocco is to receive EUA 1.2 
million to improve the operation of a 
research laboratory in Casablanca. 
Loan Granted to Help Italy 
The first phase of about EUA 1 billion 
foreseen in aid for the regions in Italy 
struck by the earthquake last Novem-
ber came in the form of a loan agree-
ment signed in mid-June between the 
Community and Italian authorities. The 
75-billion lira loan goes toward the 
repair of transportation systems. 
About half of this first installment is 
earmarked for the reconstruction of the 
highway from Salerno to Reggio Cal-
abria  which  covers  about  900  kilo-
meters.  The  rest  is  to go  toward re-
pairing about 1,100 kilometers of 
railway, tunnels, and communications 
equipment. 
For  the  first  time,  four  special  pro-
grams were approved by the EC Com-
mission in June as eligible for aid from 
the non-quota section of the Regional 
Fund. Two of these programs will help 
improve the  economic and social sit-
uation in the border areas of Ireland 
and Northern Ireland;  one  will  rein-
force economic structures in the south-
western regions of France; and one will  Regional Fund Grants Made 
improve the energy supply in  the The EC Commission approved in July 
mountainous areas of the Mezzogiorno  the second allocation of Regional Fund 
in Italy through the use of hydroelectric  grants for 1981 which came to a total 
of EUA 201 million for 335 investment 
projects. EUA 32 million was approved 
for  105 projects in the industrial and 
services  sectors,  and  EUA  169 million 
was granted for 230 infrastructure 
projects. Recipient member states were 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. 
The major projects include telecom-
munications,  road work, and several 
industrial parks for Greece; further work 
to prevent water pollution in the Bay 
of Naples and the first part of a water 
supply program for irrigation in an area 
between Naples and Caserta in Italy; 
and continuation of construction on an 
urban rail  network in  the  northern 
United  Kingdom,  involving  54  kilo-
meters of rail and 41 stations. 
EXTERNAL 
OECD Annual Meeting 
Central issues of the annual ministerial 
meeting of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)  in  Paris  in mid-June  included 
the problem of coordinating monetary 
and financial policies among the major 
industrialized nations and the contin-
uation of the North-South dialogue. EC 
Commission  President Gaston Thorn 
addressed the meeting on the need for 
progress  in  the  North-South  discus-
sions to avoid new tensions in the world. 
EC  Commission  Vice-President 
Fran<;ois-Xavier  Ortoli,  in  charge  of 
economic and financial affairs, who also 
attended the meeting for the commu-
nity, noted the recent emphasis in the 
Community on national and EC poli-
cies to stimulate jobs as well as combat 
inflation.  Other representatives  from 
the Community and Japan commented 
on the need for discussion of the US 
policy of high interest rates which af-
fect other countries' currency rates and 
investment patterns. The meeting was 
attended by ministers and representa-
tives of the 24 OECD member countries 
and other special status parties such as 
Yugoslavia  and  the  European  Com-
munity. 
Anti-dumping Actions Taken 
The EC Commission announced in late 
May two moves  aimed against the 
dumping of American products on the 
Community markets. A 38 percent 
temporary levy  on US  textured poly-
ester cloth was imposed as a result of 
complaints from  European industries 
that US  prices lower than actual cost 
were damaging EC industry. The Com-
mission also increased from 4 percent 
to 14.8 percent a duty levied on styrene 
monomer, a plastic industry chemical. 
The two actions were the latest in a 
series of moves in the Community re-
lated to the petrochemical industry. 
European firms have charged that US 
competitors have had an unfair price 
advantage because of government-con-
trolled low prices of US petroleum and 
natural gas. EC, SELA Eye Cooperation 
Opportunities  for  cooperation  be-
tween the Community and Latin 
America were discussed  in early July 
when the permanent secretary of the 
Latin America Economic System (SELA) 
visited the EC Commission. The Com-
mission stressed the value  it attaches 
to integration in Latin America and said 
it was prepared to examine means of 
stepping  up  cooperation at technical 
level between its departments and the 
SELA  Secretariat in Caracas. 
Possible  directions  include  struc-
tured contacts for examining specific 
problems, cooperation via SELA action 
committees,  the creation of coopera-
tion channels for businessmen, and im-
proved information services for them. 
EC Attends ASEAN Meeting 
EC representatives attended the annual 
meeting of foreign ministers of the 
Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Na-
tions  (ASEAN)  in  Manila in late June. 
The Community and the ASEAN coun-
tries became associated through a tteaty 
of economic  cooperation  and  devel-
opment that went into force last Oc-
tober. 
The meeting focused on a number of 
important regional  and international 
issues of interest to Southeast Asia. It 
has  become  customary  for  represen-
tatives from major trading partners to 
attend, such as Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, the United States, Japan, in 
addition to the Community. 
EC, Latin America Consult 
Representatives of the European Com-
munity and most Latin American 
countries met three times in May and 
June to talk about trade, textiles, and 
energy matters. The Latin American 
ambassadors  to  the  Community  ex-
pressed their concern about Commu-
nity trade and agricultural policies that 
adversely effect Latin American inter-
ests. 
On energy, it was suggested that the 
Latin American states evaluate their 
needs and priorities as  a first step to-
ward enlarging energy cooperation with 
the Community. A report was also given 
on the  international  economic  situa-
tion in view of the renewal of the North-
South dialogue.  Earlier discussion on 
textiles  had  been  tagged  to  the  re-
sumption of negotiations on the inter-
national Multifiber Agreement. 
Japan Surprises Commission 
The EC  Commission said it was 
"extremely surprised" to learn in early 
June of Japan's pledge to limit car ex-
ports to Germany to 10 percent above 
the  1980-81  figure.  Later  that week 
reports emerged that another arrange-
ment might be concluded covering the 
Benelux countries. The news surfaced 
during  the  first  parts of a  European 
tour by Japanese Prime Minister Zenko 
Suzuki. 
Japanese car shipments had been a 
burning issue for several months dur-
ing which both Europe and the United 
States had reacted with concern to surges 
in imports of  Japanese cars. The United 
States had worked out an arrangement 
for limiting Japanese car imports be-
fore  reports  of  any  similar  arrange-
ments with European countries. 
Tin Agreement Discussed 
In a report forwarded to the EC Coun-
cil  of Ministers  last June,  the  Com-
mission  urged  member states to  join 
the International Tin Agreement, even 
if the United States refuses to do so. 
Current negotiations for the conclu-
sion  of a  sixth  international  pact to 
replace the existing agreement, which 
expired at the end ofJune 1981, have 
run into obstacles linked to demands 
made  by  the  United  States.  US  con-
sumption of  tin has been as high as 2 7.5 
percent of world production. Major 
producing countries, including Malay-
sia, Thailand, Bolivia, Indonesia, Aus-
tralia, Nigeria, and Zaire, have rejected 
American  demands  regarding  supply 
and stocking policies  to be  followed 
under the  terms  of the  international 
pact. 
EC Scandinavia Confer 
High-ranking EC officials visited Swe-
den and Norway in late June to discuss 
international  and  bilateral  economic 
issues with each country. It  was the first 
such meeting between Commission 
officials and Swedish and Norwegian 
Government delegations. 
All  parties agreed that the existing 
free trade agreements were functioning 
smoothly  and  that contacts  and  co-
operation should continue to develop. 
In  Sweden  an  assessment of interna-
tional trade policy gave rise to discus-
sion on what could be done to counter 
protectionist tendencies. Discussion of 
this topic in Norway led to agreement 
on the need to resist protectionist tend-
encies and to further integrate the de-
veloping countries into the multilateral 
trading system. 
EC Plane Finishes Air Race 
"The Great European Traveller,"  an 
Italian-built Partenavia P 68, finished 
twelfth in the roundtrip, transatlantic 
Air Transat race in mid-June. The fliers 
took off from the Paris Air Show at Le 
Bourget airport outside Paris and flew 
to Bridgeport, Connecticut, and back 
via Iceland, Greenland, and Labrador. 
The EC plane carried a letter of good 
will  from EC  Commission President 
Gaston Thorn to US President Ronald 
Reagan. 
The pilots, Herbert Allgeier and Elda 
Stifani, both employed by the EC Com-
mission in Brussels, were in the air 51 
hours and 31 minutes. The smallest twin 
engine in the race, "The Great Euro-
pean Traveller" flew at an average speed 
of 265 kilometers per hour and covered 
13,660  kilometers.  Bad  weather  re-
ports delayed the flight in Greenland, 
and the crew encountered strong head 
winds, ice, and fog during other parts 
of the journey. Asked if they would do 
it again, however, both pilots replied 
yes. 
INSTITUTIONS 
European Council Meets 
The European Council, or heads of state 
of the  10 EC  member countries, met 
in Luxembourg in late June. The group 
discussed in depth the social and eco-
nomic situation in the Community and 
dealt with the  need to preserve and 
strengthen  the  Community's  internal 
market. In particular, the problem of 
mass  unemployment  was  a  preoccu-
pation. There was agreement that the 
highest priority should be given to co-
ordinated  action  against  unemploy-
ment  and inflation,  including  efforts 
aimed at structural adjustment. 
Investment  in  energy  conservation 
and production was emphasized, and 
it was noted that considerable growth 
potential was to be found in small- and 
medium-size enterprises.  Investment 
should be directed to industries with a 
high innovation potential, said the 
Council; optimal use should be made 
of the  Community's  financial  instru-
ments and of the European Investment 
Bank; and efforts should also be made 
to secure a larger economic benefit from 
research  activities under way in  the 
Community. 
In discussing steel, the Council agreed 
that prices in the Community need to 
be raised to a more remunerative level. 
The Council urged the EC Commission 
to do all  in  its  power to see  that the 
steel  industry takes  the necessary ac-
tion. The Council also agreed that 
preparations for the new round of global 
negotiations  in  the  North-South  dia-
logue be completed as soon as possible. 
May 30 Mandate Progresses 
The "May 30 mandate" issue dates back 
to May 29 and 30, 1980, when the EC 
Council of Ministers had to resolve the 
difficult problem surrounding the Brit-
ish contribution to the EC budget. The 
United Kingdom had complained about 
contributing more than it received from 
the budget. A temporary solution was 
adopted whereby the United Kingdom 
would be reimbursed a significant por-
tion of its net contribution to the 1981 
and  1982 budgets.  But  this  measure 
could not be renewed or extended be-
yond this period, and a definite solu-
tion had to be found to prevent a sim-
ilar situation from developing again with 
this or another member state. 
It was in this light that the Council 
of Ministers asked the EC Commission 
on May 30, 1980, to permanently re-
solve  the  problem,  a  mandate  to  be 
fulfilled  before the end of June 1981. 
In the ensuing year the EC Commission 
examined the options and completed 
drafting recommendations. 
Generally, the Commission wants to 
go beyond a strict interpretation of the 
mandate. It seeks a wholesale reform 
of Community spending and a shift in 
priorities of the joint policies. EC Com-
mission  President Gaston Thorn said 
recently, "The conflict inside the Com-
munity on the subject of its finances is 
a political crisis which puts into ques-
tion the unity of our projects and which 
risks leading to a paralysis of our in-
stitutions. Public opinion ...  should be 
clearly aware of what is  at stake." 
The May 30 mandate is  especially 
linked to a problem that has  become 
acute during the past two or three years: 
the exhaustion of the Community's fi-
nancial resources. These resources come 
from  the  customs duties  levied  on 
products entering the Community, lev-
ies  applied on imported agricultural 
products,  and from  a  portion of the 
value-added tax (VAT)  collected by the 
member states. This percentage is cur-
rently limited to 1 percent, which locks 
the Community budget within bounds 
that have become too tight to allow the 
development of new common policies 
required because of the economic cri-
sis. 
By  itself,  the  Common Agriculture 
Policy (CAP) absorbs nearly three-quar-
ters of the Community's resources and 
prevents the social, regional, industrial, 
or other policies from increasing in im-
portance. As  a result the Commission 
discussions  were  leaning  toward two 
major points. One was the recommen-
dation that at some point the financial 
resources  of  the  Community  be  in-
creased by raising the 1 percent limit 
of VAT collections contributed to the 
budget.  In  this  way new  Community 
policies and programs could be launched 
or existing ones expanded without 
having to  disrupt the  CAP.  The other 
approach emphasized the  need  to  re-
duce agricultural expenses in order to 
balance the  funds  currently available 
for other Community activities. 
The Commission is  seeking a com-
promise between two extreme views. 
It suggests certain modifications of the 
agricultural programs, but also an in-
crease in the spending for other activ-
ities.  The  United  Kingdom's  contri-
bution to  the  budget,  and  especially 
farm spending, would also be reduced 
since that country benefits little from 
the activities of the Community agri-
cultural fund. 
Regional Guidelines Set 
The EC Commission has drawn up re-
gional policy guidelines and priorities, 
it was announced in July. This step was 
taken in response to the first periodic 
report in January 1981  on the  social 
and economic situation of EC regions. 
Regional policy is to be updated on the 
basis of these periodic reports. 
In the field of employment, the doc-
ument called  for  absolute priority in 
creating productive jobs. Emphasis must 
be placed on promoting labor-intensive 
industries in the weaker regions to pre-
vent further disparities between labor 
markets  in  the  strong  and  weak  re-
gions. Additional help for the weaker 
regions, said the Commission, could be 
obtained by improving productivity and 
realizing the potential existing within 
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capacities of small  business,  craft in-
dustries,  rural  tourism,  and environ-
mental resources.  The guidelines  also 
called  for  support in  the form  of re-
search, market analysis, management, 
and technical assistance, in addition to 
the  current  form  of  physical  invest-
ment. 
Among  other  remedies,  the  Com-
mission called for cohesion between 
regional and other policies in the Com-
munity to ensure that separate meas-
ures do not clash. In coordinating EC 
regional  with  national  regional  poli-
cies, the Commission said national 
multiannual  regional  development 
programs should be  submitted to the 
Commission;  national  aid  should  be 
assessed both in relation to the member 
state concerned and in relation to the 
Community as  a whole;  and regional 
fund aid for individual projects should 
be  gradually  replaced  by  the  co-fi-
nancing of national infrastructure in-
vestment programs and national aid 
schemes for productive investments. 
In  the Regional Development Fund 
annual report, also released in July, 
assistance  totaling over  EUA  1  billion 
for 2,5 63  investment projects was re-
ported for 1980 out of the quota sec-
tion, which accounts for 9  5 percent of 
the fund's resources. Compared to 1979, 
the  total  amount of  1980  assistance 
increased  by  22  percent and  was  al-
located to a smaller number of projects, 
demonstrating a  tendency to  concen-
trate the fund's resources on fewer 
projects and thereby enhancing the im-
pact of each operation. 
1982 Budget Shifts Proposed 
In  the  1982 budget proposed by  the 
EC Commission in  late May, the aim 
was to shift the emphasis of Commu-
nity activities away from agriculture to 
the social  and economic sectors. The 
total budget comes to EUA 23.9 billion 
in  commitments and EUA  22.3  billion 
in  payments,  increases  of 15  percent 
and  16  percent  respectively  over  the 
1981 budget. 
The  portion  of spending  for  agri-
cultural  programs  amounts  to  62.3 
percent of the 1982 budget; increases 
of 25 percent and 40 percent are rec-
ommended for the Regional Fund and 
the Social Fund respectively. 
ECONOMY 
Italy Adopts Import Measures 
The EC Commission studied measures 
recently  adopted by  the  Italian  Gov-
ernment to  cope  with  that country's 
mounting  balance  of payments  and 
currency problems. The measures  in-
cluded a deposit scheme requiring im-
porters to pay a 30 percent unredeem-
able payment on the value of planned 
imports three months in  advance of 
shipment. 
Italian authorities said these steps 
conform with  EC  rules  permitting 
member states to take emergency and 
precautionary measures that might un-
der  normal  circumstances  represent 
trade restrictions. The plan would ex-
clude certain products, such as cereals 
and  energy  products.  Italy  adopted 
similar measures several years ago and 
later lifted the requirements. 
Automobile Industry Studied 
A study on the structure and prospects 
of the European automobile industry 
was adopted by the EC Commission in 
June. The study contains detailed anal-
ysis  of the  problems  in  international 
competition, and it sets guidelines for 
coordinated  action  to  improve  com-
petitiveness, facilitate adjustment, and 
develop  a  suitable economic environ-
ment. 
The Commission  is  convinced  that 
the European car industry must adjust 
its industrial and commercial base, ra-
tionalize its  apparatus of production, 
further  develop  technology,  and  im-
prove sales networks in order to com-
pete in the international market. These 
steps it believes, are the responsibility 
of the individual firms. The Commis-
sion  sees  its  own  contribution  to  be 
providing  a  suitable  economic  envi-
ufacture. The creation of Allied Steel & 
Wire is not likely to affect trade in these 
areas  between  member  states,  and 
therefore,. the Commission concluded, 
the  merger does  not constitute abuse 
of  a  dominant position  under  Com-
munity competition rules. 
ECSC Reconversion Loans 
Two European Coal  and Steel  Com-
munity (ECSC)  loans for a total of over 
EUA 31 million in favor of South Wales, 
the United Kingdom, and France were 
approved  by  the  EC  Commission  in 
mid-July. This brought the total for 13 
ECSC  reconversion  loans in  19  81  to 
nearly EUA  142 million. 
During  the  six  years  from  197  5 
through 1980, the Steel and Coal Com-
munity had already assisted many new 
and expanding enterprises in areas af-
fected  by  closures  and decline  in  the 
coal  and  steel  industries.  This  assis-
tance  was  given  in  the  form  of soft 
loans with an interest rebate related to 
the number of jobs created suitable for 
former miners and steel workers. The 
loans went to help provide a planned 
49,000 jobs which indicated a job re-
placement rate of about one-third for 
that period. 
ronment in  which to carry out the ••••••••••••••• 
needed adjustments. 
To achieve this, four broad measures  ENLARGEMENT 
are being considered by  the Commis----------------
sion:  strengthening the  internal  mar-
ket;  encouraging  structural  develop-
ment; making it easier to change jobs; 
and developing the  dialogue with EC 
trading partners. Strengthening the in-
ternal  market calls  for  steps  such  as 
ironing out disparities in  the tax and 
energy fields.  To encourage structural 
development in  the  industry,  a  new 
system  of post-monitoring state  aids 
will  be  introduced that will  draw at-
tention to any risk of excess  capacity 
or protectionist measures. 
Steel Merger Approved 
The formation of a new joint company 
called  Allied  Steel  &  Wire  Ltd.  was 
approved  by  the  EC  Commission  in 
early July. British Steel Corporation and 
Guest Keen & Nettlefolds are to com-
bine  their  steel  wire  rod,  reinforcing 
bar, and reinforcement engineering in-
terests in  an effort to rationalize pro-
duction and sales programs. Both com-
panies have already reduced their wire 
rod and bar capacity. 
British Steel will continue to be the 
main producer of other steel products 
in  the  United  Kingdom.  Guest  Keen 
will stop producing general steels while 
remaining in  the market as  a  steel 
stockholder and a producer of special 
steels. 
The new company will  represent 
about 4  percent of total  Community 
capacity for  wire  rods  and about 2 
percent of capacity for reinforcing bars. 
The merger also includes two activities 
that fall  within EC  jurisdiction, rein-
forcement  engineering  for  the  con-
struction industry and steel wire man-
Turkey to Seek Accession 
The Turkish ambassador to the Com-
munity announced in  early June that 
his  country would formally  renew its 
request for EC membership as soon as 
parliamentary democracy was restored 
there. 
The announcement was made during 
the joint EC-Turkey association coun-
cil meeting in Brussels where the Com-
munity delegation  called for  a  return 
to elected government in Turkey as soon 
as possible. The economic situation there 
and specific  aspects  of aid  and  agri-
culture were also discussed. 
The civilian Government in Turkey 
had indicated last year that the country 
would seek EC  membership, but that 
Government was overthrown by  mil-
itary officers attempting to end polit-
ical terrorism. The new leaders vowed 
a  return to civilian  rule  as  soon as  a 
new constitution was prepared. 
Spanish Accession Pursued 
EC Commissioner Lorenzo Natali, in 
charge of enlargement negotiations, held 
a series of conversations with top Span-
ish  leaders  in  early June.  During his 
visit there Natali reconfirmed the 
Community's commitment to Spanish 
entry. 
The negotiations had run into dif-
ficulties  in  recent months  because  of 
the anticipated impact of Spanish 
accession  on  the  Community's  agri-
cultural sector, for one, and because of 
the process of review and reform of the 
EC budget and agricultural policy which 
Spain was watching with interest. Many 
in that country had been urging accel-
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eration of the entry process in order to 
gain outside support for democracy in 
Spain  following  the  recent  political 
upheavals. 
Position on Portugal Finalized 
The Community's position on the cus-
toms union to be adopted in the acces-
sion negotiations with Portugal was 
finalized  in the Council of Minsters 
meeting in  mid-July. 
Talks that took place in Brussels in 
mid-May covered  transportation and 
Community  law  and  were  also  re-
ported to include the customs union, 
textiles, the automobile industry, and 
the alignment of tariffs.  Newspaper 
reports on European Parliament Pres-
ident Simone Veil's visit to  Lisbon at 
about the same time said she  had in-
dicated  that nationalist tendencies  in 
some Community countries were mak-
ing the accession talks more difficult. 
AGRICULTURE 
Action Taken on Hormones 
Agriculture  ministers  meeting  in  late 
July agreed to compromise on the use 
of hormones in animals raised for hu-
man consumption. The decision  con-
firms  the  principle  of a  general  pro-
hibition on  the  administration of 
hormones  to  stimulate  meat produc-
tion. 
Stilbenes and thyrostatic substances, 
which have been proved harmful to 
human health,  were prohibited effec-
tive  immediately. The prohibition in-
cludes the administration of these sub-
stances  and  marketing  of  meat 
containing these substances, as well as 
the marketing of the substances them-
selves.  Other  substances  with  hor-
monal action were also prohibited, ex-
cept for  use  in  therapeutic treatment. 
Still other substances are yet to be con-
sidered.  In  the  meantime, stricter na-
tional  systems  already  in  force  con-
cerning these substances are to remain 
applicable. 
Aid for Agriculture Granted 
The EC Commission recently granted 
several parcels of aid from  the Euro-
pean Agriculture Guidance and Guar-
antee Fund (EAGGF).  From general ap-
propriations,  aid  of almost  EUA  54.9 
million for 194 projects throughout the 
Community was granted, with Italy 
receiving the highest allocation of nearly 
EUA  12 million. Over EUA 25.5 million 
for 39 projects on the Mediterranean 
in  France and Italy and over  EUA  3.7 
million for six projects in west Ireland 
were also granted. 
For forestry  projects in  Mediterra-
nean areas, six special programs in It-
aly  and four in France were awarded 
financing.  The  projects  include  refo-
restation, improvement of neglected 
woodland, forestry roads, fire preven-
tion, and related works. In the fishing 
sector, the Commission approved two 
programs for  developing the process-ing industry and for marketing fishery 
products in  Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. 
SOCIAL POLICY 
jobless Problem Studied 
A record unemployment leve! of about 
8.5  million  in  the  Community,  with 
prospects  for  increasing  unernpl<?y-
rnent in the futurel was the subject "of 
an expanded Council of Ministers 
meeting  in  early  June.  Social,  eco-
nomic,  and finance  ministers  met to-
gether to seek common approaches to 
the problem. 
The meeting took place just after the 
new French President had been elected 
with promises of major changes in 
economic policy,  including the intro-
duction of a  shorter work week,  ex-
pansionary programs,  and  raises  in 
benefits and salaries. The EC  minister~ 
discussed  all  these  appro~ches, along 
with recent anti-inflation and austerity 
policies that have surfaq;d tluoughout 
the  world.  Except for  representative~ 
from the United Kingdom, the EC min-
isters agreed that the priority giveq to 
anti-inflation in the past should be tem-
pered with the need to stimulate jobs 
and inve~trnent. 
Social Fund Report Given 
The 1980 Social Fund report was ap-
proved by the EC Commission in July. 
The document outlines the fund's ex-
penditure by  category, underlines the 
deteriorating employment situ,ation in 
the  Community,  and stresses  the  n!-
gional impact of the fund. 
The two largest categories for aid an: 
regions and training young people; the 
other areas  are  agriculture, textiles, 
migrants, women, technical  progress, 
groups of firms, handicapped pefsons, 
industrial conversion, anq pilot schemes. 
The labor market continued to dete-
riorate in  1980, according to  the  re-
port, with unemployment going from 
an average of 5.6 percent of the pop-
ulation in 1979 to 6.2 percent in 1980 
aqd still rising. Job losses last year ex-
ceeded the total for the previous four 
years. The wor~t hit sectors were min-
ing,  steel,  shipbuilding,  textiles  and 
clothingl  footwear,  and  mechanical 
engineering. 
Socii.j.l Fund grants approved last year 
totaled over EUA  1 billion, 31  percent 
more than in 1979, and benefited about 
1.5 million people in the Community. 
App'rqxirn;1tely  8 8  percent of the  aid 
was for training, retraining, and reset-
tlement of workers. Regional aid ana 
young people accounted for 42 percent 
and 39 percent respectively  of Soci'al 
Fund aid. 
Consumer Program Adopted 
The second Community consumer ac-
tion program was adopted by the EC 
CouncH of Ministers in mid-May. The 
five-year  plan continues the grounds, 
objectives, and principles of the prelim-
inary program adopted in  1975. The 
five  basic rights of the consumer con-
tinue to be:  the right to protection of 
health and safety, the right to prote~­
tion of economic interests, the right of 
redress,  the  right to  information and 
education,  and the right of represen-
tation. 
The new program takes into account 
the present economic situation and the 
revival of protectionist tendencies in its 
aim  to  protect and educate  the  con-
sumer.  Means oth!!r  than legislative 
measures  will  be  sought  in  imple-
menting certain principles, such as spe-
cial agreements between parties. 
HARMONIZATION 
European Passport Adopted 
More ·than a decade will have passed 
between  the  proposal  in  1974 for  !l 
uniform European passport and its re-
alization if the January 1, 1985, dead-
line  is  met.  The EC  member states 
adopted a resolution la~t June to begin 
issuing the passports by tben at the lat-
est. 
Seen as a symbol of Europe, the plan 
had to be reconciled with the wish of 
some rnem'ber 'states to introduce the 
new  machine-readable  card  recom-
mended  by  the  Jni:ernational  Civil 
Aviation Organization. As a result the 
member states will alter the appearance 
of their national passports so that all 
have  the  same  format,  are  the  same 
color  (lilac),  and present information 
on the cover in a particular order and 
in all official EC languages. Parti~ulars 
regarding the passport holder are to be 
shown in  the  language of the  issuing 
state and in French and English. 
ENERGY 
EC  Oil Bulletin 
The Community's average increase in 
free-on-board  prices  of crude oil  be-
tween Decerp.ber  31, 1978, to July 6, 
1981, was  171  percent as  a result of 
decisions taken by  the oil-exporting 
countries. 
The pre-tax consumer prices of the 
principal  oil  products  (crude  oil  and 
irnpoqed finished products) increased 
by  an  average  of around  86  percent 
over  th~ same  period. If these  prices 
had been in line  witb  the  Rotterdam 
spot pric~s, the figure would have been 
91  percent instead of ~6 percent. 
This  information was contained in 
the weekly oil bulletin published by the 
EC Commission. 
British Sunburst Design Wins 
A sunburst design submitted by an ar-
tist at' the British Central Office of In-
formation  in  London won  the  corn-
petition for the exterior design of the 
EC pavilion at the  19~~ World's Fair. 
The design  was inspired by  a  photo-
graph of an eruption on the sun and 
thereby evokes the main theme of the 
World's Fair,  which is  energy.  Inside 
the pavilion, the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, France, Italy, and the EC Corn-
mission will jointly exhibit, among other 
things, principal activities in the field 
of energy in the Community. 
Fusion Revie)V Panel Reports 
The Fusion Review Panel set up ~y  the 
Commission last year was asked to re-
view:  the  pres~nt status and progress 
of fusion research and development in 
the Community fusion program; pros-
pects for further development of fusion 
as  an energy source for  the  Commu-
nity; and plans for the Cornmunicy fu-
sion program. The panel presented its 
recommendations in July. 
Five main recommendations were set 
down by  the group of 11  experts:  to 
push ahead as fast as possible with the 
construction,  operation,  and  upgrad-
ing of the Joint European Torus (JET); 
to initiate a substantial program in fu-
sion technology mainly focused on the 
problems of the Next European Torus 
(NET); to continue to concentrate work 
in the associated laboratories on newer 
and larger Tokarnaks; to irnplerne~t two 
new projects on magnetic confine111ent 
systems alternative to Tokarnaks; and 
to maintain a sufficient level of activity 
on inertial confinement. 
The panel  also  recommended  that 
efforts be  made to attract industrial 
participation 'in  the  NET  technology 
program at an early stage. 
ENVIRONMENT 
"Seveso Directive" Blocked 
Environment ministers meeting in early 
June were unable to settle differences 
concerning a proposal that would es-
tablish a common system of safecy in-
spection  and  reporting to  reduce  the 
risk of major pollution accidents such 
as the Seveso, Italy, chemical plant dis-
aster in 1976. The "Seveso Directive" 
has been  blocked for  two years.  The 
main stumbling  block  has  been  the 
French  Government's  disapproval  of 
provisions requiring member states to 
inform others of potential risks  close 
to a common border. 
In  other action during the meeting, 
the environment ministers agreed to se~ 
up a data system on oil pollution risks 
at sea  and means  of combatting  the 
problem. The ministers also discussed 
automobile emissions and a report on 
the reduction of the use of chlorofluo-
rocarbons in  aerosol sprays. 
Nuclear Risk Study  Pub~ished 
A  special  meeting  of nuclear  experts 
was hosted by the EC Commission in 
mid-June to discuss the first part of the 
German Risk Study on Nuclear Power 
Plant~ which was published recently. 
The meeting allowed participants to 
question  the  German experts  about 
technical features of the study, and it 
also provided feedback from specialist 
organizations in the Community to the 
German team. 
Tqe German study is at the mid-way 
point. The first part was completed using 
accepted  risk  analysis  methods  and 
currently  available  data.  The second 
part will refine the work already com-
pleted  and  provide  in-depth  discus-
sions of individual problems. 
Chemical Inventory Required 
A recent amendment to an EC directive 
relating to dangerous substances calls 
for the establishment of an inventory 
of  e~isting commercial chemical sub, 
stances on the Community market. The 
Commission  announced  in  mid-June 
that it was making available basic doc-
uments for the establishment of the in-
ventory. 
The  documents  contain  the  Euro-
pean core inventory of about 34,000 
chemical substances which exist on the 
EC market, a compendium of known 
substances of about 15,000 chemical 
s~bstances, and procedures for making 
declarations of existing substances. 
FINANCIAL 
EIB To Double Capital 
More money will be available for lend-
ing as  the  result of the European In-
vestment Bank's (E!B)  decision in mid-
June to double its subscribed capital to 
EUA  14.4 billion. This will allow for a 
corresponding increase in tpe lending 
capacity,  which  is  limited  to  a  per-
centage of the subscribed capital. 
The increase allows the  EIB  to meet 
the expanded fina~cial and investment 
needs in the EC  countries during this 
econorriic crisis period. The move comes 
after a  year of growing loan activity 
with investments in the Community still 
concentrated in Italy, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom.  An  appreciable up-
turn  in  lending  also  has  occurred  in 
Belgium and Denmark. Loans from EIB 
own resources increased by 20 percent 
for. EC  countries in  1980, and nearly 
EUA 20 million was channeled through 
the  New Community  Instrument for 
borrowing. 
Projects receiving EIB  assistance last 
year were estimated to have created or 
_safeguarded  about 49,000 jobs in  the 
member states, including about 16,000 
jobs in Ireland alone. Most loans went 
for regional development in areas with 
unemployment rates above 25 percent. 
Projects  included  industrial  develop-
ment, irrigation, water supply and sew-
age  treatment,  telecommunications, 
electricity, gas  supply, and transport. 
The EIB also lent almost EUA550 million 
for industrial, mining, energy, and in-
frastructure  investments  in  30 devel-
oping countries  associated  with  the 
Community through  the  Lome  Con-
vention and other agreements. 
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approval or recommendation of  these publications, which can be purchased 
or ordered from most booksellers. 
Dumping: A Manual on the EEC 
AntiDumping Law and Procedure. By 
Clive Stanbrook. European Business 
Publications, London, 1980. 162 
pages. $50.00. 
Practical guide to procedures and 
principles of EC anti-dumping policy; 
includes details of the anti-dumping 
code of the latest Tokyo round of 
trade negotiations and the EC  regula-
tions adopted in December 1979. 
Industrial Democracy in Europe. By 
Industrial Democracy in Europe In-
ternational Research Group. Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1981. 
449 pages. $59.00. 
A systematic international compar-
ison of the effects of national 
schemes for employee participation; 
covers 10 West European countries 
plus Yugoslavia and Israel. Investi-
gates how formal rules and regula-
tions for participation affect the dis-
tribution of influence and power, 
how the changes in law bring about 
changes in structure and behavior, 
and what conditions make for the 
success and failure of legislation to 
increase worker participation. 
European Industrial Relations. By In-
dustrial Democracy in Europe Indus-
trial Research Group. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York, 1981. 278 
pages. $45.00. 
An analytical study of the effects 
of national schemes for employee 
participation in industry. Discusses 
the relationship between industrial 
relations and industrial democracy in 
Europe with reference to existing and 
possible future sets of institutions 
and processes. 
Energy Statistics 1980: Consumption 
of Energy Sources of the European 
Chemical Industry for Feedstock and 
Fuel. European Council of Chemical 
Manufacturers' Federations, Brussels, 
1981. 2 Volumes. 
Volume 1 reviews the energy con-
sumption of the European chemical 
industry for feedstock and fuel  uses 
in the years 1974 to 1979, focusing 
on the member states of the EC. Vol-
ume 2 forecasts to 1989 the use of 
energy sources for feedstock and fuel 
by the chemical industry. 
Employment, Trade and North-South 
Co-operation. Edited by Geoffrey 
Renshaw. International Labor Office, 
Washington DC, 1981. 263 pages. 
$15.70. 
A study consisting of a broad anal-
ysis of the problems of employment 
and North-South trade in the 1980s, 
and a review of the adjustment poli-
54  EuRoPE September-October 1981 
cies pursued in four advanced indus-
trialized countries in the past decade. 
EC Competition Law: A Practitioner's 
Textbook. By Alan Cambell. North-
Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam 
and New York, 1980, 357 pages, 
$53.75. 
Reviews  development of EC anti-
trust law up to January 1, 1980. De-
scribes, for the practitioner, the law 
as it has evolved through Commis-
sion, Court of Justice and national 
court decisions. Includes a table of 
cases and an index. 
The Future of the World Motor In-
dustry. By Krish Bhaskar. Nichols 
Publishing Co., New York, 1980. 
385 pages. $42.50. 
Describes the background and 
structure of the world motor indus-
try, identifying the mature, emergent, 
and infant markets; examines the 
economic, political, and social con-
straints on producers; and analyzes 
the effects of local market forces, the 
energy problem, and the effects of 
the cyclical shifts in production on 
the industry. 
Industrial Relations in International 
Perspective. Edited by Peter B.  Doer-
inger. Holmes &  Meier Publishers, 
Inc., New York, 1981. 425 pages. 
$35.00. 
An introduction to industrial rela-
tions in advanced market economies 
and reference guide to the important 
works in the field.  Provides a com-
prehensive review of research and 
policy studies on industrial relations 
and multinational issues in eight ma-
jor industrial nations. 
The Reluctant Ally: France and the 
Atlantic Security. By Michael M. 
Harrison. Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, 1981. 304 pages. 
$24.00. 
Evaluates French alliance policies 
through the Fourth and Fifth Repub-
lics; provides an extensive discussion 
and analysis of the Socialist Party 
with focus on French President Fran-
<;ois  Mitterrand; examines the pres-
ent status of NATO in light of politi-
cal and strategic problems such as 
those posed by independent allied 
nuclear forces and the uncertain en-
vironment of detente. 
Quest for World Monetary Order: 
The Gold-Dollar System and its 
Aftermath. By Milton Gilbert. John 
Wiley &  Sons, New York, 1980. 255 
pages. $21.95. 
An analytical history of the inter-
national monetary system from the 
Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 
to the late 1970s; evaluates the ideas 
that governed US policy toward the 
dollar after 1960 and outlines the 
roots of the US  deficit. 
La Pensee Europeenne et Atlantique 
de Paul-Henri Spaak (1942-1972). 
Edited by Paul-F. Smets. Fondation 
P.-H. Spaak, Brussels.  1,251 pages, 2 
volumes. 
An anthology of selected papers 
and speeches by Paul-Henri Spaak on 
the construction of the European 
Community and the integration of 
Europe; provides insight into the 
ideas and thoughts of Paul-Henri 
Spaak through personal letters, notes, 
memos, speeches, drafts, articles, and 
conferences. 
Director of European Associations. 
Part 1: National Industrial, Trade 
and Professional Associations. Gale 
Research Co., Detroit, 1981. 504 
pages. $175.00. 
Provides updated information on 
approximately 9,000 national associ-
ations, organizations, and regional 
groups; covers a wide range of in-
dustries and activities such as adver-
tising, banking, data processing, and 
electronics; offers most information 
in English, French, and German. 
The E.E.C. Grain Market Regulation 
1980/81. By Alfred C. Toepfer Inter-
national, Hamburg, 1980. 83  pages. 
A practical brochure providing in-
formation on EC grain market regu-
lation; explains its basic features, of-
fers impressions, and analyzes the 
major changes applying in 1980-81. 
The Challenges of the New Interna-
tional Economic Order. Edited by 
Edwin P.  Reubens. Westview Press, 
Boulder, CO, 1981. 298 pages. 
$26.50 hardcover. $12.00 paperback. 
Collection of papers presented at a 
conference on the New International 
Economic Order at CUNY in April 
1979. Explores the issues involved in 
the current proposals in the United 
Nations for reconstructing the exist-
ing economic relations between less 
developed and more developed coun-
tries. 
European Community ~aw  and Na-
tional Law: The Irreversible Transfer? 
By John Usher. Allen & Unwin, Inc. 
1981. 96 pages. $15.95 cloth, $6.95 
paper. 
Explains the legal mechanisms by 
which Community rules become en-
forceable within the Member States 
and how they relate to national laws; 
examines how Community powers 
have developed in the Common Agri-
cultural Policy, the common com-
mercial policy, and the harmoniza-
tion of law. 
Policies for Interdependence. By 
James Elles. Conservative Political 
Centre, London, 1980. 63  pages. 
A pamphlet on the debate concern-
ing UK membership of the EC, from 
day-to-day issues to wider political 
considerations. Concentrates on the 
concept of interdependence in rela-
tion to external as well as internal 
policy. Examines how the EC and 
the Commonwealth can Strengthen 
the ties between their member coun-
tries to their mutual advantage. 
International Litigation. Edited by 
Steven J. Stein. Practising Law Insti-
tute, NY, 1980. 557 pages. $25.00. 
A comprehensive guide to interna-
tional litigation; covers international 
litigation and federal subject matter 
jurisdiction, selection of the appro-
priate US  forum, foreign evidence 
proceedings, international commer-
cial arbitration, enforcing arbitral 
awards, the Iranian assets litigation, 
and the Westinghouse uranium litiga-
tion. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Three 
Years After Passage. Edited by Wal-
lace L Timmeny and Robert B. von 
Mehren. Practising Law Institute, 
New York, 1981. 495 pages. $25.00. 
An extensive study of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977; fo-
cuses on the international aspects of 
the accounting provisions of the act, 
the provisions against bribery expe-
diting and facilitating payments, cor-
porate misconduct, enforcement de-
velopments, and a company's 
responsibilities under the accounting 
provisions. 
West Germany: Politics &  Society. 
By David Childs and Jeffrey Johnson. 
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1981. 
231 pages. $25.00. 
A comprehensive and up-to-date 
review of the political, social, and 
economic aspe~  of West Germany, 
focusing on the basic law, parties, 
Bundestag, and Government. Also 
covers education, the armed forces, 
welfare services, the role of women, 
the economy and industrial relations, 
and the mass media. Provides a bibli-
ography at the end of each chapter. 
Studies in International Law. By R.C. 
Hingorani. Oceana Publications, 
Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1981. 115 pages. 
$30.00. 
Analyzes the controversy of Eu-
roPe-oriented international law and 
its binding or non-binding effects 
Upon the newly independent states. 
Covers areas such as recent develop-
ments in the regime of the sea, trends 
in air laws, and laws of war. 
The Italian Communist Party. By 
Grant Amyot. St. Martin's Press, 
New York, 1981. 252 pages. $25.00. 
Studies the development of Euro-
communism and the Italian Commu-
nist Party's (PCI)  strategy from 1926 
to 1956, the rise and fall of the In-
grao Left, the MaQifesto Affair, and 
other events and topics relating to 
the formulation of the PCI. 
Legal Aspects of Doing Business with 
Japan. Edited by Isaac Shapiro. Prac-
tising Law Institute, New York, 
1981. 227 pages. $25.00. A practical guide to doing business 
with japan; covers legal aspects such 
as the protection of industrial prop-
erty rights, foreign investment, acqui-
sitions, labor-management relations, 
trade barriers, dispute resolution, 
bank policies, and foreign exchange 
law. 
Muir of HUI\tershill. By Christina 
Bewley,  Oxford University Press, 
New York,  19~1. $24.95. 
A biographical a~co~nt of the ex-
traordinary and adventurous life of 
Thomas Muir, the Scottish political 
reformer of the late 1700s; sets out 
the achievements of the movement 
for reform in Scotland. 
Foreign Tax Plallfling 1981. Edited 
by Marshall J.  Langer and RoyAl-
bert Povell. Practising Law lqstitute, 
New York, l981. 776 pages. $25.00. 
A course handbook on foreign tax 
planning addressing such topics as 
new income tax treaty developments, 
expatriation, foreign investors in US 
real estate, foreign charitable organi-
zations, and the Foreign Investment 
in Real Property Tax Act of 1980. 
The Integration of the European 
Economy Since 1815. By Sidney Pol-
lard. Allen &  Unwin, Inc., Winches-
ter, MA, 1981. 109 pages. $15.95 
doth, $6.95 paper. 
Describes the process of economic 
integration in Europe since 1815 in a 
chronological sequence; demonstrates 
how open frontiers speeded progress; 
focuses on the spread of industriali-
zation from Britain to the Continent. 
Romania in the 1980's. Edited by 
Daniel N. Nelson. Westview Press, 
Boulder, CO, 1981. 313 pages. 
$24.00. 
- A compilation of essays addressing 
the subject of Romania's develop-
ment as a Communist state; analyzes 
the leaders and citizens in Romanian 
politics and discusses the country's 
fore~~ and economic policies. 
Eastern Europe in the 1980's. Edited 
by Stephen Fiscqer-Galati. Westview 
Press, Boqlder, CO, 1981. 291 pages. 
$26.95 doth, $11.50 paper. 
A collection of essays by 10 East 
European specialists on political and 
economic cievelopments in Eastern 
Europe, focusing on agriculture, in-
dustrialization, trade, education, and 
cultural development. 
Domestic and International Licensing 
of Technology 1980. By Tom Arnold 
and J. Thomas McCarthy. Practising 
Law Institute, New York, 1980. 686 
pages. $25.00. 
A course handl:>aok analyzing do-
mestic and international licensing of 
technology;  fo~uses on topics such as 
patent license restrictions, US  anti-
trust arid misuse law for licensors 
and licetiSees, patents and trade se-
cr~ts, and the new copyright act. 
Legal A,pects of Doing Business with 
B~ack Africa. Edited by Donald R. 
Allen. Practising Law Institute, New 
York, 1981. 1,180 pages. 2 volumes. 
$25 .00/volume. 
A comprehensive analysis of the le-
gal aspects of doing business in Af-
rica; covers problems such as con-
tracting with Governments in black 
Africa, large and long-term invest-
ments, small investments, settlement 
of disputes, and the problems of en-
forcement in the host and third 
countries. 
Exploring Europe. Edited by Colin 
Joy. Sussex European Research Cen-
ter, University of Sussex, Sussex, 
England. 
A magazine devoted to studies of 
topics of importance in contempo-
rary Europe such as rural depopula-
tion, nuclear po\}'er, human rights, 
and the European Parliament; writ-
ten for the secondary school level. 
Drafting Documents in Plain Lan-
guage 1981. Edited by Richard A. 
Givens. Practising Law Institute, 
New York, 1981. 312 pages. $25.00. 
A practical guide to incorporating 
plain language into the legal system; 
covers the New York "Plain Lan-
guage" law, plain language in con-
sumer contracts and insurance, draft-
ing regulations in plain language, and 
defenses against charges of violation 
of "Plain Language" law. 
Everyman in Europe. Volume 1: The 
Preindustrial Millennia. By Allan 
Mitchell and Istvan Deak. Prentice-
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 
1981. 450 pages. $10.95. 
A compendium of essays present-
ing an account of the life, leisure, 
and work of ordinary people in Eu-
rope from classical times to the pres-
ent. Focuses on the daily existence of 
peasants, laborers, women, and 
youths; volume I covers ancient 
Greece and Rome to early modern 
Europe. 
Everyman in Europe. Volume ll: The 
Industrial Centuries. By Allan Mitch-
ell and Istvan Deak. Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981. 
450 pages. $9.95. 
An anthology of essays by social 
historians, providing an account of 
the life, leisure, and work of ordinary 
people in Europe from the Industrial 
Revolution to the present. Focuses on 
the daily existence of laborers, 
women, and youths. 
The Sea Fisheries of the European 
Community in ihe Context of En-
largement. By David I.A. Steel. White 
Fish Authority, Edinburg, 1977. 
Available from Unipub, New York. 
22 pages. 
A report on the fisheries question 
in the negotiations leading to the 
accession of Spain, Portugal, and 
Greece; highlights the relative impor-
tance of the fishing industry in the 
aspirant member countries, in partic-
ular Spain; presents related statistical 
information. 
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
POSTWAR ITALY 
From the Old to the New 
Center Left 
Norman Kogan 
Discusses  Italia  ism  and 
communism, t  gm~  social 
climate,  de  nts  m  the 
trade unio  ent, political 
stresses  in  70s,  economic 
and  social  ises  and  political 
reactions,  and  initial  moves 
toward a grand coalition. 
200 pp., 1981,  $22.95,  056653-3 
WEST GERMANY AND THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
Changing Interests and 
Competing Policy 0  ·  ectives 
Wenner Feld 
Examines  the 
Germany vis-
Communit 
many's  ~  policy  motiva-
tions as the  ave evolved in the 
last thirty years and by discussing 
the  evolution of public  opinion 
in  Germany  with  respect  to  the 
Community. 
ca.  176 pp., 1981,  ca.  $19.95, 
058019-6 
FOREIGN WORKERS IN 
WESTERN EUROPE 
An Emerging Political Force 
Mark J. Miller 
Illustrates  how  for  workers 
are  emer~ing as  'cal force 




and Switzer  d and documents 
ways  in  which  the workers  take 
on  significance  in  both  foreign 
and domestic politics. 




The Role of Public Opinion 
Research 
edited by W. Phillips Davison 
and Leon Gordenker 
Presents  a  large  amount  of 
public opinion data gathered by 
the  authors  and  not  previously 
available  to  scholars.  Con-
tributors present information on 
Spain and the Basques, the Arab 
minority  in  Israel,  northern 
Ireland,  the  Philippine  "Moro" 
problem,  and  Belgium.  Written 
under the auspices of  the Center 
of  International Studies,  Prince-
ton University. 
256 pp., 1980,  $25.50,  056229-5 
NATIONS WITHOUT 
A STATE 
Ethnic Minorities in 
Western Europe 
edited by Charles R. Foster 
Examines the emergence of ethnic 
groups in conflict with  dominant 
political,  cultural,  and economic 
forces  in  Western  Europe.  Con-
tributors  focus  on  the  Scottish, 
Welsh,  Basques,  ·Bretons,  Cor-
sicans,  the  Occitans,  and  the 
South Tyrol and the Jura. 
224 pp., 1980,  $24.50,  056807-2 
DEFENSE POLITICS OF THE 
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 
edited by Edwin H. Fedder 
Distingmshed by  its  emphasis on 
the  rational  perspectives  and 
policies  of the  key  Western  alli-
ance  partners,  with  implications 
for  their  roles  in  common  de-
fense.  Published  in  cooperation 
with  The  Committee on Atlantic 
Studies,  Washington,  D.C. 
208 pp., 1980,  $23.50,  058018-8 
THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY AND THE 
THIRD WORLD 
The Lome Convention and 
Its Impact 
Ellen Frey-Wouters 
"This book makes a timely con-
tribution  to  the  ongoing debate 
over  North-South  economic 
issues . . . ,,  -Perspective 
Clarifies the growing role of the 
EEC  in  the  North-South  dia-
logue  and  its  response  to 
pressures from the Thud World. 
304 pp., 1980,  $26.50,  055746-1 
PREJUDICE AND 
TOLERANCE IN IRELAND 
Michael MacGreil 
Explores  the  attitudes  and 
dispositions of a random sample 
of 3,000 Dublin adults in regard 
to  a  wide  range  of  ethnic, 
political, occupational, religious, 
and  social  categories.  A  com-
prehensive  theoretical  explana-
tion  of  dominant-minority  at-
titudes and behavior is presented 
and the theoretical and political 
implications  of  P.luralism  are 
discussed and clanfied. 
634 pp., 1980,  $34.95,  056718-2 To order the publications  listed below, please check the desired
items and fill out the order blank. Mail to the European Com-
munity Information Servic e, 2L00 M Sreet, NW, Suite 707,
Washington, DC 20037, (202) 862-9540. In the New York
area copies can be ordered from the European  Communiry
Informaiion  Service,245 East 47th Street, New York, NY L0017,
(212) 37t-3804. Telephone orders are also welcome.
tr The Couft of Justice  of the Euro-
pean Communities.  European Docu'
gouerntttent  budgets, h ouseh old con-
sumption, moftq rates, health,  edu-
cation,  general econotnic  indicators,
agriculture, trade, trf,nsport, tourism,
and data on tlre EC institutions.
n EC Raw Materials Balance Sheets
1975-1978.  Statistical  Office, Lux-
embourgo 1981, 253 pages......$17.50
Supply balance sheets for 21 strdtegi-
cally sensitiue  raw tnaterials.  De-
scription of the metbodology  used,
analysis of Community balances,  and
compffisons uith tbird countries,
Couers  world tesert)es, self-suffi-
ciency of the EC, dependency of
third countries,  and a technico-eco-
nomic commentdry.
f) New Programme for Consumers.
European  F/e No. 13181, Commis-
sion, Brussels, 1981, 7 pages........free
Description of general consumer pol-
icy programs  and specifically  the sec-
ond Eurapean  coflsumer protection
program adopted  in Mry L981.
fi[Reflections on the Common Agri-
cultural Policy. Bulletin of tbe Ewo-
pean Communities,  Suppletnent No.
6/8O Commission,  Brussels,  198L,
34 pages  ...free
Communication from the Commis-
sion to the Cauncil on December  8,
798A, on future approaches to the
Common  Agricubural  Policy.
fl European Investment Bank An-
nual Report 1980. European Invest-
ment Bank, Luxembourg, 1981, 100
pages ........  ..................free
Reuiew of the Bank's  borrowing  and
lending  operations  in the Commu-
nity, the Mediterranean,  and the Af-
rican, Caribbean, and Pacific coun-
tries belonging  to the Lomi
Conuention.  lncludes  the balance
sheet and profit and loss account.
I  Report from the Commission  of
the European Cornmunities  to the
Council Pursuant to the Mandate of
30 May 1980. Bulletin of the Eura-
pean Communities,  Supplement No.
1/87, Commission,  Brussels,  1981,
23 pages  ...free
Commission  paper reuiewing  the op-
eration  and funding af Communiry
policies.
Brochure  on the methods of adminis'
tering Community aid. Couers aid
prograrnming,  proi ect preparatlon
and appraisal,  preparation of financ-
ing decisions, prciect execution *nd
final eualuation.
n The Key to Information  in Eu-
rope. Commission,  Luxembourg,
198 1, 10 pages.............................free
Pamphlet  on the Euronet  DIANE itt-
formation  netuork.
I  Forestry  Statistics  1973-1977,  Sta-
tistical Office, Luxembourg, 1981,
143 pages  ..............$11.00
7981 yearbook.
n Fisheries: Catches  by Region
1967-1979. Statistical  Office, Lux-
embourg, 1981, 221 pages......$25.50
1981 vearbook.
I  Integrated  Development  of Moun-
tain Areas: The Alpine Region. Re-
gional Policy  Series No. 20, Commis-
sion, Brussels,  1981, 90 pages...$4.45
Summing up of the efforts made to
prontote deuelopment of EuroPe's
hill and mountain areas.
-$ipeglomeration  Policies in the Eu-
''rofean Community: A Comparative
Study. Regional Policy Series No. 18,
Commission,  Brussels, L981, 248
pages ........  .............$23.00
Examines  regional  disincentiue  poli-
cies in the EC designed  to encourage
firms to moue from areas of ouercon-
centration of economic actiuity into
areas in need of employment.
fl Potato Products: Production and
Markcts in the European Communi-
ties. lnformation on Agriculture No.
75, Commission,  Brussels, 1981, 224
pages ........  ...............$5.60
Detailed  examination of the potato
pracessing industry in each member
state.
tr The Problems of Oriental To-
bacco Production in the EC,lnfor-
mation on Agriculture No.72, Com-
mission,  Brussels,  1981, 300 pages
"""""""$8'50
Study on the production and process-
ing of oiental tobacco in ltaly,
Greece, and Turkey and the EC and
world ttarkets for oriental tobacco.
mentation No. L187, Commission,
Brussels, Lg}l, 43 pages ..............fte" fl The Community LEd O5d9r, Eu'
Booklet' on thi poieiq composition,  roqedn Perspectiues,  Commission,
and operation  ol the iourt o1 1"s-  Brussels,  1980, 145 pages......-.$5.00
tice.  By Jean'Yictor  Louis. Study of the
n rhe European community' '  'E:H,]|;',::;':X:; ffi'r;f;i:::'f!,
Transport lgt.L European.Docu'  between iommunity  and national 
-
tnentation No. 2187, Commission,  law.
Brussels,  1987, 37 pages ..............free  .. .t,
Brochuie  on the aims"and achieue- fi,European Regional Development
tnents  of a common  ffdnspart policy../Fuhd Fifth Annual \.po* (1979\.
Commission,  Brussels,  1980, 101
Order Blank
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Please send me the sales items checked
and
il Bill me
fl My check for $
is enclosed.
pages ........  .............$12.00
Report on the actiuities of the Re-
gional Fund in 1979 and develoP'
ments in regional  policy.
I  Compandium  of Community Pro-
visions on Social Security. Commis'
sion, Brussels,  1980, 389
pages ........  .............$54.00
Cotmpilation  of official texts, briefs
of iudgments  of the Court of Justice,
and decisions and recornmendations
of the Administratiue Comtnission  on




ICELANDAIR HAS MADE 
EUROPE AFFORDABLE. 
THIS YEAR IS NO EXCEPTION. 
NY TO LUXEMBOURG 
s 
ROUNDTRIP  ROUNDTRIP 
SEPTEMBER 15 TO  OCTOBER 31, 1981  NOVEMBER 1  TO MARCH 31, 1982 
Apex fare. Stay 7-60 days. 
14 day advance purchase required . Seats limited. 
S570 NORMAL FARE. 
No restriction on stays to 1  year. 
D Free bus service from Luxembourg to Frankfurt, Cologne, 
Dusseldorf, Bitburg, Mannheim and Wuppertal,  Germany. D Bargain 
car rentals for as little as $109/week. D Confirmed reservation. D Free 
wine with dinner, cognac after. D Free stop in Iceland for fantastic duty 
free shopping. D Bargain Stopover Tours of Iceland for as little as 
$30.00/day including hotel, transfers, sightseeing, and some meals. 
Purchase tickets in U.S. Fares and other prices subject to change 
without notice. See your travel agent or call 800-555-1212 for the toll free 
reservations number in your area. 
Apex fare. Stay 7-60 days. 
14 day advance purchase required . Seats limited. 
S549 NORMAL FARE. 
No restriction on stays to 1  year. 
NOW MORE THAN EVER YOUR BEST VALUE  TO EUROPE 
ICELANDAIR~ 